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The haciendas lie abandoned; semi-tropical growth burst from a 
thousand crannies, wreathing these monuments of a dead past in a 
wilderness of flowers.  Green lizards dart through the deserted 
chapels.  The bells which summoned to toil and to worship are 
silent.  The peons are free.  But they are not contented. 
 
-Ernest Gruening on Morelos, Mexico and its Heritage, New York: Appleton 
Century Croft, 1928, 162. 
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 Studies on the state of Morelos and its role in the Mexican Revolution (1910-
1920) have tended to focus on the origins of the conflict or the fighting itself rather than 
the outcomes of the insurgency led by Emiliano Zapata (1879-1919).  This dissertation, 
instead, analyzes the aftermath of the revolution in Morelos by providing a new political 
and environmental history of the state in the 1920s and 1930s.  It argues that previous 
conceptualizations of the region’s villages as being motivated by either moral or 
economic factors are by themselves insufficient to explain the diversity of pueblos, or 
rural communities, in Morelos.  Rather, this study uses Mexico’s historically-rooted, 
liberal concept of village sovereignty to integrate moral, economic, and cultural 
interpretations of village behaviors in post-revolutionary Morelos.  The idea of what it 
meant to be a sovereign village, however, evolved in the 1920s and 1930s to include new 
political and institutional ties to centralized government in Mexico City.  Rural 
engagement with the post-revolutionary state in fact strengthened local control over 
elections, natural resources, and primary schools vis-à-vis old elites now in retreat during 
 ix 
this period.  Villagers, meanwhile, constantly dialogued with national authorities over the 
aims of federal state-building policies and negotiated the terms of the region’s loyalty to 
Mexico City.                
 x 
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 1 
Introduction: Reinterpreting the Role of the Pueblos of Morelos in Post-
revolutionary Mexican History 
The Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) devastated the villages, or pueblos, of Morelos—a 
small state south of Mexico City.  Almost ten years of warfare reduced the population of 
the state by two fifths from almost 180,000 residents in 1910 to just 103,000 people a 
decade later.  As one observer described the state of affairs in Morelos in 1920:  
its inhabitants, who emigrated to other states in the country during the last decade, 
have not all returned to their homes.  There is no sugar production; work that was 
once a source of wealth for mill workers, no longer exists.  Urban property is 
mostly destroyed. Government offices are disorganized…education 
establishments have no defined curriculum and lack supplies…schools buildings 
have even deteriorated.  Commerce…is reduced to a bare minimum.
1
  
With the end of fighting in 1920, however, there began a transition to a period of relative 
peace, allowing the state’s inhabitants to resettle the countryside and rebuild their 
villages.  As Tetelcingo’s inhabitants remembered it, the hour had arrived for “the new 
work of reconstruction.”2  The pueblos, in other words, would reconstitute themselves; 
yet in many respects the post-revolutionary world looked much different from that of the 
pre-revolutionary past.  Indeed, the idea of what it meant to be a pueblo would change as 
the region’s agrarian communities established themselves anew and participated in the 
construction of the post-revolutionary state over the course of the 1920s and 1930s.   
  The villages of Morelos have received a particular amount of attention from 
academics within Mexico and abroad.3  This is largely because Morelos was home to the 
                                                 
1 AGN, Particulares, Genovevo de la O, caja 24, exp. 1, f. 31, Dr. Manuel Mazari to De la O, 3 June 1920. 
2 AGA, Dotación de Tierras, Tetelcingo (Cuautla), exp. 23/2980, f.4, Refugio Rodríguez to José Parres, 12 
October 1920. 
3 Notable early studies for Morelos include Robert Redfield, Tepoztlan, a Mexican Village; a Study of Folk 
Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930); Oscar Lewis, Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlán 
Restudied (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951); Eric R. Wolf, “Closed Corporate Peasant 
Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 13, no. 1 (1957): 
1-18. 
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zapatista revolt, the iconic revolutionary movement for “land and liberty” led by 
Emiliano Zapata in the 1910s, which today still stands as a national symbol of social 
justice.4  For the same reason, Morelos has proved fruitful ground for scholars seeking to 
explain the nature and behavior of rural communities; why they do or do not rebel; and 
how villages operate internally and with the outside world.  For all that historians have 
studied the origins of the zapatista uprising and the subsequent insurgency of 1911-1920, 
however, the outcomes of the local revolution in the 1920s and 1930s—the topic and 
period of this dissertation—have received significantly less attention.  Traditionally, 
authors have also tended to conceptualize Morelos’s rural communities by arguing that 
their behavior was driven by either moral or economic impulses.5  This did not change 
much even in the 1990s, when research on Mexican rural communities began to 
emphasize “popular culture” as the terrain whereby popular actors and the architects of 
the Mexican national state “negotiated” a post-revolutionary consensus.6  Yet as this 
dissertation demonstrates, these previous analytical frameworks by themselves are 
insufficient to understand Morelos’s integration into the post-revolutionary state.   
This study takes the irresolvable tension between economic and moral 
interpretations of village behaviors as a starting point for analysis of the diversity and 
                                                 
4 Samuel Brunk, The Posthumous Career of Emiliano Zapata: Myth, Memory, and Mexico’s Twentieth 
Century (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008); John Womack, Jr., ed., Rebellion in Chiapas: An 
Historical Reader (New York: New Press, 1999). 
5 While the present study contains its hypothesis specifically to Morelos, the debate on the nature of rural 
communities includes studies of village life in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  For two classic works on 
Southeast Asia, see James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in 
Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The 
Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).   For a 
more recent treatment of the subject involving rural rebellion and the closed corporate community model in 
Latin America, see Jim Handy, Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in 
Guatemala, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). 
6 The seminal volume of this scholarship is G. M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., Everyday Forms of State 
Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1994). 
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nuances of the Mexican countryside.  I argue that between the violent period of village 
decomposition in the 1910s and the revival of rural society in the 1920s and 1930s, the 
idea what it meant to be “a pueblo” evolved to include new political and institutional ties 
to centralized government in Mexico City.  The revolutionary war shattered rural 
solidarity and at the forefront of the reconstruction process reemerged Mexico’s 
historically-rooted, liberal concept of village sovereignty.  Yet unlike in the past, village 
sovereignty could now be negotiated more effectively with Mexico City through a 
plethora of new institutions and even buttressed by ties to the federal government.  In 
order to begin exploring the pueblos’ evolution, this introductory chapter does four 
things: it first reviews the literature on post-revolutionary Morelos; secondly, it elaborates 
on the concept of village sovereignty; thirdly, it presents the dissertation’s research 
findings; and finally, it concludes with a note on sources.    
Historiography 
The literature on the zapatista revolt is as old as the peace in Morelos,7 yet most works 
within this large historiography essentialize the pueblos rather than historicize them in 
nuanced, complex shades.  Initial portrayals by urbanites and the Mexico City press 
imagined Zapata and his country followers as a savage country horde set on destroying 
                                                 
7 For three historiographical essays on Morelos and zapatismo, see Felipe Ávila Espinosa, “La 
historiografía del zapatismo después de John Womack,” in Estudios sobre el zapatismo, ed. Laura Espejel 
López (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 2000); Felipe Ávila Espinosa, “La 
historiografía del zapatismo,” in Historia de Morelos, vol. 7: Tierra, gente, tiempos del sur, ed. Felipe 
Ávila Espinosa, (Cuernavaca: H. Congreso del Estado de Morelos, 2010); Brígida von Mentz, “Miradas 
recientes sobre las tierras de Zapata. Notas historiográficas sobre el estado de Morelos,” in Historiografía 
regional de México. Siglo XX, eds. José Mario Contreras Valdez, Pedro Luna Jiménez, and Pablo Serrano 
Álvarez (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 2009).  See 
also the essays in María Herrerías Guerra, ed., Construcciones de género en la historiografía zapatista 
(1911-1919) (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios para el Adelanto de las Mujeres de la Equidad de Género, 
2010).  More broadly, for bibliographic commentaries on Morelos history, see Domingo Díez, Bibliografía 
del Estado de Morelos (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1933) and Lorena Careaga 
Viliesid, Morelos, bibliografía comentada (Mexico City: Instituto Mora, 1990). 
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civilization itself.  Zapata became known infamously as the “Attila of the South,” 
implying a personalist, barbarian struggle.  Later accounts by veterans of the war and the 
personal associates of Zapata established the positive qualities of rural Morelos.  Among 
the most influential early works are accounts by Zapata’s former secretaries and 
ideologues: Gildardo Magaña, who, before his death in 1939, had published three of five 
volumes entitled Emiliano Zapata y el agrarismo en México; and Antonio Díaz Soto y 
Gama, who wrote extensively in newspapers and taught at the national university after 
serving in the Chamber of Deputies in the 1920s.8  Both of these authors extolled the 
virtues of their former chief and martyred leader.  Each looked to the ancient and colonial 
past to trace the roots of discontent in the countryside, and each offered romantic portraits 
of the pueblos.  Soto y Gama’s and Magaña’s villages were indigenous, autonomous, 
egalitarian, homogenous, and timeless, if encroached upon by expanding sugar estates 
since the sixteenth century.   
At the national university, moreover, Soto y Gama taught Jesús Sotelo Inclán, 
author of the classic Raíz y razón de Zapata published in 1943.  Sotelo Inclán was the 
first to gain access to the historical documents of Zapata’s home village and narrate the 
agrarian struggles of Anenecuilco through the centuries, providing both the historical 
background and ideological justification for the 1911 rebellion.  It was also Sotelo Inclán 
who first traced the essence of the pueblo back to the pre-Hispanic calpulli—a village 
institution that distributed communal lands worked by the families of the agrarian 
settlement.  The calpulli, wrote Sotelo Inclán, was “effectively a human group, united by 
                                                 
8 Gildardo Magaña and Carlos Pérez Guerrero, Emiliano Zapata y el agrarismo en México (Mexico City: 
Editorial Ruta, 1951).  For a collection of Soto y Gama’s newspaper writings, see Antonio Díaz Soto y 
Gama, El pensamiento de Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama a través de 50 anõs de labor periodística, 1899-1949, 
ed. Román Iglesias González (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1997).  By the 
early 1940s, Soto y Gama had also penned a general history of agrarianism in Mexico that was lost until 
recently.  See Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama, Historia del agrarismo en México, ed. Pedro Castro (Mexico 
City: Era, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 2002). 
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blood and kinship.”9  This notion of the pueblo as a tight-knit family unit became the 
cornerstone of a closed and communitarian vision of zapatismo.  Raíz y razón de Zapata 
places the pueblo at the center of a long defensive struggle for its land with Anenecuilco 
taken as the exemplary village of Morelos.  The “root and reason” of Zapata are the 
community itself and the surrounding lands that sustain the community’s livelihood.  As 
in Magaña’s and Soto y Gama’s portrayals, the pueblo is portrayed as being internally 
cohesive, besieged before the revolution by land-hungry sugar planters.10   
Post-revolutionary anthropologists also contributed to the study of Morelos.  The 
village of Tepoztlán, in particular, located at the base of the Ajusco Mountains, 
welcomed two distinguished twentieth-century anthropologists, Robert Redfield and 
Oscar Lewis.  Redfield lived and studied in Tepoztlán in 1926-1927, while Lewis studied 
the village in 1943-1944 and 1947 with a large research team.  After their respective field 
studies, Redfield and Lewis engaged in a classic debate concerning the nature of peasant 
communities that has shaped scholars’ understanding of the rural world.  Like Soto y 
Gama and Sotelo Inclán, Redfield’s book, Tepoztlan, stressed communal solidarity and 
the cycle of religious and agricultural rituals that bound the surrounding hamlets to the 
municipal seat of Tepoztlán.11  Lewis, instead, focused on the political economy of 
Tepoztlán and found internal divisions, factionalism, and struggles over power and 
wealth rife in the village.12  Lewis also criticized Redfield for neglecting poverty and the 
                                                 
9 Jesús Sotelo Inclán, Raíz y razón de Zapata, Anenecuilco, second edition (Mexico City: Editorial CFE, 
1943/1970), 25. 
10 John Steinbeck’s screenplay Viva Zapata! and the subsequent film directed by Elia Kaza in 1952 
represent the English counterparts to these foundational works chronicling the history of zapatismo in 
Morelos.  John Steinbeck, Zapata, ed. Robert Eustis Morsberger (New York: Penguin Books, 1993). 
11 Robert Redfield, Tepoztlan. 
12 Oscar Lewis, Life in a Mexican Village.  Lewis also published oral histories of a family in Tepoztlán.  
See Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sánchez, Autobiography of a Mexican Family (New York: Random 
House, 1961); Oscar Lewis, Pedro Martínez: A Mexican Peasant and His Family (New York: Random 
House, 1964). 
 6 
darker aspects of life in the pueblo.  In his later book, The Little Community, Redfield 
responded to Lewis by accepting some of the criticisms, noting that anthropological 
methodology had evolved in the years between their monographs.  He believed the 
different cultural and personal values of the investigators also explained the academic 
breach.  Redfield’s defense was most eloquent when he concluded that “the hidden 
question behind my book is, ‘What do these people enjoy?’ The hidden question behind 
Dr. Lewis’s book is, ‘What do these people suffer from?’”13  Redfield’s positive notion of 
“folk society,” we might add, was reprised in an influential article by Eric Wolf in 1957, 
albeit one later critiqued widely in anthropology, history, and the social sciences.  Wolf 
argued that villages in Mesoamerica (including Morelos) are “closed corporate peasant 
communities” where membership is exclusive to those born and raised in the rural 
settlement.  The pueblo as a whole controls surrounding lands and redistributes surplus 
wealth to public works and religious festivities.  Although criticized today for being too 
rigid and isolated, Wolf’s concept of the closed corporate community steered the author 
of probably the most famous book on Morelos.14 
John Womack Jr.’s Zapata and the Mexican Revolution stands not just among the 
most widely read and cited works on modern Morelos, but on Mexico.15  With its pithy 
                                                 
13 Robert Redfield, The Little Community, and Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), 136.  For an article that analyzes the different interpretations between Redfield and 
Lewis, see Phillip K. Bock, “Tepoztlán Reconsidered,” Journal of Latin American Lore 6, no. 1 (1980): 
129–150. 
14 Eric R. Wolf, “Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java,” Southwestern 
Journal of Anthropology 13, no. 1 (1957): 1-18.  Twenty-nine years later, in light of the research that he 
inspired, Wolf revisited his notion of closed corporate communities and noted that “the overly generalized 
interpretations of the mid-1950s need to be qualified by very much variation both in geographical space in 
historical time.”  Eric R. Wolf, “The Vicissitudes of the Closed Corporate Peasant Community,” American 
Ethnologist 13, no. 2 (1986): 326.  See also the discussion of Morelos in chapter one in Eric R. Wolf, 
Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969). 
15 One appraisal noted that within a year “journalists, literary critics, and professional reviewers in a wide 
variety of magazines, newspapers, and nonhistorical reviews have received the book well.”  Michael C. 
Meyer, “Review of Zapata and Mexican Revolution by John Womack Jr.,” The Hispanic American 
Historical Review 49, no. 4 (1969): 775. 
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insights and colloquial writing, its use of narrative rather than academic analysis, it ably 
recounts the life and times of Emiliano Zapata.  At the heart of the study lie the selfless 
Zapata and equally selfless agrarian communities of the fertile valleys of Cuernavaca and 
Cuautla de Amilpas.  In many ways, Womack’s Zapata begins where Sotelo Inclán’s 
Raíz y razón de Zapata left off—at the outbreak of the violence.  The prologue, “The 
People Choose a Leader,” cites Sotelo Inclán and recounts the evening of 12 September 
1909, when Anenecuilco’s elders gathered to elect the then thirty-year-old Zapata as the 
new village chief in charge of defending the pueblo’s land and water titles in court.  The 
rural folk of Morelos, Womack argues, subsequently rose up to uphold this way of life 
and to recover control of their town councils, lands, waters, and forests resources.   
Like Sotelo Inclán, Womack portrays local rural life as cohesive, holistic, and 
unified: villages existed as bastions of rural tradition in the face of the expanding 
haciendas and hated municipal authorities imposed by the Porfirian political machine.  
The book’s narrative emphasis also accounts for its strengths and weaknesses.  Womack, 
although influenced by Wolf, Redfield, and Lewis, was not interested in grappling 
analytically with the diversity of pueblos.  Rather, he was recounting a rural epic and, as 
in Sotelo Inclán’s study, the story of Anenecuilco and the collective experience of the 
villages are writ large over Morelos.16  Precisely because it lacks analysis, the most 
                                                 
16 Readers, especially in Mexico, found a conservative strain in the revolutionary movement.  A review in 
Historian interpreted Womack’s characterization of the peasantry as people who “did not want ‘reform’ of 
the agrarian system, only a return to their traditional forms of land ownership before the advent of Porfirio 
Díaz.” Frank Jellinek, “Review of Zapata and the Mexican Revolution by John Womack,” The New York 
Times (New York, February 2, 1969).  Another review in the New York Times modestly opined that “it may 
be that Mr. Womack overstresses the Zapatistas’ conservatism.”  Oakah Jones, “Review of Zapata and the 
Mexican Revolution by John Womack,” Historian 32, no. 2 (1970): 32.  Recent criticism, though still rare, 
has been more poignant.  William Schell takes aim at Womack’s portrayal of Zapata in the transformation 
from village leader to regional revolutionary by arguing that John Steinbeck and Elia Kazan’s 1952 film, 
!Viva Zapata!, became the underlying source to interpret Zapata’s Porfirian background.  Steinbeck had 
encountered more myth than reality surrounding Zapata’s personal history and ultimately produced a 
cinematic rendering of the official myth of the caudillo.  William Schell Jr., “Emiliano Zapata and the Old 
Regime: Myth, Memory, and Method,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 25, no. 2 (2009): 327–365. I 
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famous book on Morelos does not fully penetrate the diversity of the countryside or the 
multifaceted nature of zapatismo and makes some normative assumptions about pueblo 
life.17  Morelos villagers, in Womack’s view, were not too different from the insurgent 
Cuban and Vietnamese peasantries of the early and mid-1960s, then fighting national 
wars of liberation.  In similarly heroic fashion, Womack provides a chapter on the 
outcomes of the revolution and ends with a very populist conclusion:  
 
So ended the year 1920, in peace, with populist agrarian reform instituted as a 
national policy, and with the Zapatista movement established in Morelos politics.  
In the future through thick and thin these achievements would last.  This was the 
claim Zapata, his chiefs, and their volunteers had forced, and [Gildardo] Magaña 
had won and secured.18   
The post-revolutionary period is deemed a natural outcome of 1910–1919, with the 
zapatistas “inheriting” the state and local governments.  Combatants and migrants return 
to their pueblos to work the lands they have taken by conquest; subsequently village 
virtues become institutionalized in the land reform.  In the larger scheme of Mexican 
politics and history, of course, Womack’s classic work also inserted Emiliano Zapata into 
the orthodox agrarian interpretation of the Mexican Revolution.19  For a long time, no 
                                                                                                                                                 
would argue that Sotelo Inclán’s Raíz y razón de Zapata, rather than Steinbeck’s film, was Womack’s main 
source to interpret Zapata’s Porfirian background.  See also Patrick J. McNamara, “Rewriting Zapata: 
Generational Conflict on the Eve of the Mexican Revolution,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 30, no. 
1 (2014): 122–149. 
17 Womack later recalled that at the time of the writing, “I was well aware you could have different 
villages…even next door they could be different.” Personal communication with the author, 12 June 2012. 
18 Womack, Zapata, 369. 
19 The traditional view, first espoused by the war’s veterans and quickly adopted by the national 
government, stresses the popular and above all agrarian character of the uprising that swept away the 
oppressive system of the dictator Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911).  Workers and peasants united to defeat the old 
regime, culminating in the formation of a revolutionary state that delivered the goods of land and labor 
reform.  The peasants of Morelos became iconic Mexican country people in this process. Several influential 
works on the Mexican Revolution include Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930); Eyler N. Simpson, The Ejido: Mexico’s Way Out 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina press, 1937); Jesús Silva Herzog, El agrarismo mexicano y la 
reforma agraria; Exposición y crítica (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1959). For the sources 
of Tannenbaum’s thinking, see Charles A. Hale, “Frank Tannenbaum and the Mexican Revolution,” The 
Hispanic American Historical Review 75, no. 2 (1995): 215–246.  
 9 
historian ventured into the archives to reappraise Womack’s Zapata as Lewis had done 
with Redfield’s Tepoztlán.  If anything, Morelos served as a yardstick for the study of 
other regions, rather than an object of historical study.  Womack’s definitive archival 
account essentially ended the first generation of studies on revolutionary Morelos.  In the 
end, however, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution is a story about how the pueblos 
sustained an insurgency for nearly a decade, not a deep look at the internal conflicts and 
contradictions within a movement, and still less an account of how that insurgency 
translated into the post-revolutionary context.   
If historians shied away from Morelos, anthropologists certainly did not.  In the 
1970s, Arturo Warman led a team of anthropologists to eastern Morelos to study peasant 
communities in Villa de Ayala, Hueyapan, Tepalcingo, Zacualpan, San Gabriel 
Amacuitapilco, and Jaloxtoc.  The group of investigators used oral history techniques, 
corroborated using documents and books, to uncover the historical memories of the 
communities.  Their research produced several published accounts, which included 
Warman’s We Come to Object: The Peasants of Morelos and the Nation State.20  
Warman’s students, meanwhile, compiled essays into three complementary volumes 
entitled Los campesinos de la tierra de Zapata.21   
In many respects, We Come to Object represents a classically revisionist but local 
interpretation of the Mexican Revolution.22  Warman dedicated a lengthy chapter to local 
                                                 
20 Arturo Warman, “We Come to Object”: The Peasants of Morelos and the National State (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). 
21 Sinecio López Méndez, Laura Helguera Reséndiz, and Ramón Ramírez Melgarejo, Los campesinos de la 
tierra de Zapata, vol. 1: Adaptación, cambio y rebelión (Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones 
Superiores, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1974); Alfonso Corcuera Garza, Jorge Alonso, 
and Roberto Melville, Los campesinos de la tierra de Zapata, vol. 2: Subsistencia y explotación (Mexico 
City: Centro de Investigaciones Superiores, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1974); Elena 
Azaola Garrido and Esteban Krotz, Los campesinos de la tierra de Zapata, vol. 3: Política y conflicto 
(Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones Superiores, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1976). 
22 A new generation of scholars, in the wake of the 1968 government massacre in Tlatelolco of protesting 
middle-class students, questioned the origins, popularity, and outcomes of the Mexican Revolution.  
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aspects of land distribution in post-revolutionary Morelos.  His more expansive, analysis 
of the 1920s and 1930s differed sharply from Womack’s outcomes of the revolution.  
Central to Warman’s thesis is the strength and cooptative power of the federal 
government vis-à-vis the pueblos.    
 
Agrarian reform was not going to legitimize the historic right of the villages to the 
land nor strengthen their autonomy; it was not going to carry out acts of justice… 
On the contrary, it was going to distribute the land as a unilateral concession from 
the State, like a powerful figure who retains for himself the right to watch over the 
fulfillment of his supreme edict and to intervene overtly in its administration to a 
create a political clientele.23   
The federal regime, through land reform, manipulated the peasantry for its own political 
and capitalistic ends, while village autonomy weakened at the expense of the centralized 
government.  Political elites, in other words, betrayed and co-opted zapatismo.  Yet for 
all of Warman’s sweeping generalizations condemning the entire state, his study arguably 
focused on an atypical group of seven eastern villages; his state-centered interpretation 
also suppresses any notion of peasant agency written as it was at the height of scholarly 
disenchantment with the Mexican revolutionary state. 
Additional works by anthropologist in the 1970s and 1980s created a second 
generation of studies on Morelos, but each generally fell within either of these traditional 
                                                                                                                                                 
Historians found plenty of evidence across Mexico to demonstrate that the revolution had failed to establish 
democracy and economic well-being in the countryside.  Instead, political bossism (caciquismo) and 
electoral fraud permeated society, and a strong post-revolutionary state emerged in the 1920s and 1930s to 
impose its will on rural Mexico.  For works dealing with the revisionist genre of the Mexican Revolution, 
see Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, 2 vols. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990) and 
“Revisionism and Revolution: Mexico Compared to England and France,” Past & Present, no. 134 (1992): 
159–199; Barry Carr, “Recent Regional Studies of the Mexican Revolution,” Latin American Research 
Review 15, no. 1 (1980): 3–14; Romana Falcón, “El revisionismo revisado,” Estudios Sociológicos, no. 14 
(1987): 341–351; Paul J. Vanderwood, “Review: Building Blocks but Yet No Building: Regional History 
and the Mexican Revolution,” Mexican Studies 3, no. 2 (1987): 421–432; Heather Fowler-Salamini, “The 
Boom in Regional Studies of the Mexican Revolution: Where Is It Leading?,” Latin American Research 
Review 28, no. 2 (1993): 175–190;; Álvaro Matute, “Orígenes del revisionismo historiográfico de la 
revolución mexicana,” Signos Histórico, no. 3 (June 2000): 29–48. 
23 Warman, We Come to Object, 136. 
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(Redfield, Womack) or revisionist (Lewis, Warman) interpretations on the nature of the 
region’s pueblos.  Guillermo de la Peña, for example, studied four municipalities in the 
northern highlands of Morelos in the 1970s and centered his analysis on outside 
economic and political forces and their impacts on villages.  Like Warman, he argued that 
government representatives controlled reform, not landless peasants.24  Judith Friedlander 
also emphasized the importance of external actors in the northeastern village of 
Hueyapan, in which, she argued, the colonial cargo system that integrated Indians into a 
Catholic society was effortlessly secularized to serve a strong national state.25   
Since the 1990s and 2000s, a third wave of scholarship on Morelos produced by 
historians returning to the archives has emerged.  These recent works investigate new 
time periods and topics such as politics, water, and social movements and offer a breadth 
of analytical lenses to view the countryside.  In 1995, Samuel Brunk produced the first 
English-language account of the local revolution since Womack thirty years before.26  
While corroborating many of Womack’s findings, Brunk, however, goes beyond the 
narrative of a rural epic by providing a more detailed political biography of Zapata.  
Brunk finds a heterogeneous movement characterized by internal divisions between 
generals, peasant leaders, and civilian ideologues.27  Brunk’s scholarship, thus, 
illuminates the diversity of the countryside and decentralizes the military component of 
                                                 
24 Guillermo de la Peña, A Legacy of Promises: Agriculture, Politics, and Ritual in the Morelos Highlands 
of Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 77. 
25 Judith Friedlander, “The Secularization of the Cargo System: An Example from Postrevolutionary 
Central Mexico,” Latin American Research Review 16, no. 2 (1981): 132–143.  See also, Judith 
Friedlander, Being Indian in Hueyapan, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1975/2006). 
26 Samuel Brunk, Emiliano Zapata: Revolution & Betrayal in Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1995).  For two recent works in Spanish that explore the zapatista revolt, see Francisco 
Pineda Gómez, La irrupción zapatista. 1911 (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1997) on the military component 
of the movement and Felipe Arturo Ávila Espínosa, Los orígenes del zapatismo (Mexico City: Colegio de 
México, 2001) on why so many villagers from Morelos joined and then abandoned Francisco Madero in 
1911. 
27 See also Samuel Brunk, “‘The Sad Situation of Civilians and Soldiers’: The Banditry of Zapatismo in the 
Mexican Revolution,” The American Historical Review 101, no. 2 (1996): 331–353. 
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zapatismo, but it stops with Zapata’s assassination in 1919.  Edgar Rojano’s Las cenizas 
del zapatismo complements the above study by covering state politics from the years 
1919 to 1924, revealing how villages sought to engage the state in a new political 
context.28  To contrast these recent treatments of Morelos politics, Cuando el agua se 
esfumó by Laura Valladares studies Morelos’s hydraulic system from 1880 to 1940 and 
shows how water disputes in the ejido generated political conflict.  Valladares goes 
beyond an emphasis on land and demonstrates the importance of water in Morelos’s 
agrarian struggle, in the process providing a more holistic and environmental reading of 
the zapatista revolution.29   
Surprisingly, only one work in the literature on Morelos in the past twenty-five 
years employs a cultural history approach, which has marked the study of the Mexican 
Revolution since the 1990s.  More recent studies of the revolution emphasize the 
negotiated settlement between elite and popular actors, whereby the cultural values of 
rural folks influenced state formation through daily dialogue and interactions with 
government officials and institutions.30  This process of negotiation, it is argued, forged a 
“hegemonic consensus” between rulers and ruled around 1940.  Anthropologist Claudio 
Lomnitz-Adler’s Exits from the Labyrinth finds that the revolution weakened central 
authority and gave villagers greater control of local institutions.  He cites Redfield’s 
finding of an elaborate popular religious culture in the countryside and articulates the 
                                                 
28 Edgar Damián Rojano Garcia, Las cenizas de zapatismo (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios 
Históricos de las Revoluciones de México, 2010). 
29 Laura R. Valladares de la Cruz, Cuando el agua se esfumó: Cambios y continuidades en los usos 
sociales del agua en Morelos, 1880-1940 (Mexico City: UNAM, Facultad de Estudios Superiores 
Cuautitlán, 2003). 
30 Mary Kay Vaughan, “Cultural Approaches to Peasant Politics in the Mexican Revolution,” The Hispanic 
American Historical Review 79, no. 2 (1999): 269–305; Eric Van Young, “Review: Making Leviathan 
Sneeze: Recent Works on Mexico and the Mexican Revolution,” Latin American Research Review 34, no. 
3 (1999): 143–165; Alan Knight, “Subalterns, Signifiers, and Statistics: Perspectives on Mexican 
Historiography,” Latin American Research Review 37, no. 2 (2002): 136–158; Luis Barrón, Historias de la 
revolución mexicana (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económico, 2004). 
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importance of a localist community ideology based on kinship, inheritance, reciprocity, 
and justice.  Lomnitz-Adler, however, overemphasizes the closure of Morelos’s pueblos 
during the post-revolutionary period.31  Nevertheless, in many respects, the case of 
Morelos in the 1920s and 1930s supports the cultural thesis.  The national state was 
weaker in the countryside than revisionist historians such as Warman have asserted, but 
that certainly did not translate into a peasant utopia.  Yet while it is clear that Mexicans 
negotiated rule with a new set of elites in the 1920s and 1930s, the bases of that 
negotiation subsumed in the cultural argument are not always clear.   
This dissertation, rather, shows that Mexico City and rural Morelos negotiated the 
revolutionary settlement precisely over questions regarding the rights and powers of town 
councils, village agrarian committees, local primary schools, and pueblo religious 
institutions.  Equally as important for this study, the villages of Morelos were a diverse 
group of communities with varied behaviors.  But the question should not be only if the 
pueblos were opened or closed, but rather which villages displayed which characteristics 
and why?  How did this shape their role in making the post-revolutionary state?  Life in 
rural Mexico was by no means uniform, even in a small state such as Morelos.  This 
dissertation, therefore, integrates cultural, material, and environmental approaches to the 
study of rural Morelos in order to retool interpretations of the outcomes of the Mexican 
Revolution.  By doing so, it offers a fresh political history of the post-revolution years 
and sheds new light on the environmental component of the agrarian reform.   
                                                 
31 Claudio Lomnitz-Adler, Exits from the Labyrinth: Culture and Ideology in the Mexican National Space 
(Berkely: University of California Press, 1992).  The author has also written a book on Tepoztlán and 
surveyed the anthological field work conducted in Morelos.  See Claudio Lomnitz-Adler, Evolución de una 
sociedad rural (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1982) and Claudio Lomnitz-Adler, “La 
antropología de campo en Morelos, 1930-1983,” in Morelos: Cinco siglos de historia general, ed. Horacio 
Crespo (Cuernavaca: Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Morelos, 1984). 
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The Idea of the Sovereign Pueblo and its Antecedents  
The concept of village sovereignty was rooted in Morelos’s liberal past.  During the War 
of Independence (1810-1821) and for much of the nineteenth century, the ideal of the 
self-governing rural community dominated the Mexican political landscape.32  
Particularly important to this development was the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz, which 
called for the abolition of the repúblicas de indios and legal ethnic distinctions.   The 
Constitution promised to treat all political subjects as equal citizens, with universal male 
suffrage, representative government, and indirect elections characterizing the new 
democratic system.  Repúblicas with at least one thousand inhabitants became 
ayuntamientos constitucionales.  These new governments oversaw annual elections to 
choose local authorities, administered the community’s natural resources, and provided 
local police services.  Now the locus of political rights, the town councils cut across 
ethnic lines and formed the basis of the electoral system, while civic militias formed in 
the pueblos to defend the ayuntamientos with arms.  But rather than having a positive 
effect on local democracy, in Morelos, the rupture of the old order primarily strengthened 
the hand of hacendados at the expense of pueblo political representation.  Sugar 
production increased during the first half of the nineteenth century, as estate owners 
replaced the Church as the region’s principal landlords.  Hacienda owners often 
controlled local elections by mobilizing estate workers to vote on their behalf, thereby 
giving them, or their relatives or subordinates, power in municipal offices.  This process, 
                                                 
32 Antonio Annino, “The Two-Faced Janus: The Pueblos and the Origins of Mexican Liberalism,” in 
Cycles of Conflict, Centuries of Change: Crisis, Reform, and Revolution in Mexico, eds. Elisa Servín, 
Leticia Reina, and John Tutino (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Antonio Annino, “Soberanías en 
lucha,” in Inventando la nación: Iberoamérica siglo XIX, eds. Antonio Annino and François-Xavier Guerra 
(Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003); Peter F. Guardino, Peasants, Politics, and the 
Formation of Mexico’s National State: Guerrero, 1800-1857 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). 
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in turn, facilitated the despoilment of pueblo lands at the hands of expanding sugar 
haciendas.33   
For these reasons, the struggle for local autonomy in Morelos continued in the 
mid-1850s.  The civil wars of the period, the French invasion of Mexico, and the Liberal 
reform movement led by Benito Juárez offered rural inhabitants new opportunities in 
regional and national politics.  In fact, the rustic individuals who flocked to the Liberal 
armies constructed their own visions of citizenship and liberty, stressing equality, 
expansion of the electorate, communal responsibility, and an inclusive nation-state blind 
to class and ethnicity.  This widespread experience of joining the locally commanded 
National Guard led to a shared experience of citizens in arms.  In Morelos, the key 
principal of popular liberalism remained municipal freedom—the notion of the municipio 
libre.  Local autonomy was indeed one of the most persistent tenets of village ideology 
during the tumultuous period from the 1810s to 1860s.34  As a result of their support for 
the liberal cause, rural communities were rewarded with a significant measure of local 
autonomy; after the Liberal armies triumphed over their French and conservative foes, in 
1868 Morelos became an official state carved out Estado de México.35  
                                                 
33 Jaime Irving Reynoso, Las dulzuras de la libertad. Ayuntamientos y milicias durante el primer 
liberalismo. Distrito de Cuernavaca, 1810-1835 (Mexico City: Nostromo Ediciones, 2011). 
34 Catherine Héau, “La tradición autonomista y legalista de los pueblos en territorio zapatista,” in Estudios 
sobre el zapatismo, ed. Laura Espejel López (México: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 2000), 
126. 
35 Numerous works document the political and social history of rural Morelos and the development of 
municipal politics in the nineteenth-century.  In addition to the above studies, see Florencia E. Mallon, 
Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995); Alicia Hernández Chávez, La tradición republicana del buen gobierno, (México: El Colegio 
de México, 1993); Brígida von Mentz, Pueblos de indios, mulatos y mestizos, 1770-1870: Los campesinos 
y las transformaciones protoindustriales en el poniente de Morelos (Mexico City: Centro de 
Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 1988); Paul Hart, Bitter Harvest: The Social 
Transformation of Morelos, Mexico, and the Origins of the Zapatista Revolution, 1840-1910 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 2005). 
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The post-revolutionary villagers of Morelos inherited this legacy of liberalism, 
only exercise of village rights evolved during the 1920s and 1930s to include new 
political and institutional ties to a more interventionist government in Mexico City.36  To 
be a sovereign pueblo in post-revolutionary Morelos meant to sacrifice a measure of 
municipal autonomy in exchange for federal leverage.  A sovereign village, for example, 
possessed local offices for national political parties, a land grant signed by the president 
of Mexico, and a federal primary school.  Communities utilized these national projects 
specifically to serve local ends.  For instance, federal primary schools fostered rural 
reconstruction, while ejidal assemblies provided local agraristas with a nationally-
sanctioned forum to defend natural resources against abusive state and local politicians.  
The concept of the sovereign pueblo, in other words, was somewhat federalized during 
the period.  Indeed, village discord most often involved state-level politicians and local 
elites—caciques, municipal authorities, village merchants, proprietary smallholders, 
hacendados—rather than the federal government.  For this reason, the national regime 
became an ally of the morelense countryside, which villagers used as leverage in rural 
struggles.  Put another way, official ties to Mexico City made agrarian communities more 
sovereign, at least in the 1920s and 1930s.  Pueblos, therefore, adapted to the post-
revolutionary landscape, articulated their demands before the federal government, and 
strategically defended their interests in the process.   
This type of state formation in post-revolutionary Morelos corresponds to what 
political scientists have termed “negotiated sovereignty,” whereby the different levels of 
government in a federal system (such as Mexico) share and contest supreme authority.37  
                                                 
36 Helga Baitenmann, “Popular Participation in State Formation: Land Reform in Revolutionary Mexico,” 
Journal of Latin American Studies 43, no. 01 (2011): 1–31 shows how villagers embraced local agrarian 
commissions sanctioned by national institutions.   
37 Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, “Federalism as State Formation in India: A Theory of 
shared and negotiated sovereignty,” International Political Science Review 31, no. 5 (2010), 553–572. 
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Such an approach challenges the master narrative of nation-state formation which 
presents sovereignty as a monopoly of the national government.  It is important to note 
that villages did not seek simple "autonomy," which entailed independence and non-
interference from Mexico City.  Instead, shared sovereignty represented a form of 
conditional dependence in which rural communities courted the federal government in 
order to strengthen local control over elections, natural resources, and schools.  It is 
equally important to note that contemporary morelenses did not use the term 
"sovereignty" (or "autonomy" for that matter).  Rather, rural inhabitants expressed these 
concepts in traditional language such as the "true right of the pueblos" (verdadero 
derecho de los pueblos) or the “ideals of the pueblos” (los ideales de los pueblos) to 
capture the idea of local supremacy.38  In another case, when campesinos perceived a 
centralized threat to village sovereignty, they warned federal representatives that “the 
pueblo knew how to impose its will.”39  Yet these phrases were different ways to 
emphasize the rural belief that the villages could only be governed by consent.   
The pueblos of Morelos in the 1920s and 1930s can indeed be viewed as a bed of 
clams in that communities had the ability to shut and burrow themselves in the face of 
external threats.  Villages remained largely open, however, and acquired sustenance from 
the outside world in various forms such as federal primary schools, agricultural aid, the 
Catholic Church, and regional and national political alliances.  Rural communities could 
“filter feed” the external world of state-building policies emanating from Mexico City; 
they were sensitive to the stimuli of federal schools and skillful at resisting 
anticlericalism in the classrooms at the same time.  Post-revolutionary villages were thus 
                                                 
38 Quoted in Jean Meyer, La cristiada, vol. 1: La guerra de los cristeros, 5th ed. (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores, 2005), 378. 
39 AHSEP, Escuelas Primarias, caja 46, exp. 13, f. 40, Juan Ponce y Rodríguez to Director de Educación 
Federal en el Estado, 8 November 1934. 
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willing to shed or retain specific aspects of traditional village life while also embracing or 
opposing new influences at the same time, thereby redefining the character of the 
pueblo.40  Meanwhile, the federal government grew stronger as it learned to govern 
mobilized villages.  Alicia Hernández Chávez articulates how the Mexican Revolution 
produced a strong, centrist state by the middle of the twentieth century: 
 
The zapatista dream of a republic of pueblos and citizens under municipal 
jurisdiction, represented by elected authorities to the town council, governed 
totally by elected officials at the three levels of government, was altered and gave 
life to a distinct pyramid of power.41 
That mighty national state, however, had yet to emerge by 1940, when villages still 
possessed ample space to maneuver politically.  Post-revolutionary Mexico, therefore, 
should be seen as a narrow but significant temporal window that allowed communities to 
evolve favorably with federal support, which, in turn, explains why rural Morelos backed 
the national regimes of the 1920s and 1930s.    
Research Findings 
With respect to politics, chapter one demonstrates how the villages of Morelos carried on 
the tradition of buen gobierno (good government) into the primaries of the official 
Partido Nacional Revolucionario (hereafter PNR) as a way to protect the electoral 
integrity of the pueblos.  Like other states such as Sonora, Morelos displayed continuities 
                                                 
40 This dynamism should not, perhaps, surprise us.  Paul Eiss’s recent book on the communities of 
Hunucmá, Yucatán, for instance, explores the multiple meanings of the term “el pueblo” and how the 
concept cuts across class and ethnic lines to unite a diverse array of actors.  Paul K. Eiss, In the Name of El 
Pueblo: Place, Community, and the Politics of History in Yucatán (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 
41 Quoted in Alicia Hernández Chávez, “El zapatismo: una gran coalición nacional popular democrática,” 
in Zapatismo: origen e historia (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de las 
Revoluciones de México, 2009), 45.  See also by the same author Anenecuilco: Memoria y vida de un 
pueblo, 2. ed. (Mexico City: Colegio de México y Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993) and Breve historia 
de Morelos (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 2002). 
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in terms of its civic and liberal past based on a strong degree of local sovereignty.42  
Rural inhabitants used elections with remarkable success to make political authority 
contingent on popular consent.  For instance, the experience of the 1920s and 1930s 
shows that Morelos was ungovernable without the pueblos’ political consent.  To achieve 
centralization, therefore, the high politicians of Cuernavaca and Mexico City were forced 
to reconcile their interests with those of mobilized local communities.  Furthermore, this 
study finds elections in the 1920s and the period known as the Maximato from 1928 to 
1934 to be much more competitive than is often thought.43  During these years, the PNR 
quickly established itself as the only institution capable of organizing internal elections in 
all of Morelos’s then thirty-two municipalities.  These primaries, even at this early point, 
hosted the real competition for access to centralized power, as they could mobilize more 
people during the gubernatorial race than could actual constitutional elections.44  Most 
                                                 
42 Ignacio Almada Bay, La conexioń Yocupicio: Soberaniá estatal y tradición cívico-liberal en Sonora, 
1913-1939, (Mexico City: Colegio de Mexico, 2009). 
43 A new and much-needed dissertation examines politics in the 1920s.  See Sarah Osten, “Peace by 
Institutions: The Rise of Political Parties and the Making of the Modern Mexican State, 1920-1928” (PhD 
diss., University of Chicago, 2010).  See also, Pedro Castro, Álvaro Obregón: Fuego y cenizas de la 
revolución mexicana (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 2009).  Older works on politics in the 1920s include 
Álvaro Matute, Historia de la revolución mexicana, 1917-1924, vol. 7: Las dificultades del nuevo estado 
(Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1995); Álvaro Matute, Historia de la revolución mexicana, 1920-1924, 
vol. 8: Carrera del caudillo (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1980); Enrique Krauze, Historia de la 
revolución mexicana,1924-1928, vol. 10: La reconstrucción económica (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 
1977); Jean A Meyer, Historia de la revolución mexicana, 1924-1928, vol. 11: Estado y sociedad con 
Calles (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1977).  The most recent work covering the maximato is Jürgen 
Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).  
Older works on the period from 1928 to 1934 include Lorenzo Meyer, Historia de la revolución mexicana, 
1928-1934, vol. 12: Los inicios de la institucionalización (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1978); 
Lorenzo Meyer, Historia de la revolución mexicana, 1928-1934, vol. 13: El conflicto social y los gobiernos 
del maximato (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1978); Tzvi Medin, El minimato presidencial: Historia 
política del maximato, 1928-1935 (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1982); Arnaldo Córdova, La revolución en 
crisis: La aventura del maximato (Mexico City: Cal y Arena, 1995); Luis Javier Garrido, El partido de la 
revolución institucionalizada: La formación del nuevo estado, 1928-1945 (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores, 1982). 
44 Lorenzo Meyer, Historia de la revolución mexicana, 1928-1934, vol. 12: Los inicios de la 
institucionalización (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1978), 273.  For the importance of party primaries 
in Mexico’s gubernatorial politics, see Kathleen Bruhn, “Choosing How to Choose: From Democratic 
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importantly, the PNR learned not to repeat the abuses committed by the political parties 
of the mid-1920s, when capricious unelected governors imposed authorities in the 
municipalities.  The state governments of the 1930s, of course, exercised their 
constitutional powers over local entities, but they learned to do so with relative respect 
for the pueblos’ electoral integrity, at least compared to the impositions of the mid-1920s.   
The second chapter argues that the agrarian reform did more than secure peace in 
the countryside and land, of course; it also offered villagers the opportunity to practice a 
lively form of agrarian democracy through elected ejidal assemblies.  In particular, locals 
embraced official agrarian institutions and used them to defend their natural resources 
from corrupt politicians and ambitious neighbors.  Control of the land reform resided 
with individuals and agrarian committees in the villages, especially during the 1920s.  
With federal support, villagers were able to recover Morelos’s natural resources and left 
free to exploit nature’s riches as they saw fit.  The northern highland pueblos of Morelos, 
for instance, exploited the wooded hillsides to produce charcoal for commercial sale with 
no government oversight.   
Decentralized control of the region’s natural resources, however, had serious 
ecological consequences.  In particular, deforestation led to decreasing amounts of 
available irrigation waters, which, in turn, heightened agrarian conflicts between pueblos.  
The post-revolutionary agrarian reform, that is to say, threatened an ecological 
catastrophe.  Yet it was not so much that rural inhabitants lacked the ability to live in 
harmony with the surrounding natural environment, but rather the demands of reviving 
their communities overrode any long-term vision of conservation.  In this regard, 
environmental history provides a new framework to examine the interactions of nature 
                                                                                                                                                 
Primaries to Unholy Alliances in Mexico’s Gubernatorial Elections,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 
30, no. 1 (2014): 212–240. 
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and culture.  In Miller’s words, the natural environment “is more than mere backdrop to 
the human drama, more than the resource that sustains it.”45  Land, forests, and waters 
represent valuable commodities in each pueblo and the revolutionary reforms made it 
possible to reclaim them.   
Chapter three, unlike most histories of Morelos, emphasizes control of water as 
the main engine of dispute driving agrarian struggles in the countryside.46  Most studies 
of the region gloss over water and consider it as part of the general patrimony of the 
pueblos.  Here, water is treated as a prized asset giving the farmer the main resource to 
grow commercial crops, particularly rice.  By electing to cultivate rice on an extensive 
scale, indeed Morelos’s agricultural workers showed that they were open to market 
forces.47  The liquid became a constant source of conflict between neighboring 
                                                 
45 Shawn William Miller, An Environmental History of Latin America (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 2.  See also Christopher R. Boyer, ed., A Land Between Waters: Environmental Histories of 
Modern Mexico.  (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012). For a general history of water in Mexico, 
see Luis Aboites, El agua de la nación: Una historia política de México, (1888-1946) (Mexico City: 
Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 1998).  New studies of forests in 
the post-revolutionary period include Christopher R. Boyer and Emily Wakild, “Social Landscaping in the 
Forests of Mexico: An Environmental Interpretation of Cardenismo, 1934–1940,” Hispanic American 
Historical Review 92, no. 1 (2012): 73–106; Emily Wakild, Revolutionary Parks: Conservation, Social 
Justice, and Mexico’s National Parks, 1910-1940 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2011).  See also 
Mikael Wolfe, “Bringing the Revolution to the Dame Site: How Technology, Labor, and Nature Converged 
in the Microcosm of a Northern Mexican Company Town, 1926-1946,” Journal of the Southwest 53, no. 1 
(2011): 1–32; John Tutino, “The Revolutionary Capacity of Rural Communities: Ecological Autonomy and 
Its Demise,” in Cycles of Conflict, Centuries of Change: Crisis, Reform, and Revolution in Mexico, eds. 
Elisa Servín, Leticia Reina, and John Tutino (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 
46 For two works that put water at the center of the zapatista struggle, see Valladares, Cuando el agua se 
esfumó and Alejandro Tortolero, Notarios y agricultores: Crecimiento y atraso en el campo mexicano, 
1780-1920: propiedad, crédito, irrigación y conflictos sociales en el agro mexicano (Mexico City: Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores, 2008), 161-183.  The latter work argues that the competition for water, rather than land, 
was the principal factor that led to the zapatista rebellion.  
47 This finding supports Emilio Kourí’s argument that peasants under certain conditions were willing 
participants in the market economy.  See Emilio Kourí, A Pueblo Divided: Business, Property, and 
Community in Papantla, Mexico (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).  By contrast, a recent work on 
the jaramillista movement in Morelos during the mid-twentieth century suggests that peasants resisted 
participation in the regional sugar economy. See Tanalís Padilla, Rural Resistance in the Land of Zapata: 
The Jaramillista Movement and the Myth of the Pax-Priísta, 1940-1962 (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2008). 
 
 22 
communities because a lack of water deprived a village of a key source of material 
improvement.  Complicating this equation were the Juntas de Aguas (water councils) 
established by the federal government in 1926 to distribute and administer the principle 
sources of irrigable water.  The juntas, another arm of the executive branch, undercut 
previous rights enjoyed by the town councils and local associations of water users—
namely the ability to collect payment for water usage and to manage the hydraulic 
system.  In general, pueblos that possessed sufficient amounts of irrigation waters 
opposed the federal juntas, while those communities that lacked the liquid sought the 
intervention of federal authorities as leverage against stronger neighbors.  An emphasis 
on water also reveals that the villages did not fight a revolution merely to retreat into their 
cornfields.  As early as 1920, farmers planted rice for commercial sale, and production of 
the grain boomed during the decade.  Participation in the market economy placed the 
pueblos in direct contact with the state, which attempted to regulate the sale of rice. 
Chapter four shows how, through federal primary schools, villagers negotiated a 
place for local religion in the face of national pedagogical reforms hostile to the Catholic 
Church.  Community control of the village patron saint represented the essence of the 
sovereign pueblo.  The success of rural schools depended on the willingness of village 
parents, especially mothers, to send their children to class, participate in pedagogical 
activities outside the school, and construct and maintain educational facilities.  Villagers 
found unique ways to promote education by creating micro-industries and cooperatives 
funded by school gardens that grew cash crops.  Although well-received in the 1920s for 
the material improvement associated with the federal project, the school curriculum’s 
leftist turn into a vaguely defined “socialist education” in 1934 led to a plunge in 
attendance in federal classrooms.  That year, the state’s anticlericalism offended rural 
sensibilities by broadcasting secular values into the heart of communities, flying in the 
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face of tradition.  Only when President Lázaro Cárdenas rolled back anticlericalism in 
1936 did attendance in primary schools resume normal levels.   As such, this dissertation 
uses both a cultural and material approach to trace development of the federal 
government’s educational project in rural areas.48   
A Note on Sources 
The archival research for this dissertation draws on many untapped collections in 
Morelos and Mexico City, which correspond loosely to the chapters presented in this 
study.  For the first chapter on politics, the Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales collection 
in Gobernación (henceforth, Ministry of the Interior) and the presidential files at the 
Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) in Mexico City present a wealth of information on 
the struggles for power and the rise of the official party.  While much of the Ministry of 
Interior’s espionage reports cover politics at the state level, the collection contains dozens 
of accounts of elections in the municipalities. Understanding the state government’s 
political relationship with the municipalities represents a key facet of the pueblos’ ties 
with the outside world.  In the presidential files of the AGN rest the correspondence from 
villages to the chief executives of Mexico, detailing the federal-municipal relationship in 
this period.   
For the two following chapters on the agrarian reform, the Archivo General 
Agrario (AGA) and the Archivo Histórico del Agua (AHA) in Mexico City provide the 
bulk of primary sources.  The AGA houses the documents pertaining to the land 
redistribution, with each community possessing several feet of papers covering the 
                                                 
48 For a cultural approach to federal schools, see Mary K. Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution: 
Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in Mexico, 1930-1940 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997).  A 
material approach to rural schools includes Elsie Rockwell, Hacer escuela, hacer estado: La educación 
posrevolucionaria vista desde Tlaxcala (Zamora: Colegio de Michoacán, 2007).  Wendy Waters, 
“Revolutionizing Childhood: Schools, Roads, and the Revolutionary Generation Gap in Tepoztlán, Mexico, 
1928 to 1944,” Journal of Family History 23, no. 3 (1998): 292–311 offers a blend of both approaches. 
 24 
twentieth century.  The documents detail the travails of the redistribution process and 
villagers’ relationship with the National Agrarian Commission and its local offices in 
Cuernavaca, the Local Agrarian Commission (CLA).  This study uses the files of thirty-
three villages from the archival branch Dotación, Restitucion y Ampliación de Tierras 
Ejidales (roughly a fifth of the Morelos collection), and the files of five villages from the 
branch Dotación de Aguas.  The selected cases give the study a broad geographic base of 
the agrarian reform from the northern highlands to the fertile Cuernavaca and Cuautla de 
Amilpas Valleys.  Some files, such as those corresponding to the municipalities of 
Tetecala and Puente de Ixtla, were chosen to complement a wealth of information on 
these pueblos found in the AGN collections and the Morelos state archive.  Others, such 
as the small villages of Tetelcingo, Amilcingo, and Moyotepec, each located in the heart 
of zapatista country, represent cases that have not been studied by previous investigators.  
Still other files, such as Chiconcuac, Villa de Ayala, and Anenecuilco produced new 
documentation to complement and reinterpret previous works.  The AHA enhances the 
research in the AGA with document holdings pertaining to the eleven water juntas 
established by the federal government in Morelos after 1925.  Several of these juntas, 
including those of the Cuautla, Yautepec, Amatzinac, and Apatlaco rivers, leave behind 
thousands of documents from 1926 to roughly 1934.49  Not only do these papers contain 
the letters and petitions from villages, but also dozens of reports by engineers and 
inspectors, who visited the smallest of hamlets to inquire on water usage. 
At the same time the federal water juntas arrived in Morelos, the Calles regime 
and the Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP) initiated a project of rural education in 
1926 and established primary schools in pueblos across the state.  The fourth chapter uses 
                                                 
49 Why the documentation significantly thins out around 1935 remains unclear.  This could have been 
influenced by the cardenista reorganization of the agrarian bureaucracy.   
 25 
an abundance of documentation in the SEP historical archive beginning in 1926, 
including hundreds of reports by schools inspectors.  Each month these bureaucrats 
attempted to visit every village within their respective zones to check on the status and 
progress of rural schools.  The files also contain correspondences from villagers detailing 
their interactions with teachers and federal institutions.  Beginning in 1934, the Archivo 
Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública (AHSEP) also collected documentation 
pertaining to the rebellion in eastern Morelos led by Enrique Rodríguez “El Tallarín,” 
whose revolt is the subject of the final chapter.   
Several additional repositories complement the four national archives above.  In 
Cuernavaca, the Archivo Histórico del Instituto Estatal de Documentación de Morelos 
(AHIEDM) houses several thousand documents on the 1920s and 1930s.  A new source, 
it holds a rich collection of the CLA during the provisional land reform of the 1920s.  The 
Tierras branch includes disparate quantities of documents pertaining to roughly fifty 
pueblos, complementing the AGA and AHA files.  Records of agrarian conventions, 
governors’ correspondence, newspaper clippings, and financial documents pertaining to 
the haciendas can also be found in the underutilized state archive of Morelos.  The 
Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca also proved a 
valuable resource for correspondence and reports by governors of the state.  Finally, the 
Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas at Austin, 
especially its collection entitled Revolutionary Mexico in Newspapers, 1900-1929, 
houses crucial primary and secondary sources used for this study.  All told, this 
dissertation utilizes archival documents pertaining to more than 100 pueblos, well over 
half of the 175 villages that existed in Morelos in 1933. 
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Chapter I: Pueblo Politics and the Rise of the Post-Revolutionary State 
The 1920s and 1930s in Morelos represent a period of transition from armed struggle to 
political stability and economic reconstruction.50  Reintegrating the state’s then twenty-
six municipal seats into the political order became the central task.  The most important 
factor determining how soon Morelos returned to normalcy was the governing classes’ 
relationship with the pueblos of the state, because without village political consent, 
Morelos was simply ungovernable.  The political struggles that slowly reshaped the 
countryside’s relationship with Mexico City during the 1920s and 1930s can be broken 
down into four periods.  First, weak central authority and political instability 
characterized Morelos under Álvaro Obregón’s presidency from 1920 to 1924.  In these 
years, former zapatista chiefs, the voices and symbols of the pueblos, battled civilian 
politicians in the state government who sought to reassert their authority over the 
municipalities.  Those centralizing efforts largely failed but they ushered in a second 
period from 1925 to 1926, when electoral upheaval in Morelos destabilized the state-
building process and further decentralized power.  After political passions cooled, 
political stability returned to Morelos between 1927 and 1934, as the state government 
was buttressed by more social cohesion among a landed peasantry and a more active 
federal regime under Plutarco Elías Calles.  Rural Morelos made real political gains 
during this third stage, especially in the form of definitive land resolutions, and villagers 
began to participate in the primaries of the official Partido Nacional Revolucionario 
(PNR) as a way to influence elite callistas through party structures.  This negotiated 
                                                 
50 Parts of this chapter were takes from Salvador Salinas, “The Partido Nacional Agrarista and the Quest 
for Power: Morelos in the 1920s,” in Mexico in Transition: New Perspectives on Mexican Agrarian 
History, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries/ México y sus transiciones: reconsideraciones sobre la 
historia agraria mexicana, siglos XIX y XX, Antonio Escobar Ohmstede and Matthew Butler (eds.), Centro 
de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (Mexico City, 2013), 357-384.  
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settlement between rulers and ruled, however, broke down in 1934, initiating a fourth and 
final period during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas from 1935 to 1940.  At this time, a 
growing landless population, social reforms, and bureaucratic centralization increased 
tensions in rural areas and forced the national government to renegotiate its pact with the 
morelense countryside.  The process culminated in about 1938, when former zapatistas 
won the governorship and all but one of the state legislature seats, symbolizing the power 
and persistence of Morelos’s pueblos as political power brokers after nearly twenty years 
of rural state-building.   
The travails of post-revolutionary politics stemmed from the fact that the Mexican 
Revolution had dismantled the old structure of Porfirian jefatura politics, and in its place 
had reemerged ideas of popular sovereignty rooted in Mexico’s War of Independence 
(1810-1821), Liberal Reform of the 1860s, and zapatismo, of course.  The municipalities 
of Morelos were therefore poised to reassert a local political tradition, but in contrast to 
the nineteenth century, rural inhabitants encountered an increasingly activist federal 
government in the 1920s and 1930s, whose policies and projects they embraced 
according to whether such programs could be made to serve local ends.  Obregón, we 
shall see, paid little more than lip service to village sovereignty in Morelos and was 
resigned to let local actors settle political conflicts among themselves.  Consequently, the 
battle over who would represent the villagers in the state government erupted after 
Obregón left office in December 1924.  The Calles regime then spent a good two years 
responding to the warring political faction in Morelos, sending over a dozen spies to the 
region to investigate the complexities of local society.  From their detailed reports, the 
political idiosyncrasies of morelenses and the terms on which it would be possible to 
bring the zapatistas into the state became clearer.  The cardenistas, too, doubled down on 
their efforts to engage the rural polity by carrying out more land reform.  Throughout 
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these ebbs and flows of state-building, rural inhabitants showed that when political elites 
could further the conditions of village sovereignty, they could bring rural Morelos into 
the national regime.   
Following a chronological approach, this chapter begins to trace the pueblos’ 
changing relationship with outside actors with a section outlining the history of 
obregonismo in Morelos from 1920 to 1924.  Although rural communities were not 
politically homogenous, each governor’s success or failure depended on their ability to 
coexist peacefully with the pueblos, or at least with a critical mass of them.  A second 
section examines the changing political climate in Morelos during the brief chaotic 
electoral sequence of the mid-1920s, using the case studies of Puente de Ixtla and 
Tetecala to demonstrate how rural inhabitants rejected civilian politicos that offended 
village patriotism.  A third section explores the rise of the PNR in Morelos from 1927 to 
1934, when the callista regime learned how to govern Morelos and the party established 
local offices in every municipality in the state.  It highlights the importance of PNR 
primaries at the local level to show how internal elections provided a forum for rural 
voters to influence party elites, while the old political culture defined by traditional 
chieftainship began to fade into the past.  The final section investigates the breakdown 
and renegotiation of the alliance between the federal government and former zapatista 
combatants during the cardenista presidency, concluding with a discussion of the 
changes and continuities in the politics of post-revolutionary Morelos.    
Obregonismo & Traditional Chieftainship, 1920-1924 
The end of the armed revolution in 1920 and the forging of the zapatista alliance with 
president-elect Álvaro Obregón of Sonora marked the beginning of political 
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reconstruction in Morelos.51  With Obregón’s blessings, the former combatants and 
civilians in the zapatista movement took control of the state and local governments.  
Among the most powerful figures in Morelos after Zapata’s death was General Genovevo 
de la O, who assumed the strategic position of chief of military operations in the state in 
1920.  De la O hailed from the northwestern highland village of Santa María Ahuacatitlán 
and his influence spread southward into lowland Morelos and westward into the Estado 
de México.  As the official chief of military operations of the state from 1920 to 1924, De 
la O emerged as a leader in state politics and his political clout spread beyond 
northwestern Morelos.  Ever since his pre-revolutionary days defending Santa María’s 
lands from the Temixco hacienda, De la O, like most chiefs, had close ties to his home 
village.  But not even De la O, or any other zapatista for that matter, was influential 
enough to unite all of Morelos’s revolutionary factions.  Only Zapata had been capable of 
that.  Rather, De la O used his position of authority to defend pueblos against abuses 
(often electoral) committed by civilian politicians.  In the face of a rapidly changing 
political milieu, he championed traditional chieftainship, which stressed longstanding 
military service and allegiance to villages rather than external connections or 
intellectualism as the prerequisites for power.  These principles led De la O to clash with 
politicians who had not sprung from the pueblos in 1911, and who therefore did not have 
village interests at the heart of their governing agenda.52  
                                                 
51 The alliance between the Sonorans and the zapatistas had origins in the presidential succession of 1920.  
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Prominent among the civilians that entered Morelos politics was Dr. José G. 
Parres, who held the post of provisional governor from 1920 to 1923.  Parres was born 
and raised in Hidalgo and joined the Liberating Army of the South in 1914 as a medic.  
The military wing of the zapatista coalition, led by De la O, selected Parres to serve as 
governor in June 1920, probably because they thought he would be weak and malleable.53  
This selection overrode Gildardo Magaña’s candidacy and the purely civilian wing of 
zapatismo.54  Moreover, events would show that De la O and the generals could control 
Parres in the governorship and dispose of the doctor if he ever stepped out of line.  Parres 
himself became symbolic of the non-morelense politicians and intellectuals who 
surrounded zapatismo in the 1910s and sought to dominate it thereafter.  These 
individuals exercised influence in Morelos because of their connections in Mexico City 
with organizations such as the National Agrarian Party (hereafter PNA), which was 
founded and led by Antonio Soto y Gama in 1920 and, by virtue of its leader’s former 
zapatista affiliations, became a credible interlocutor between popular agrarianism and the 
state.55  Yet they could not count on a base of support in the pueblos to the degree that the 
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chiefs could.  Parres’s governorship, for example, became mired in personal conflict with 
De la O after repeated accusations that the governor committed electoral fraud in the 
municipalities. 
For this reason, relations between Parres, the PNA, and De la O soured shortly 
after the medic assumed office.  Villagers frequently wrote to De la O detailing the 
schemes of local politicos who had connections to Governor Parres through the PNA.  
The PNA’s political clout was strongest in the national Congress, where Soto y Gama 
served as federal deputy representing his home state of San Luis Potosí from 1920 to 
1928.  But at the grassroots, locals accused PNA members in the agrarian bureaucracy of 
threatening to take away lands from villagers who did not vote for the party.  As one 
subordinate wrote to De la O,  
 
 in my land propaganda is being carried out for municipal president.  First, the 
agrarian party was formed, made up purely of people from the state and the city, 
but they are directed by two licensiados [sic]…they tell the pueblo that he who 
does not vote for the agrarian club will not have land (disen [sic] al pueblo que el 
que no bote [sic] por el club agrarista no tendra tierras).56 
Even the colloquial Spanish here reveals that a cultural chasm separated the urbane 
clubbiness of the PNA and the personalistic authority of De la O.  Then, in 1922, 
opposition to the Mexico City-based party began to organize beyond individual pueblos.  
Prominent chiefs such as De la O, Pioquinto Galis, José Rodríguez, Zeferino Ortega, and 
Francisco Alarcón declared that Parres and “the new ‘men of letters and schemes’ were 
sordidly exploiting the ideals and sacrifices of the pueblo of Morelos and particularly of 
working people in the fields.”57  This situation worsened after the annual municipal 
                                                 
56 AGN, Particulares, De la O, caja 36, exp. 6, Jesús Hernández to De la O, not dated. 
57 AGN, Particulares, De la O, caja 60, exp. 2, Memorandum by De la O and the above, 1 August 1922.  
Before the declaration, in April 1921, Parres held a two-hour meeting with De la O, who laid out several 
reasons for his “disgust.”  The general resented the fact that Parres employed persons not from Morelos in 
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were true, but he argued that these employees served as low-level clerks and copyists who possessed no 
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elections held in December 1922, when various pueblos––Miacatlán, Huitzilac, and 
Xochitepec, as well as residents of Cuernavaca and Cuautla––sent telegrams and letters 
to the federal government accusing the governor of violating the popular vote and 
imposing unelected municipal councils.58  Pressure mounted on Parres, who now sought 
the intervention of Obregón.  The governor requested that the president send his personal 
representative to Morelos in order to judge fairly the disputes revolving around the 
electoral law.  Obregón rejected the proposal with a reprimand, however, stating that it 
would not be “appropriate nor decorous to send [a] person [to] oversee your acts, because 
[the executive office] believes that you, precisely, are a representative of authority.”59  
The national regime wanted no part of local electoral disputes in Morelos.   
The PNA was not the only national party to establish a foothold in Morelos 
politics, because for political organizations based in Mexico City, rural Morelos 
represented a mobilized and symbolically important electorate.  Most notably, the 
Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (hereafter CROM) and its political vehicle, the 
Mexican Labor Party (hereafter PLM), gained many adherents in Morelos politics during 
the early 1920s.  The CROM was formed in 1918 and it would for over a decade become 
the most dominant labor organization in Mexico, as both Presidents Obregón and Calles 
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appointed members of the confederation to their presidential cabinets.  Although each 
claimed to champion CROM labor struggles, it would be President Calles who allied 
most closely with the laboristas.  In any case, CROM’s weight in local morelense politics 
could be seen by the early 1920s.  For example, around the same time that Parres lobbied 
Obregón for support in 1923, CROM members in Tepoztlán supported the zapatista 
faction battling the sons of Porfirian caciques.  One specific case, whereby the village’s 
CROM adherents (the so-called bolcheviques) were jailed by their rivals known as the 
centrales, illustrates how all three levels of government interacted and how affiliations 
with national parties and politicians infiltrated local politics.  After three weeks in a 
Cuernavaca jail, one of the CROM members later recalled their release: 
 
Then the jailkeeper came in with the newspaper.  Whew! It said that if the 
seventeen peasants in jail were not set free in twenty-four hours, than the judges 
of Cuernavaca would go in under the same charges.  Signed, Obregón!  Even the 
jaikeeper jumped.  “Man! You’ve got influence! Just look at that, even signed by 
the President of the Republic!”…José Parrés was Governor then.  He was playing 
politics because some people wanted to get him out of the governorship…they 
took us to see him…He saw that we were all furious and said, “Look here, boys, 
those scoundrels took advantage of you because I wasn’t around.  I am a member 
of the CROM, too, so don’t you worry.  This is a great victory.  But don’t you go 
around causing any sudden deaths because then we’ll lose everything.  None of 
that, eh!  All that sort of thing is finished.  Everybody observes the law, now.”60 
In truth, Parres’s administration identified most closely with the National Agrarian Party, 
but the fact that the governor claimed CROM membership reveals how national 
organizations could be invoked for political survival by embattled state and local 
politicians.  What is indeed surprising is the extent to which CROM’s influence had 
spread into the morelense countryside and how rapidly it had done so.  By 1926, the 
confederation had established dozens of peasant unions in pueblos across the state.61  
                                                 
60 Quoted in Lewis, Pedro Martínez, 132-133. 
61 Rocío Guadarrama, Los sindicatos y la política en México: la CROM, 1918-1928 (Mexico City:  
Ediciones Era, 1981), 208-210. 
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Laboristas were thus expanding into the agraristas’ stronghold and trying to overhaul the 
PNA, setting off a heated rivalry that would destabilize Morelos politics. 
Before the storm, however, Obregón made a last attempt to save Parres by 
personally traveling to Cuernavaca in a show of support for the governor in March 1923.  
For appearances’ sake, the local political class temporarily set aside differences and 
rallied behind the president.62  The president’s visit represents an example of the national 
chieftain using his personal prestige to negotiate political conflicts among his loyal 
followers, yet his charismatic authority was insufficient to unite a divided state.  Indeed, 
continued pressure from the pueblos and De la O forced Parres to abandon his office, as 
he secretly fled Cuernavaca in the early hours of 14 December, at the same time that 
Adolfo de la Huerta launched a rebellion from Veracruz.  De la Huerta—a member of the 
so-called Sonoran Triumvirate—had served as provisional president in 1920 before 
Obregón assumed office, but the latter’s decision to back Calles in the 1924 presidential 
contest led De la Huerta, also a presidential aspirant, to revolt against the federal 
government.  Back in Morelos, Parres relinquished his post at this moment because the 
national crisis presented De la O with an opportunity to finally depose him through force 
and install a loyal supporter, Alfredo Ortega, as interim governor.  With no other options, 
Obregón ratified Del la O’s coup.  The caudillo from Santa María then defeated Rómulo 
Figueroa’s delahuertista forces, which invaded from Guerrero.63   
                                                 
62 For Obregón’s visit to Cuernavaca, see Rojano García, Las cenizas, 125-126. 
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The military victory and departure of Parres could have left De la O as the 
undisputed leader of Morelos politics, but the general was himself soon mired in 
accusations that he had taken advantage of the rebellion to settle old scores with rival 
chiefs.  Most notoriously, it was widely believed that De la O was behind the December 
1923 assassination of General Gabriel Mariaca, who was a native of Morelos and had 
revolutionary credentials going back to his days as a maderista.  The scandal angered 
many officers and rank-and-file soldiers under De la O’s command and caused the 
caudillo to lose prestige among his troops and in the pueblos.64  The general’s flaws as a 
politician then became evident through his choice of governor, Alfredo Ortega—a 
mexiquense.  Apparently, De la O selected outsiders to run the government because they 
would not be beholden to any of the political factions in Morelos except his own.  He 
indeed used Governor Ortega to try and tighten his control over the agrarian movement: 
soon a report circulated in the agrarian bureaucracy that the governor commissioned an 
individual to depose unfriendly village land committees.65  This type of behavior was 
consistent with De la O’s past dealings with rivals during the armed revolution and the 
De la Huerta rebellion.66  Yet the purges only heightened tensions between Cuernavaca 
and the pueblos because De la O now had enemies across Morelos; it was obvious he had 
learned little from the mistakes committed by the Parres administration.  Another 
observer claimed that these impositions “are being repeated all over the state or in the 
majority of pueblos, worsening the conflict.”67  Shortly after these reports appeared, 
scandals involving De la O and Governor Ortega beset Morelos’s participation in the 
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 36 
1924 national elections.  In Cuernavaca, the official candidates and their supporters were 
chauffeured from one voting station to another in order to take control of electoral 
documents and personnel.  The groups backed by Governor Ortega also intimidated 
opponents by brandishing pistols, often with the connivance of the federal army.68  These 
instances of corruption further tainted De la O’s name and reputation and demonstrate 
that he had overestimated his charismatic authority in his native state.  After the 1924 
debacles associated with the presidential election in Morelos, the national Congress 
deposed De la O’s puppet governor, Alfredo Ortega.69 
The National Agrarian Party, which still held influence in Congress, now sent 
Ismael Velasco to serve as provisional governor of Morelos.  De la O openly opposed the 
appointment of Velasco, who, like Parres, was from outside the state and a member of the 
PNA.  He then threatened to post guards at the entrance of the government’s central 
offices to prevent Velasco from assuming the governorship.  With a touch of irony, the 
general stated that “the people no longer want outsiders who solely come to disturb and 
deceive those of Morelos.”  He then reassured Obregón: “If disorders or the like should 
occur, take little notice because it’s only a local matter and has nothing to do with the 
central government.”70  With De la O openly hostile to the next PNA-appointed governor 
and the Obregón regime perhaps fearing that Velasco would be dominated by De la O as 
easily as Parres and Ortega had been, the War Department decided to transfer the caudillo 
to Tlaxcala as head of military operations in the state.  On that same day (20 September), 
three trains carrying six hundred soldiers arrived in Cuernavaca. General Juan 
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 37 
Domínguez, originally from Baja California, took control of military operations in the 
state and Velasco, now safe from De la O’s intimidation, assumed the governorship.71  
Domínguez was a battle-hardened veteran, who Obregón believed was the solution to 
Morelos’s problems.  The president was clearly more concerned about possible resistance 
to Velasco, and with integrating civil and military power under a new federal remit, than 
he was about the imposition itself.  Although the removal of De la O from Morelos would 
be Obregón’s last major intervention in regional political affairs, it turned out to be one of 
the most costly, as the state soon entered a short period of electoral upheaval on a scale it 
had not experienced before. 
Electoral Upheaval, 1925-1926 
De la O’s removal from Morelos created a power vacuum that climaxed in a chaotic 
electoral sequence in 1925-1926.  New struggles between civilian politicians, unelected 
provisional governors, generals, and rural folks erupted during these years.  No less than 
six career politicos—half of them from outside Morelos—attempted to govern the state 
from Cuernavaca.72  All of these unelected officeholders were appointed by the national 
legislature, and they all repeated the mistakes of their predecessors by imposing loyal 
politicos in the municipalities, which alienated the pueblos and led to serious protests.  
Take, for example, Ismael Velasco, who managed to last a full year in Cuernavaca.73  
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 38 
Numerous pueblos accused Velasco of imposing municipal councils and not respecting 
the popular vote.  One group opposed to the governor wrote to President Calles in 1925 
to demand a solution to the “endless chain of abuses committed by the state authorities of 
Morelos,” declaring that the region depended on the “capricious will” of individuals 
“who are not Morelenses.”74  Velasco, of the PNA, also angered rice growers in the 
southern hotlands when he tried to instate a one-peso tax on every kilogram of rice sold 
out of state.  Rice farmers likened the tax to an alcabala (sales tax) and refused to pay 
it.75  As a result of the state government’s actions, democratic governance and clean 
elections in the pueblos practically vanished in 1925-1926, as was reflected in the fact 
that villagers wrote an enormous amount of correspondence to national authorities 
detailing local struggles during this period.  Likewise, Gobernación sent over a dozen 
spies to Morelos to investigate the anarchy of local politics.  By relaying information on 
the conflicts unfolding on the ground between the municipalities and the state 
government, however, national authorities learned to deal more effectively with the rural 
population.  This process can been seen especially clear in the two well-documented case 
studies of Puente de Ixtla and Tetecala, both of which highlight the interactions of all 
three levels of government during this mini-period. 
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The case of Puente de Ixtla demonstrates the bitter local divisions that existed 
within the agrarian communities and, just as clearly, their links to state and national 
politics.  Various forces––Governor Velasco’s PNA, callista interlopers, and their 
respective peasant allies; a corrupt CNA official, and a hacendado, who sought to profit 
from his enemies’ confusion––collided in Puente de Ixtla.  This southwestern 
municipality in Morelos, adjacent to Guerrero, was among the first pueblos to receive a 
definitive land grant signed by Obregón in 1922.  Its ejido consisted of lands taken from 
the Vista Hermosa and San Gabriel haciendas.  Over three hundred families received title 
to 2,664 hectares of land, nearly a quarter of which included irrigated plots.76  Little by 
little, the pueblo also recovered from the revolutionary war.  The inhabitants first rebuilt 
the town hall, installed a public clock, and constructed a girls’ school; by 1925 they 
planned to finish work on a small electrical plant.77  Outside forces, however, upset any 
harmony that may have existed in the municipality.  
Puente de Ixtla’s troubles began during the De la Huerta rebellion, when invading 
forces under Rómulo Figueroa took control of the local government and maintained 
political dominance in the village even after the defeat of the delahuertistas.78  Governor 
Velasco and the PNA exacerbated factional tensions in Puente de Ixtla in November 
1924, when a personal representative of the governor appeared in the village to depose a 
member of the ejidal executive committee.  The municipal president backed this action, 
and the local ejidal administration descended into anarchy for several months.  No single 
faction could take control of the agrarian committee.  A majority group, led by Aurelio 
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Villegas and hostile to the PNA, could not overcome a minority group led by the 
municipal president.  A third party, Emmanuel Amor, the owner of the San Gabriel 
hacienda, tried to take advantage of the village’s internal divisions by maneuvering to 
take control of mango orchards that lay on the outskirts of Puente de Ixtla’s ejido.  In 
response, Villegas wrote Calles and the agrarian authorities numerous times, accusing 
Amor of striking a deal with the CNA’s secretary, César Córdova, that would allow him 
to reclaim the orchards.  It was true that Amor sent a hacienda representative to 
Cuernavaca, and that he employed both his sons, Manuel and Ignacio, to lobby on his 
behalf.79  In March 1925, however, after receiving numerous petitions, Calles sent a 
representative to Puente de Ixtla to oversee the election of a legitimate ejidal committee. 
Calles’s local supporter, Villegas, won the contest and became president of the agrarian 
administration.  Yet from the moment of victory, Villegas sent a torrent of complaints to 
the federal government accusing Velasco, the municipal president, and a delegate from 
the National Agrarian Commission (hereafter CNA) of obstructing the elected ejidal 
committee. 
Around the same time, outsiders appeared in the orchards and began picking the 
fruit.  Doubtless these were Amor’s minions, as the hacendado later attempted to sell 
seventy crates of mangos and offered to pay for them if the CNA ordered him to do so.  A 
federal army detachment was called in to avoid violence and to protect Amor’s access to 
the orchards.  Locals blamed everything on politics, or Puente de Ixtla’s refusal to engage 
in the political activity that Velasco’s PNA required.  “Little to nothing have we been 
able to dedicate to partisan politics,” Villegas wrote on behalf of the villagers, a fact that 
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“has profoundly disgusted certain political leaders in the local government.”80  In sum, 
Puente de Ixtla’s ejido was carved up by a community of outside interests: Velasco and 
his local proxy, the municipal president, on the one hand, who between them sought to 
force the ejidatarios to support the PNA and meddled in their internal elections when 
they resisted; and, on the other hand, the estate owner who, through his own proxy (the 
CNA’s secretario), tried to bring in a valuable mango crop.  The object of these illegal 
pressures––Villegas, the elected ejidal commissioners, and most villagers––declared that 
they upheld and lived by the principles of the agrarian revolution, but could not be 
strong-armed into supporting a political party. 
  Ultimately for Villegas’s faction, strategic recourse to national authority allowed 
the orchards to remain in the ejido, but only after much bureaucratic wrangling.  To begin 
with, the CNA ordered the pueblo’s ejidal committee to respect the decision to return the 
hacienda’s orchards, and did so, apparently with little sense of embarrassment, by 
invalidating the land survey carried out by its own engineer on grounds of some technical 
infringement.  The orchards legitimately belonged to the San Gabriel hacienda, said the 
CNA.  The evidence suggests, therefore, that the hacendado, Amor, did indeed come to 
an agreement with the CNA regarding the fruit trees.  How or why or exactly with whom 
the agreement was made remains unclear, but Amor struck at an opportune moment, as 
internal divisions deepened in the pueblo when Governor Velasco attempted to create a 
loyal electoral base by installing loyal followers in the ejidal committee.  Nonetheless, 
Puente de Ixtla’s ejidal leaders continued to petition the federal government, forcing the 
CNA in June 1925 to send yet another engineer to Puente de Ixtla to further study the 
matter.  This time, however, the investigation concluded that the current secretary of the 
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CNA had mistakenly upheld a 1924 decision by his predecessor, César Córdova, to give 
control of the orchards to Amor; the fruit trees, therefore, rightfully belonged in the ejido 
because in no way could Puente de Ixtla’s definitive land grant be altered.81  These events 
in Puente de Ixtla reveal how repeated village protests could force national institutions to 
side with ejidatarios in conflicts with local elites, even if the CNA had to reverse its 
previous decision that enabled the hacendado to collect the pueblo’s fruit crop in 1924-
1925. 
The Puente de Ixtla case reminds us that even ejidal assemblies were part of much 
larger political formations, be they electoral coalitions or webs of patronage, and so could 
be destabilized by distant political disputes.  Yet the example also shows that villagers 
sought to create high-level alliances, as Puente de Ixtla’s elected agrarian authorities 
lobbied President Calles to intervene in an instance where the ejidal assembly was 
outnumbered by CNA corruption, the hacendado, the governor, and local caciques.  For 
locals, the lesson learned was that outside actors could be both sources of discord and 
support, and therefore alliances had to be cultivated strategically.  For President Calles, 
the lessons were clear: resolutions to disputes in Morelos required decisive responses by 
the executive and a willingness to override abusive state governors and corrupt agrarian 
officials.  If Puente de Ixtla represents one of the pueblos whose clashes with the 
governor upset internal social harmony most severely, other villages also loathed official 
agraristas.  The violence at Tetecala one evening in August 1925 would be among the 
bloodiest episodes in Morelos since the end of the fighting five years prior.   
The western municipal seat of Tetecala also suffered at the hands of corrupt 
outside influences, internal divisions, and rival pueblos.  Since 1921, Tetecala had 
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petitioned the Local Agrarian Commission (hereafter CLA) for lands for three years with 
no success.  While neighboring pueblos such as Miacatlán and Mazatepec and a military 
colony led by general Salvador Saavedra took control of the best rain-fed and irrigated 
lands in the region, agrarian authorities in Tetecala quarreled with several CLA 
engineers.  Landless residents accused the CLA representatives of siding with 
hacendados and smallholders.  Finally, after years of lobbying the CLA and renting lands 
from nearby haciendas, the state government issued a provisional land grant in June 
1924.  The granted lands, however, included fields coveted by Coatlán del Río and the 
military colony at the Actopan hacienda.82   
On 13 May 1925, at the same moment that Emmanuel Amor was pulling strings 
with national agrarian authorities in the dispute with Puente de Ixtla, soldiers arrived in 
Tetecala.  Upon their arrival, General Juan Domínguez, the military chief of Morelos, and 
several subordinates announced that they had orders from the Minister of War and Calles 
to return the lands used by Tetecala to the Actopan hacienda and Emmanuel Amor.  The 
soldiers ordered the local agrarian authorities to sign a document that would relinquish 
their control of the land, which they refused.  The soldiers gave them a choice: “they 
would sign the document or, on the contrary, they would be sent to Mexico City bound 
and beaten (mecateados),” reported an agent sent to investigate the matter.83  Tetecala’s 
agrarian authorities then signed the paper without telling the village’s campesinos, buying 
time before the pueblo realized their mistake.  Again, exactly with whom Amor was 
cutting deals inside the federal bureaucracy in the mid-1920s remains unclear.  This time, 
however, the state and federal governments sided with Tetecala against the intrigues of 
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the hacendado.  Calles sent a note to the Minister of War to respect Tetecala’s 
provisional land grant, indicating to local agraristas that they could count him on their 
side in local disputes.84  All the while, tensions in Tetecala stirred between the agrarian 
authorities and the municipal president in a situation eerily similar to that of Puente de 
Ixtla.   
Tetecala then held municipal elections in July 1925.  PNA members backed by 
Governor Velasco lost.  Under false pretexts, Velasco annulled the results of the contest 
and called for new elections.  The PNA lost a second time.  Within days, the governor 
sent men to Tetecala with instructions to take control of the election documents before 
the residents could form a new government.  The automobile the men travelled in broke 
down en route, forcing them back to Cuernavaca.  Informed of the failure, Cuernavaca’s 
police inspector, Felipe Vital, proceeded to travel to Tetecala himself.  On his journey, he 
stopped in Coatlán del Río, Miacatlán, and Mazatepec, where he rallied dozens of armed 
PNA supporters to accompany him to Tetecala.  In a Mazatepec cantina, discussion of a 
plan to apprehend Tetecala’s elected officials was overheard. The eavesdropper quickly 
went to the village to warn the residents. Tetecala’s elected officials took refuge in a 
house in front of the army barracks.  At nine o’clock that evening, 14 August, Vital and 
his men knocked on the door of the house. As the door opened, bullets rained down on 
the occupants. Those inside returned fire. Vital fell wounded and died several hours later 
from his wounds, the only assailant to fall.  Six residents of Tetecala lay dying on the 
floor of the house that night.85  Following the massacre, villagers from Morelos sent a 
storm of protests to President Calles denouncing Velasco and stories of the bloody events 
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at Tetecala circulated in the national press.86  Even those with no affiliation to the 
deceased raised a voice: the “victims do not belong to our party,” the Grupo Libertario 
Emiliano Zapata declared to Calles, “but for humanity” they asked him to intervene to 
oust the “infamous despotism oppressing Morelos.”87  Governor Velasco was widely 
accused of having a hand in a political massacre involving members of the PNA.  The 
tragedy gave the federal government scope to act. Consequently, Calles and the Senate 
deposed Velasco in September 1925 from the governorship.  No one protested Velasco’s 
ousting.  For villages across the state, his removal was a blessing. 
The ousting of Velasco represents one of the clearest examples of the 
municipalities bypassing the state government and successfully lobbying federal 
intervention.  More generally, the villages looked to Mexico City for leverage in their 
struggles against impositions by state governments during this period.  The residents of 
Santa María Alpuyeca, describing the chaotic politics of the mid-1920s, wrote to Calles 
in typical style: “All we know is that every day things go from bad to worse and who 
knows where we shall end if the Supreme Federal Government does not save us.”88  
Petitions such as these made it known to national officials that Morelos demanded 
stronger federal involvement in order to ensure political stability and to guard against 
despotism in Cuernavaca.  Rural inhabitants, that is to say, considered it better to ally 
with Mexico City than with Cuernavaca.  This pattern set in 1925-1926 paved the way for 
stronger ties between the central government and the rural polity.  Throughout the mid-
1920s, in fact, pueblos not only lobbied the federal regime through written letters and 
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telegrams, but they also sent delegations to Mexico City to demonstrate in favor of and 
against governors.89  Petitions and mobilization, in other words, were now taking the 
place of ballots and elections.   
The campaigning culminated in the gubernatorial election of 1926, the first held 
since 1912.  Recall that at this time Morelos still operated under unelected provisional 
governments appointed by the national legislature, as no state legislature existed during 
the 1920s to give the municipalities a formal voice in Cuernavaca.  Given the abuses 
committed by members of the PNA, it is not surprising that most of the chiefs supported 
its main rival, the Mexican Labor Party and its patron, Calles.  Numerous influential 
zapatista generals––Genaro Amezcua, Jesús Capistran, Dolores Damián Flores, Timoteo 
Sanchéz, Zeferino Ortega, and Gil Muñoz Zapata––publicly declared their support for the 
PLM candidate, Senator Fernando López.90  The recent scandals involving public 
officials, they believed, “had provoked the resurgence of the reaction.”91  That so many 
generals––over a dozen––supported the laborista candidate demonstrates the degree to 
which the PNA and obregonismo had declined and the PLM, CROM, and callismo had 
risen in mid-1920s Morelos.  The state’s political youth also supported the laboristas, and 
village clubs once controlled by the PNA fled to the PLM.92  Nonetheless, the election of 
1926 only prolonged instability in Morelos when three parties declared victory and 
created rival legislatures.  The resulting debacle forced the federal government to 
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intervene and annul the election results.  More politicos came and went for the next year.  
Cuernavaca, still semi-destroyed and under populated in the mid-1920s, was described 
during this period as a “cemetery in a florid garden.”  Only government employees, 
soldiers, and tourists inhabited the capital.  After visiting the attractions, tourists walked 
the streets taking photographs of houses and buildings ruined by the revolution.  
Commercial activity was at a halt and public services non-existent.93  
Six months after the violence at Tetecala, on the eve of the 1926 gubernatorial 
contest, a second political massacre struck Morelos.  On 6 February, dozens of workers 
from the National Highways Commission were bussed into the state capital to participate 
in a demonstration in favor of one of the candidates, Carlos Ariza.  When the raucous 
crowd arrived at Cuernavaca’s central square they were met by laboristas, who shouted 
“viva López!”  The opposing camp countered with shouts of “viva Ariza!”  Leaders from 
both groups simultaneously drew their pistols and fired; both were killed.  Moments later 
the city police arrived and fired on the laboristas, killing and injuring several.  The 
aristas suffered no further casualties.  At least seven people died as a result, including a 
twelve-year-old boy.  Ariza, who stood on the balcony of his hotel not far from the 
central plaza during the shooting, quickly fled the city.  The state government soon 
apprehended several police officers involved in the slaughter.94   
The following day, of course, witnessed widespread irregularities at voting 
stations across the state.  Three candidates declared victory and established rival 
legislatures.  The political standoff ended only after the federal government annulled the 
elections, citing the irregularities committed.95  The state-building project in Morelos lay 
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in tatters, with the national government exercising little more influence in rural areas than 
it had six years before.  Morelos hit a political low point, while interim governors came 
and went for the remainder of 1926.  Yet the the ordeal provided the region’s inhabitants 
and the callistas with invaluable governing experience that would be put into practice 
once political passions settled.       
Callismo & the Rise of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, 1927-1934 
Among the first lessons learned from the 1926 debacle in Morelos was that the individual 
selected by Congress to govern until constitutional elections could be convened had to be 
chosen with delicacy.  For this reason, Calles refused to nominate a provisional governor 
from the Mexican Labor Party to assume office in Cuernavaca “because the majority of 
morelenses are connected to any one of the groups that are disputing control of the state, 
and the executive wants a person, who, beyond being apt the for the position, does not 
have ties to agraristas or laboristas.”96  By doing so, Calles demonstrated that he could 
govern independently of his closest supporters and place the interests of the rural 
populace above his own faction’s political aims.  Then, Congress appointed Ambrosio 
Puente as provisional governor in March 1927, who endured three years in Cuernavaca.  
Little is known of Puente’s background except that he was an ally of Calles, but what 
enabled his longevity in the post was the fact that the governor did not ride roughshod 
over village elections and impose authorities in the municipalities.  Puente realized, in 
other words, that in order to avoid political instability and to coexist peacefully with rural 
Morelos the pueblos had to be allowed a degree of sovereignty.  In fact, Puente largely 
ignored the question of elections all together and instead focused on reconstruction, 
giving his political enemies reason to attack him.  The provisional governor could buy 
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time, however, because he had strong backing from both Calles and his successor, Emilio 
Portes Gil (1928-1930).  President Portes Gil himself wrote to Puente’s enemies to assure 
them of his commitment to the provisional governor, citing the improving economic 
situation, which benefitted the peasant class.97  This close arrangement between 
Cuernavaca and Mexico City was also due to Puente’s role in arresting General Francisco 
Serrano, who plotted against the federal government from Cuernavaca in October 1927.98  
Furthermore, the governor remained loyal during the Cristero War and cooperated with 
national authorities to defend Morelos from invading rebels from Guerrero.99   
From the village perspective, Puente gave the pueblos room to breathe politically 
by respecting the outcomes of local elections, which explains the drop in the number of 
village protests that had inundated the federal government in the mid-1920s.  Puente, 
rather, used the prestige of his office to resolve conflicts between pueblos and refused to 
deploy the army when tensions between rural communities rode high.100  For example, he 
was able to negotiate water-management accords between rival pueblos and channel 
material resources into village reconstruction.  The governor believed that before a 
gubernatorial election could be held the state’s finances had to return to order and that 
economic reconstruction would pave the way for democratic elections.101  Meanwhile, 
shortly after the failed gubernatorial election of February 1926, the national government 
began to invest more resources in Morelos to construct public works and rural primary 
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schools, and federal water juntas were established to administer the region’s waterways.  
These were clear signs that all three levels of government were at last working in tandem 
toward the common goal of rebuilding the state.   
Yet perhaps the most important way the callista regime showed its commitment 
to an alliance with rural Morelos was by delivering definitive land titles.  Of the 189 
presidential resolutions executed in Morelos between 1920 and 1929, nearly half of the 
cases were resolved in 1927 and 1929 alone, precisely when Morelos was proving loyal 
and the violence of the Cristero War peaked and threatened the stability of the federal 
government (see Appendix A).  Military strategy was not the sole consideration 
accelerating the land reform in the late 1920s, however.  Villagers themselves clamored 
for definitive resolutions, because the provisional titles executed by the state government 
in the early 1920s could be altered or revoked and gave no long term security.  In Jojutla, 
for example, as early as 1923, farmers demanded a definitive land grant.  Each month 
local rice growers read the state government’s official newspaper and saw other pueblos 
receiving definitive resolutions.  “We have waited with angst” for the president’s final 
decision, wrote residents to the Local Agrarian Commission.  A presidential resolution 
would “completely ensure our rights over these lands that we deem our heritage and that 
of our children…we have waited for this solemn moment to arrive.”102  This type of 
petition increased under Calles.103  A peasant league in Axochiapan wrote in 1926 that 
until the pueblo received a presidential resolution, their property remained in an “insecure 
position” and that ejidatarios could not fully devote themselves to reconstruction.104  The 
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presidential resolutions also entailed concrete benefits and access to government aid such 
as agricultural credit.  In 1927 the inhabitants of Tlalquiltenango demonstrated this when 
they urged the CNA to proceed with a definitive resolution, because, without it, the 
pueblo could not obtain credit from the government-sponsored Agricultural Bank.105  
That same year Totolapan’s ejidal committee requested its provisional resolution in order 
to create an official agrarian cooperative.106  Despite these pleas, most pueblos kept 
waiting until the Calles presidency to obtain definitive titles.  The Calles regime, that is to 
say, actively provided tangible benefits for the rural populace in the form of primary 
schools, public works, definitive land titles, and access to credit, whereas Obregón tried 
to stay above the political fray in Morelos and use his charismatic authority to resolve 
issues.  For these reasons, a period of political stability and relative social cohesion in the 
pueblos characterized the late 1920s and early 1930s.  Political violence waned during 
these years, and cases such as those of Puente de Ixtla and Tetecala in 1925 were not 
repeated in the municipalities.  Morelos was now riper than ever for building a loyal 
electoral base.    
As a sense of normalcy returned to Morelos, political crisis shook Mexico in 1928 
after president-elect Obregón was shot by a religious zealot in the “La Bombilla” 
restaurant in Mexico City.  As is well known, Calles responded by creating the PNR in 
1929 in a top-down effort to unite all the revolutionary factions under one umbrella 
party.107  Back in Morelos, the PNR was formed just as talk of holding gubernatorial 
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elections gained steam in early 1930.    To ensure the contests would be convened with 
impartiality, Puente resigned from the governorship in March.  The official daily of the 
newly created PNR applauded the move and reminded readers that Morelos had not 
possessed a constitutionally elected governor since Patricio Leyva held the post in 1913 
during the presidential administration of Francisco Madero.  The national Congress then 
sent Carlos Lavín to assume the governorship with orders to convene election 
promptly.108  Meanwhile, a convention sponsored by the PNR was held in Cuernavaca to 
select the party’s ticket of candidates in the coming campaign.  Vicente Estrada Cajigal, a 
native of Cuernavaca and a trusted associate of President Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930-
1932), won the nomination for governor and campaigned in all eight districts of the 
state.109  In Tlaltizapán and Ticumán alone, over three hundred veterans of the revolution 
organized to welcome Estrada Cajigal, while 5,000 supporters rallied behind the PNR 
candidate in Cuernavaca.110  On election day, few disturbances were reported and Estrada 
Cajigal won the governorship in a landslide victory with 21,000 votes.111  Estrada 
Cajigal’s extensive campaigning across Morelos with the backing of PNR elites, coupled 
with the opposition’s lack of a viable alternative, gave the ticket a sense of inevitable 
victory.  Of the four gubernatorial elections held in Morelos during the post-revolutionary 
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period, indeed the 1930 contest represents the most peaceful transition of executive 
power.   
The return to constitutional order in 1930 and the callistas’ respect for village 
sovereignty went a long way toward restoring normal relations between the pueblos and 
centralized authority.  Here we should also recall that the absence of a state legislature in 
Morelos between 1914 and 1929 had deprived the municipalities of a formal voice in 
Cuernavaca.  In the early 1930s, however, each of the seven state congressmen could 
claim roots in Morelos.112  As a consequence, the number of village petitions arriving in 
the presidential office dropped dramatically, while Gobernación archived only a few 
espionage reports on Morelos from 1928 to 1933.  Also of significance was the fact that 
during the early 1930s the municipal governments of Atlatlahucan, Emiliano Zapata, and 
Temixco were created to ease tensions between rural communities and distribute power 
more evenly in the countryside; hence the PNR oversaw a more locally represented 
political geography. 113  Once the state legislature reconvened in the early 1930s, it 
passed numerous laws to reorganize and fund the state government.114  Economic 
reconstruction, which had stalled for much of the 1920s, then began to accelerate with 
political stability.  The state government’s finances returned to order, and the governor’s 
office gained a reputation for donating school supplies and building materials to villages 
in order to reconstruct the irrigation system and classroom facilities.115  Road building 
also expanded and linked more isolated settlements to the larger commercial centers of 
                                                 
112 None of the state legislators were former generals.  For short biographies of the seven state legislators 
in 1930, see López González, El restablecimiento del orden constitucional en el estado de Morelos 
(Cuernavaca: Gobierno del Estado de Morelos, 1980), 57-84. 
113 Valentín López González, Morelos, historia de su integración política y territorial: 1200-1977, 2 ed. 
(Cuernavaca, 1998), 82-83. 
114 For these laws and decrees, see AHIEDM, Gobierno, cajas 62-69. 
115 See chapters three and four. 
 54 
Cuernavaca, Cuautla, and Jojutla.116  It was also in the early 1930s when Calles 
purchased the estate known as Quinta Las Palmas on the outskirts of Cuernavaca, where 
soldiers and prominent politicians such as Governor Carlos Riva Palacios of Estado de 
México came and went.  Estrada Cajigal, who had a close relationship with Calles, could 
be seen riding on horseback with the jefe máximo in Cuernavaca.117   
Most importantly, Governor Estrada Cajigal, like his predecessor Puente, better 
managed the state capital’s relationship with the pueblos than had previous 
administrations.  One way he did this was by writing to the federal government on behalf 
of pueblos to explain problems in the ejidos, thereby projecting Morelos’s rural voice into 
the offices of the national executive and enabling power to be more effectively 
articulated.118  Estrada Cajigal took official tours of rural areas to speak personally with 
ejidatarios about their plight and by doing so learned the complexities of rural issues.119  
He accumulated enough knowledge to subsequently write a multipage report titled 
“General Consideration of the Study of the Agrarian and Ejidal Problem in the State of 
Morelos,” which circulated in national offices.120  Estrada Cajigal’s positive relationship 
the Morelos countryside did not go unnoticed by national elites.  In fact, Calles felt 
comfortable enough about the situation in Morelos to appoint Estrada Cajigal as the Jefe 
del Departmento del Distrito Federal for seven months in 1932.  Later that year when 
Estrada Cajigal returned to the governorship in Cuernavaca, villagers in the Federal 
District lamented his departure to Calles.  Apparently, the governor had also cultivated 
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good relations with the pueblos of the Federal District.  Residents from Tepepan, a 
village some thirty kilometers north of Morelos, wrote that Estrada Cajigal was “well 
intentioned” and “knew how to interpret the needs of los de abajo and solve difficult 
problems.”121  Back in Morelos, Estrada Cajigal boasted to national authorities that 
campesinos had collaborated with the state government to build reconstruction projects 
such as roads and schools, volunteering labor and even donating money for the 
completion of public works.122    
As Estrada Cajigal consolidated the PNR system, by the middle of his term in 
1932, it was becoming apparent to all that the real competition for political power was 
already occurring within the structures of the PNR rather than constitutional elections.  
After the 1932 municipal contests, the state’s official newspaper announced that the most 
notable aspect of the vote was a lack of “the slightest incident or intent of disorder, which 
is very significant and shows the idiosyncrasy of morelenses, always standing by their 
traditions.”123  Fewer instances of electoral fraud and less meddling by state politicians 
allowed the pueblos to “decompress” politically between 1927 and 1933.124  It may be 
surprising that rural communities were given more room for self-governance during the 
Maximato, which is often viewed as a period of centralization, but it was the period when 
a high percentage of village families gained formal access to lands and a say inprimary 
polls.  In 1930, for instance, over three-fourths of the rural population worked ejidal 
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plots.125  The peasantry’s secured rights to the soils, in other words, translated into 
political stability, as locals asserted more control over pueblo institutions such as the 
town councils, schools, and agrarian committees.     
 The question remained, however, whether or not the state government could carry 
out a second and consecutive peaceful transition of power in 1934.  Before the 
gubernatorial contest that year, the PNR convened primaries in January, which marked a 
key moment of party formation in post-revolutionary Morelos.  Practically every faction 
with ambitions to capture the governorship participated in the contests held in January.   
That both former revolutionaries and civilian politicos alike now considered themselves 
members of the PNR speaks to the rapid rise of the organization in Morelos.  Over 19,000 
individuals voted in the January primaries.  It was the first statewide contest in which the 
party flexed its organizational muscle in the countryside, and it was also watched closely 
by authorities in Mexico City.  Fifteen Gobernación spies descended on rural Morelos to 
oversee and report on elections in every municipal seat.126  Gobernación ordered every 
postal and telegraph office in the state to relay the election results back to the capital, 
“without intervening in them.”127   
Francisco Álvarez, the official candidate supported by Governor Estrada Cajigal, 
ran the most spectacular operation in Cuernavaca.  Days before the contests, propaganda 
circulated throughout the state capital announcing a “national luncheon” and “popular 
celebration” at nine in the morning in Cuernavaca Stadium, where the alvaristas would 
gather to count votes.  Álvarez promised boxing matches, cockfights, music bands, 
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dancers, charros, free food, and free bus rides to and from the stadium and Jardín 
Morleos for all those who wanted to attend the event.  A federal agent found “many 
families, women, and children” that morning in the stadium and “six barrels of pulque” to 
liven up the festivities.  Not surprisingly, Álvarez won the votes of Cuernavaca’s thirty-
two delegates to represent him at the state party convention afterwards.128  In Cuautla, the 
alvaristas counted votes in the bullring, where a horse show (“jaripeo”) and bullfight 
were held for voters.129  Meanwhile, busloads of farmers from small pueblos poured into 
the municipal seats to cast votes.  Mobilizing buses full of campesinos was so important 
to the candidates’ voter turnout strategies that the alvaristas destroyed a bridge 
connecting Jojutla and Tlaltizapán to prevent the passage of their rivals.130  Álvarez, 
however, was ultimately outmatched by his rival, Refugio Bustamante, who held a seat in 
the Morelos state legislature and was widely known to be supported by national Senator 
Carlos Riva Palacio.  Bustamanete employed similar tactics to the alvaristas and won a 
third of the total votes casted on election day, thereby becoming the official PNR 
candidate for governor in 1934.  The primaries were in fact now the main forum for 
political struggle.  When, for example, the constitutional elections were held three 
months later, a Gobernación agent noted “the elections passed with marked indifference,” 
as Bustamante was the only candidate to participate in the campaign.131  In just four 
years, therefore, the PNR had established itself as the only party capable of delivering 
electoral victories in Morelos.  Part of its electoral strategy—distributing booze and 
providing entertainment during primary elections—was, of course, old-fashion patronage, 
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but popular participation in the internal contests also showed that the political culture of 
rural Morelos was maturing out of traditional chieftainship and into an electoral system 
of political parties.  It had taken a good six years since political stability returned to 
Morelos in 1927 to establish a functioning electoral system in which PNR leaders could 
mobilize the rural electorate and villagers could have a say in the official ticket through 
primary voting.  Yet progress on the political front faced an uncertain future as both a 
new governor of Morelos and president of Mexico assumed power in 1934.     
Cardenismo & the Renegotiation of Pueblo Loyalty, 1934-1940 
With Ambrosio Puente and Vicente Estrada Cajigal gone, the alliance between Mexico 
City and rural Morelos broke down.  This was due to several factors.  Population growth, 
social reforms, bureaucratization, and renewed stormy relations between Cuernavaca and 
the municipalities put new pressures on agrarian communities.  While the state never 
returned to the chaos of the mid-1920s, the relative social and political cohesion that 
characterized the early 1930s vanished.  One reason for this was that Governor 
Bustamante failed to live up to the pact with the pueblos.  He was typical of the state’s 
non-zapatista political class and his governing style became a source of rocky relations 
between Cuernavaca and the municipalities.  A Cuautla businessman with investments in 
agriculture, Bustamante fled Morelos during the revolution and returned in 1916 to 
launch a career in local politics.132  While politicians in Morelos never opposed agrarian 
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reform, Bustamante sought to channel all organization, mobilization, and demands of the 
popular classes through the government and official party.  His rise had more to do with 
an alliance with the powerful Senator Carlos Riva Palacio, president of the PNR from 
1933 to 1934, than his popularity in the pueblos, as both the governor and the senator 
were loyal callistas.   
These callista credentials were now of declining value, however, as the years of 
1934-1936 witnessed the decline and fall of Calles as the most powerful figure in 
Mexican politics and the emergence of President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940).  Indeed, 
as cardenismo rose as a political force in the pueblos, callistas lost their political tough 
and grew more remote and manipulative.  Villages in Morelos abetted this national 
regime change by denouncing the callista governor to Cárdenas, which further isolated 
Bustamante politically.  Cries of official meddling in local elections resurfaced during his 
administration and split the state legislature into pro and anti-Bustamante factions.133  In 
the meantime, official corruption became blatant.134  Then the state teacher’s union, 
formed in 1934, allied with national organizations and struck against Bustamante’s 
regime in 1936, in protest at its attempts to control the appointment of teachers in 
pueblos.135  Within the PNR, a struggle erupted for control of the state party between the 
governor’s callista faction on the one hand and a loose coalition of cardenistas on the 
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the governor’s hold over the municipalities.  The event did, however, alienate some business groups and 
local parents, who protested the politicization of their children’s teachers and the closings of schools.  For 
the strike, see AHSEP, Escuelas Primarias, caja 134, exp., ff. 10-11, Liga to Lázaro Cárdenas, 22 January 
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other.  The struggle pitted the governor and his supporters against the Morelos Liga de 
Comunidades Agrarias (hereafter Liga), the state teacher’s union, leftists in the state 
legislature, and dozens of chiefs in the pueblos.136   One of Bustamante’s greatest 
misdeeds came in 1935, when he held a secret meeting in Yautepec to conspire against 
and remove unfriendly PNR committees in the municipalities.137  The maneuver reeked 
of the impositions of the mid-1920s and complaints against the governor landed in 
Cárdenas’s offices.138  Attempts such as these to remove political figures from the town 
councils ultimately cost the callistas control of the Morelos PNR.  To make matters 
worse, the governor and his allies in the municipalities used heavy-handed tactics to deal 
with former zapatistas who would not fully support the state regime, leading Enrique 
Rodríguez “El Tallarín” to launch an armed rebellion from eastern Morelos that 
threatened political stability in the state.139  Callista efforts to cling on to power made 
Morelos ungovernable once again.   
There was a demographic explanation as well as a political one.  Tensions also 
stirred inside rural communities because population growth put new pressures on natural 
resources by the mid-1930s.  Specifically, the statewide agrarian reform attracted landless 
peasants from Guerrero to settle in Morelos, dividing villages between natives and 
newcomers.  In 1940, it was estimated that guerrerenses made up a third of the total 
population in Morelos.140  Most of this migration appears to have occurred in the 1930s; 
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there is little mention of guerrerenses living in Morelos pueblos in the documentation of 
the 1920s.  This was especially so in the hotlands of southwestern Morelos adjacent to 
Guerrero, where plentiful irrigation waters allowed rice cultivation to flourish in the post-
revolutionary period.  Across the state, a nativist pulse, which had justly characterized 
village opposition to the non-morelense governors of the 1920s, resurfaced in the 1930s 
to divide factions at the village level.  Morelenses viewed the newcomers with suspicion 
and tried to keep them out of communal decisions.141  Land invasions and cattle raiding 
launched by peasants from Guerrero exacerbated these pueblo tensions.142  Even worse, 
complaints arose during the land reform of the mid-1930s that some agrarian bureaucrats 
gave newcomers preference over natives of Morelos in deciding who would receive ejidal 
plots.143  Established families in the pueblos reacted by attempting to prevent 
guerrerenses from gaining ejidal plots or influence in local politics.  An agrarian leader 
from Panchimalco (Jojutla) went so far as to declare in front of an applauding audience in 
Cuernavaca that not all villagers should have the same rights; the founders of the ejido 
and their direct descendants should have first come first serve access to the best fields.144  
State and local politicians capitalized on these sentiments and appealed to voters’ 
regional loyalty with slogans such as “First the Morelenses and then the Mexicans.”145  
Divisions such as these went beyond politics and physically segregated pueblos, with 
migrants from Guerrero often residing in separate neighborhoods.  Finally, it was the 
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native and better-off ejidatarios, according to Rounds’s case study of Yautepeec, who 
forged closer ties with central authority as a way to prevent the landless from gaining any 
rights.  As a result, their dependence on outside authorities grew as they sought to defend 
the status quo and reward loyal inhabitants during a decade of rapid population growth.146   
In the mid-1930s, all these factors heightened rural dissatisfaction with the official 
party and threatened to undo the gains made in Morelos since the late 1920s.  Take for 
instance the PNR primaries held in late 1937.  The turnout for the internal elections was 
so low—less than half the total of the 1934 turnout—that the state party annulled the 
electoral results and fielded no official candidate in the constitutional contests held in 
April of 1938.  This constituted a major blow to Bustamante, because the annulment 
amounted to a motion of no confidence by party authorities.  Consequently, members of 
the party were free to vote for whomever they pleased in the constitutional races.147  The 
state PNR had thus responded to the low turnout in the primaries and would not allow an 
official candidate with little internal support to dominate the constitutional elections.  It 
was a notable concession to rural voters, who would reward party elites by turning out in 
high numbers for the popular contests.  In sum, the cardenista state had allowed the 
pueblos to hand-pick a successor to Bustamante by thwarting his attempt to fix the PNR 
primaries.    
Governor Bustamante characteristically attempted to impose a loyal successor in 
the 1938 state elections, but rural mobilization overwhelmed his campaign.  The year 
1938, in fact, was the apogee of pueblo power in Morelos politics.   Elpidio Perdomo, a 
former colonel in the zapatista army, won the gubernatorial contest, even though three 
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additional local candidates with revolutionary credentials, Emigdio Marmolejo,148 
Maurelio Mejía,149 and Porfirio Neri,150 further split rural ballots.  The contests witnessed 
higher voter turnout than any of the previous statewide races, and though voting 
irregularities were reported across the state, Perdomo won the race handily with over 
26,000 of the 38,000 ballots cast, most of which came from 32,000 ejidatarios in the 
countryside.151  Still, Bustamante refused to recognize the election results, and a ten-day 
standoff ensued between two rival legislatures.  On 1 May, six hundred perdomista 
farmers poured into Cuernavaca from the surrounding countryside.  Many were armed, 
heightening political tensions in the town.  Meanwhile, Perdomo led a march of 1,500 
supporters through Cuernavaca’s principal streets.  The procession included mostly 
children from the town’s public schools, government employees, hotel and restaurant 
employees, and workers from the electrician and highways unions.152 
Then, at two thirty in the afternoon, a Gobernación agent relaxing in Jardín 
Morelos heard shots.  The firing came from the direction of Perdomo’s offices.  Seven 
armed men had entered the governor-elect’s headquarters and indiscriminately fired some 
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forty bullets at those unfortunate persons present in the office.  One individual was killed 
instantly, while half a dozen lay injured.  Troops stationed in Jardín Morelos quickly 
arrived at the scene to restore order and detained several individuals.  Three of the 
suspects were federal deputies, including the representative from Morelos, Andrés 
Duarte, and Congressmen Atanasio Arrieta from Durango and Miguel Hidalgo Sálazar 
from Puebla.  They were accompanied by three or four gunmen from Mexico City.153  
The botched conspiracy gave the perdomistas the scope to act.  On 4 May, the victorious 
state legislature was sworn in.  Its first order of business was to oust Bustamante from the 
governorship with less than a dozen days remaining in his mandate.  It was the final blow 
to callismo in Morelos.  The mobilized farmers returned to the countryside and Perdomo 
assumed the governorship by mid-May.154     
The defeat of the PNR’s old guard in 1938 paved the way for a reorganization of 
the party in Morelos.  At the national level, the party was also transforming.  In March 
1938, delegates met in Mexico City to reorganize the PNR and rename it the Party of the 
Mexican Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Mexicana), integrating state agrarian 
leagues into the party apparatus.  By doing so, the institution grew into a nationwide 
party of the masses.  Membership in the organization increased from 1,300,000 persons 
in 1934 to 4,305,000 in 1938—over half of whom were campesinos.155  Back in Morelos, 
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the countryside began to decompress politically after a period of growing tensions.  
President Cárdenas had not only curbed anticlericalism in village classrooms by this time, 
but he also oversaw more land redistribution in Morelos.  Moreover, he revived the sugar 
economy in March of 1938 by inaugurating the giant sugar mill at Zacatepec.156 Perhaps 
most noteworthy was the fact that former zapatista combatants won electoral victories in 
districts across the state.  Five chiefs secured nearly every seat in the state legislature in 
1938, cementing the political strength of Morelos’s pueblos. Pioquinto Galis, Demetrio 
Gutiérrez, Quintín González, Miguel Zúñiga, and Nicolás Zapata were among the former 
zapatistas who won state legislative seats.157  The victory of the revolutionary coalition in 
Morelos that year further enhanced the prestige and influence of the official party in rural 
areas.  Finally, after Enrique Rodríguez surrendered and returned to civil life in 
September 1938, the pact between rural Morelos and Mexico City was reestablished.   
Electoral victories, however, did not translate into political unity among the 
zapatistas.  In many respects, Elpidio Perdomo’s governorship represented the 
institutionalization of zapatismo after 1920.  Originally from Tlalquiltenango, Perdomo 
had fought in the army against De la Huerta rebels in Guerrero in 1924.  He was later 
stationed in northern Mexico and returned to Morelos in 1935, earning a spot as an 
alternate senator (suplente) in the national Congress.  In the high-turnout election of 
1938, Perdomo captured the votes of ejidatarios unhappy with the leadership of the 
Morelos Liga, but his later tendency to use a heavy hand when dealing with political 
enemies at the local level earned him the ire of numerous pueblos.  By the end of 1938, 
Perdomo was himself accused of hiring gunmen to kill and intimidate political opponents 
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in Cuautla, Yautepec, Yecapixtla, Jojutla, Jonacatepec, and other villages.158  To make 
matters worse, in 1939, five revolutionaries in the state legislature accused Perdomo of 
overstepping his authority by meddling in the affairs of the judicial and legislative 
branches.  Pioquinto Galis, Miguel Zúñiga, Demetrio Gutiérrez, Quintín González and 
Nicolás Zapata were subsequently expelled from the legislature after a standoff with 
Perdomo.159  Perdomo’s support in his home region around Jojutla and elsewhere then 
plummeted in the early 1940s, as his relationship with the sugar union’s leader, Rubén 
Jaramillo, deteriorated until the farmer was provoked into revolt in 1942.  Jaramillo’s 
rebellion would carry the torch of zapatismo back into the hills and usher in a new era of 
politics in Morelos.160   
By way of conclusion, it is important to highlight changes and continuities in 
Morelos politics during the tumultuous post-revolutionary period.  One factor in the 
political equation remained constant: the state could not easily be governed without a 
significant degree of pueblo consent, as shown in the electoral chaos of the mid-1920s, 
the upheaval of the mid-1930s, and the 1938 post-election stand-off.  This was, perhaps, 
the legacy of zapatismo in the politics of post-revolutionary Morelos.  Indeed, pueblos 
counted more now than ever as the foundation for larger regional and national political 
coalitions.   
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The strength of the pueblo as both an idea—“the people”—and as a body of 
political communities explains why rule by consent stood at the center of post-
revolutionary politics in rural Morelos.  To be a member or representative of the “the 
people” meant to embody the popular will.  Zapatismo, after all, placed emphasis on 
village cohesiveness as social units rather than as simply geographic entities, because a 
democratic and tight-knit people guarded against despotism.161  In their political 
conflicts, locals frequently invoked the term “el pueblo” to mobilize a municipal 
electorate and emphasize village sovereignty, clean elections, and honest government.  
Take for instance the 1926 gubernatorial election in Puente de Ixtla.  On election day, 
municipal authorities blatantly favored the official candidate and would not allow voters 
to cast ballots for the opposition.  Villagers then took the initiative and mobilized 
explicitly in the name of the pueblo.  A Gobernación secret agent reported what unfolded 
next:  
 
The pueblo en masse took the determination to install an independent voting 
station… [and] to organize it in accordance with the law.  I was convinced of the 
organizing force of the campesinos and the sensible and ordered labor of their 
candidate by the fact that everyone gathered at the independent voting station very 
respectfully showed their credential that testified to their residency, and they went 
on voting in complete order.162   
Spontaneous creation of independent voting booths became a recurring way for villagers 
to bypass corrupt officials and ensure the electoral integrity of the community.  The same 
thing happened during the 1938 elections for governor.  In every municipal seat where 
the authorities favored one candidate over another, villagers were distrustful of official 
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voting stations and set up their own booths to count the ballots.163  Ubiquitous 
invocations of the pueblo such as these demonstrate how locals used the 
multidimensional concept as a way to defend and even enforce sovereignty.  To varying 
degrees, each settlement in the countryside possessed the ability to mobilize the pueblo 
and to pursue popular causes, even if such cohesive behavior was often weakened by 
internal divisions and pernicious outside influences.  Be they migrants from Guerrero or 
politicians from other states, membership in the Morelos “pueblo” was almost 
exclusively for morelenses, which explains why the nativist pulse in regional politics 
endured so strongly for two decades.   
Change, on the other hand, could be seen in the relationship between rural 
Morelos and Mexico City.  For example, President Obregón was reluctant to engage with 
the pueblos.  His trip to Cuernavaca in March 1923 to shore up the Parres government, 
the transfer of De la O to a military post in Tlaxcala, and the lip service he paid to the 
agrarian cause was largely the extent of his involvement in Morelos, and none provided 
real solutions to region’s enduring problems.  Calles, on the other hand, assumed the 
presidency and had to respond almost immediately to the electoral upheaval gripping the 
state in 1925-1926.  One way he did so was by ousting Governor Velasco in 1925 after 
the massacre at Tetecala when village petitions poured into executive offices.  Another 
way the callistas came to terms with the countryside was to appoint Ambrosio Puente to 
the governorship, who respected the outcomes of municipal elections.  Vicente Estrada 
Cajigal’s election to the post in Cuernavaca in 1930 continued this practice, which helped 
expand the PNR’s reach into rural areas.  Cárdenas, like the callistas, also actively 
responded to circumstances in Morelos by carrying out more land reform, curbing 
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anticlericalism, cancelling the results of the low-turnout PNR primaries of 1937, and 
backing Perdomo in the 1938 electoral standoff.  Throughout all these negotiations with 
different federal regimes, the rural polity in Morelos displayed an uncanny knack to cast 
its lot with the victorious coalition in national politics.  In 1920 they had backed 
Obregón, and they then supported Calles four years later until it became apparent that 
Cárdenas would emerge triumphant in the national political struggle of the mid-1930s.  
Mexico City, meanwhile, had managed to retain support in the Morelos countryside 
because it had shared sovereignty with the pueblos in the 1920s and 1930s rather than 
impose its will on mobilized villages.  
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Chapter II: Land Reform and Pueblo Revival 
The agrarian reform of the 1920s and 1930s was a democratizing as well as centralizing 
force in the Morelos countryside, as villagers sought not just land and liberty from the 
federal government, but also political room to maneuver through newly established ejidal 
assemblies sanctioned by the National Agrarian Commission.  Instituted by Carranza’s 
1915 Agrarian Law and CNA Circular #22, the assemblies consisted of local comités 
ejecutivos and comités particulares adminstrativos (executive and administrative 
committees).  President Calles further elaborated on the responsibilities of the committees 
in a 1925 decree.  Each year villagers elected members to the land committees to manage 
the community’s natural resources.  Functionally distinct, the executive committee 
handled the external affairs of the ejido and its relations with state and national 
bureaucrats, while the administrative committee managed the ejido’s internal 
organization and plot assignments.164  Over the course of the 1920s, these assemblies 
formed bridgeheads with the CNA for the pueblos to voice local grievances in 
presidential offices.  The agrarian committees, in fact, became bastions of resistance 
against abusive state-level and municipal politicians and rural elites.  Pueblos, in other 
words, gained power through the ejidal assemblies, which were subject to local control in 
Morelos.  At the same time, rural inhabitants strategically manipulated the different levels 
of authority within the agrarian bureaucracy as leverage in local conflicts.  This process 
enabled the Local and National Agrarian Commissions to perform legislative acts and 
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function as a kind of judiciary in land-related matters, allowing Mexico City to usurp 
powers once exercised by the state and municipal governments.  In the meantime, 
agronomists served as middle-men between elites and villagers, negotiating statistical 
representations and the ejidal boundaries of rural Morelos that further facilitated Mexico 
City’s assertion of control over the countryside.  Villagers thus actively used the agrarian 
bureaucracy to engage the state.165  All told, from 1920 to 1929 over 208,000 hectares of 
lands were redistributed to the pueblos of Morelos.  A second phase of the agrarian 
reform then followed in the mid-1930s under President Cárdenas, who doled out a further 
69,000 hectares of lands in Morelos, thereby cementing the alliance between the villages 
and the federal government (see Appendix A).   
Studies of the post-revolutionary ejidal assemblies, however, have tended to 
emphasize their role in empowering Mexico City at the expense of rural polities, while 
relegating any benefits these committees may have brought to villagers.  Likewise, the 
federal government’s preference for redistributing lands in the form of dotación (grant) 
instead of restitución (restitution) has been seen as proof of the center’s political project 
to control the agrarian reform at the expense of the peasantry.   In short, most works have 
focused on authoritarianism in the ejidos and the political project of national elites while 
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ignoring what pueblos gained from such as relationship.166  This chapter reappraises the 
role of the ejidal assemblies by arguing that the agrarian reform carried out in post-
revolutionary Morelos was both a centralizing and a democratizing device, at least vis-à-
vis local elites, and that rural communities were more politically pragmatic and willing to 
deal with Mexico City than scholars have previously assumed.  The national regime 
offered the countryside a crucial ally against rural elites in Morelos who were in retreat 
but nonetheless hostile to agrarian reform.  Communities anguished over the return of 
Porfirian landlords because most villages held only provisional titles to the soil in the 
1920s, which explains the pueblo insistence on rapid land redistribution and a close 
alliance with the federal government mediated via the new ejidal assemblies.     
This chapter first provides an analysis of the land petitions written by villagers in 
the early 1920s in order to capture the dispositions of the pueblos at the crucial juncture 
between revolution and reform.  It argues that the legal distinction between dotación and 
restitución was of secondary importance to the majority of communities and that what 
mattered most to the villages was to secure control of the land in the form of definitive 
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title—the surest form of defense against vindictive landlords.  A second section examines 
how the ejidal assembies provided a counter weight to hostile smallholders, tenants on 
haciendas, and former hacendados who sought to control the town councils.  The politics 
of deforestation, the subject of the third section, further explores this theme by showing 
how the nationally-sanctioned agrarian committees were used to battle municipal 
authorities and private landowners who exploited the forest resources at will.  Finally, the 
chapter concludes with a section devoted to the village petitions that prompted President 
Cárdenas to carry out a second agrarian reform in Morelos during the 1930s. 
Land Petitions 
The land petitions of the early 1920s capture the outlook of the pueblos at this crucial 
juncture between revolution and official reform and their desire to engage with Mexico 
City via the ejidal assemblies against local elites.  In July 1920, the Local Agrarian 
Commission, headquartered in Cuernavaca, circulated the procedures for communities to 
follow in order to obtain lands and waters.167  Villagers expressed claims to the soil by 
recalling the events surrounding the despoilment of their natural resources, sometimes 
going back hundreds of years.  The residents of Ocuituco, for example, reclaimed waters 
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given to the community in 1608 colonial land documents.168  The rancho of Huatecalco 
(Tlaltizapán) traced the loss of its lands to 1843, when a parish priest tried to sell the 
inhabitants’ small plots.  Ten years later, the Amilpa hacienda controlled the disputed 
fields.169  Meanwhile, Huitzilac, a northern village bordering the Federal District, 
remembered losing a strip of mountainous terrain in 1904.  The piece of land in question 
had belonged to the pueblo “since times immemorial,” a common phrase used by 
villagers but one that should not be interpreted literally.  At the time of Huitzilac’s 
despoilment, however, residents did not even issue a formal complaint because of “the 
state we found ourselves in.  As is well known…in those times of the dictatorship, raising 
a voice against an abuse was enough to be immediately persecuted.”170  This Manichean 
language of a black and white world dividing village and hacienda was a hallmark of the 
political language of zapatismo.  Dozens of rural communities could recall generations of 
land transactions and name the individuals involved, the exact year of a dispute, and the 
outcome of litigation.  They employed the same events and memories that once justified 
rural rebellion to now reclaim their historic right to the land.  
Recollections of abusive landlords and the experiences of the Porfiriato indeed 
remained fresh and bitter.  Take for instance Santa Maria, which recounted its 
relationship with the Temixco hacienda going back to 1870: 
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It was the said estate that invariably extorted the residents of this pueblo to the 
degree that that it repeatedly exercised revenge against our Representatives and 
persons who had the boldness to claim the just rights of the pueblo.  We even 
remember six residents of Santa María who were deported to Quintina Roo just 
for assuming the representation of the population…Eighteen years after such a 
fatal incident, we have had no news of them despite having vigorously inquired 
about their whereabouts.171 
Horrific memories of hacienda authorities abducting relatives and neighbors and 
banishing them to the notorious labor camps of the Yucatán peninsula fed a constant fear 
that the hacendados would return to power in the 1920s.  The widespread belief that 
landlords could make a comeback in post-revolutionary Morelos, coupled with the 
militarization of the land question, in significant measure explains why the federal 
government found a bastion of support in the state.  The Sonoran regime and villagers 
both possessed a mutual enemy in the scions of Porfirian Morelos.  By recalling past 
injustices, then, the early land petitions opened the door to a tacit alliance between 
peasants and national elites, as Cuernavaca and Mexico City overwhelmingly sided with 
the pueblos in disputes with estate owners who sought to recover lost lands during the 
1920s.   
The CLA ordered petitioners to include data from the títulos primordiales 
(colonial land deeds) as the basis for all restitution claims.  These títulos contained the 
origins of village collective memories, as the Spanish Crown, through these documents, 
established the pueblo’s right to land.  Where they existed the thick files demarcated a 
community’s boundaries in writing, pictures, and maps and sanctioned the possession of 
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land.  Most communities went to extraordinary lengths to keep these papers safe.  When 
Zapata was asked why he was fighting, he famously brandished a bundle of copied 
village land titles of Anenecuilco.172 
Using colonial deeds as the basis of their claims, nearly every community in 
Morelos petitioned for “restitution” of their natural resources, but only one percent of the 
redistributed lands were ever delivered in the form of restitution.  Practically all pueblos, 
instead, took control of the soil in the form of dotación, or grant.  Scholars often take the 
federal government’s preference for grants over restitutions to emphasize the political 
project of elites.173  That is, the post-revolutionary order would not recognize the 
previously held rights of the pueblos but rather created a system whereby the state 
bestowed usufructuary rights upon a rural population.  By doing so, according to this 
orthodox interpretation, the state, not the village, was the ultimate decider in who 
controlled which lands.  And for the villages, restitution equaled justice, whereas a grant 
was interpreted as an insult.174  While perhaps the preference for dotación was tinged 
with political considerations, few works have produced actual cases of a pueblo’s 
response to receiving a grant, rather than restitution.  How did a rural community that had 
safeguarded ancient documents interpret the discarding of its historic right to surrounding 
lands? 
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The evidence in fact suggests that for most pueblos the all-important distinction 
between grant and restitution has been exaggerated.  Only a few villages, as it turns out, 
actually went to the extraordinary lengths needed to provide the sufficient documentation 
to earn a restitution of land; most pueblos accepted the grants without quibbles.  That is 
to say that ancient parchments secured a political rather than a strictly historical claim to 
the land.  The legal distinction was undoubtedly important to the government, but the 
villages learned to accept dependency on Mexico City in exchange for backing in 
disputes with local elites.  The few pueblos that did demand restitution over a grant 
included the cradles of the revolution—Anenecuilco (home of the Zapatas) and Santa 
María (De la O’s birthplace).  Each of these small communities staked an aggressive 
claim to natural resources surrounding the villages and sought recognition of their 
previously held rights to the land.  Each also displayed more unity and cohesiveness 
during the 1920s than did other more divided communities.  Anenecuilco, for example, 
was one of the first villages to receive land in October 1920, but it could not furnish 
sufficient documentation to prove that the neighboring haciendas of Coahuixtla, Hospital, 
and Tenextepango had usurped its territory.175  Two-and-a-half years later, residents from 
Anenecuilco wrote to the authorities stating they now had the documents necessary to 
prove past despoilments.  The residents clamored for restitution before a presidential 
resolution issued them a grant.  “We testify before this court…that the pueblo of 
Anenecuilco is the cradle of the revolution, the principal foundation to restitute and grant 
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[lands to] pueblos.”176  If Zapata’s home village could not earn restitution, they asserted, 
then who could?  In 1927, Anenecuilco’s leaders presented their títulos primordiales 
before the agrarian authorities demonstrating the community’s ownership of the fertile 
Nopal and Zacuaco fields.177  Villagers then wrote to De la O, in distant Tlaxcala, urging 
him to use his influence to help their case; yet the government was still not convinced by 
the pueblo’s claims.  Two years later, indeed President Emilio Portes Gil signed 
Anenecuilco’s presidential land grant (dotación).  Anenecuilco did not even receive an 
extension of its provisional grant either, leaving the pueblo to conclude “that we are not 
agreement with these dispositions” of the National Agrarian Commission.178  The case 
closed, temporarily at least until the mid-1930s.   
Another rare instance of dispute over the form of land redistribution occurred in 
Santa María, where the pueblo’s inhabitants placed paramount importance on earning 
recognition of the village’s historic rights.  Pueblo leaders spent several years in the 
1920s searching in the national archives in Mexico City for the required documents to 
obtain restitution.  Their quest delayed official reform.  In 1933, Santa María remained 
the only pueblo in Morelos without a definitive resolution;179 only a year earlier the 
community had belatedly received a provisional restitution of 5,271 hectares of lands 
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(mostly wooded hillsides) from the Temixco hacienda.180  When Santa María’s case 
moved to a conclusion in federal executive offices that November, however, villagers 
rejected the presidential resolution, “refusing to sign any document related to the said 
possessions,” reported a CNA representative.181  Santa María sought more woodland, 
even though the government was willing to acknowledge its dispossession at the hands of 
the Temixco hacienda during the Porfiriato.  Jorge Rojano of the CNA studied the case 
for several years and wrote in 1934 that the presidential resolution of 1929 “had not been 
executed due to village residents opposing it and believing that it did not satisfy their 
desires, since they demand more surface area.”182  He blamed their stubbornness on 
caciques, who rallied the inhabitants against the resolution handed down by the president.  
When, and if, Santa María finally resolved its land claims remains unclear, but the case, 
like that of Anenecuilco, represents an internally cohesive community demanding 
recognition of the community’s historic rights and staking an aggressive claim to a large 
amount of natural resources.183  These unique pueblos were strong enough to stare down 
the state over legal distinctions that most villages were pragmatic about but not strong 
enough to get what they deserved, or not all at once. 
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Given the fact that Genovevo de la O was the military commander of Morelos from 1920 
to 1924, it is not surprising that Santa María was one of the most powerful pueblos in 
Morelos at this time.  Santa María was home to a well-armed militia and had ambitions to 
control a huge swath of the Ajusco Mountains at the expense of smaller and weaker 
neighbors, and their aspirations reignited an old conflict with neighboring Huitzilac.184  
Both villages, reported the Local Agrarian Commission, were mobilized and ready to 
“resolve the subject with arms in hand,” because Santa María sought “an enormous 
extension of wooded lands in the Ajusco for no less 12 sitios de ganado” in the area 
surrounding Huitzilac.  Such antagonisms were made all the more bitter given that Santa 
María and Huitzilac had violently disputed these lands a decade before, when De la O 
ordered the chief of Huitzilac, Francisco Pacheco, to be shot after he defected from the 
zapatistas.185  What unfolded in 1920s Morelos, then, reflects to a degree what occurs in 
all triumphant revolutions: the victorious insurgents had defeated and expelled the old 
rulers from the scene and they now turned on each other in a struggle for the spots.  
Command over Morelos’s lands, waters, and forests drove this competition.  
Santa María’s strong preference for restitution brought the pueblo into conflicts 
with communities across the northwestern region since it would confer rights of a 
primordial kind over lands that were simultaneously claimed by other, newer, villages.  
For Santa María, rights based on history and law trumped the rights of others based on 
need.  Take the tiny hamlet of Buena Vista del Monte.  In 1921, the pueblo described 
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Santa María as “expansionist and absorbent.”186  Three years later, when the CNA 
commissioned agents to visit Buena Vista in order to consider the pueblo’s land petition, 
delegates found the hamlet unpopulated and the houses destroyed.187   “It is not remote to 
suppose,” wrote a delegate of the CNA, “that the residents of Buenavista have been throw 
out of their homes by means of force, since almost all the residents of Santa María were 
armed and formed part of the forces of General Genovevo de la O, who supports them in 
their violent acts towards other pueblos.”188  Residents of the hamlet fled to neighboring 
communities, where they found access to ejidal parcels; they would not return to Buena 
Vista del Monte to repopulate the settlement until eight years later.  Santa María’s 
aggressions, in fact, led the pueblo to quarrel with San Antón, Cuentepec, Tlaltenango, 
and Tetela—nearly every village in the highlands northwest of Cuernavaca.  The CLA 
reported in 1921 that the “the conditions that the nearby pueblos [to Santa María] have 
been put in are well known by the Executive of the State.189  This all fit De la O’s 
personalist style of dealing with friend and foe alike, and there was little Cuernavaca 
could do to protect the weaker villages.    
Several factors explain Santa María’s bellicose behavior during these years.  The 
pueblo possessed fresh and bitter memories of conflicts with the Temixco hacienda 
during the Porfiriato, when raising protests against the hacendado could result in 
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banishment to the Yucatán and a life of hard labor.  During the revolution, the location of 
the village in the highlands between Mexico and Cuernavaca made it a strategic point in 
the military campaigns, where De la O’s forces formed a first line of defense against 
invading armies.  The federal army knew this and burned Santa María to the ground 
during the war.  As a result, the pueblo’s inhabitants had learned to stick together in order 
to survive, and its high degree of martial spirit allowed it to pursue ambitious territorial 
claims.  That De la O possessed access to arms as chief of military operation of Morelos 
only increased Santa María’s ability to pursue its agrarian interests effectively.  
Unusually, the village did not rely on links to the central state (its CNA files are thin) and 
displayed a kind of primitive agrarianism based on traditional chieftainship and 
militarism.  All told, Santa María was the most Spartan-like pueblo in all post-
revolutionary Morelos, carving out a living in the woods and ready to defend its territory 
with arms. 
To be sure, Santa María and Anenecuilco represent exceptions to the rule in 
regards to whether a land grant rather than restitution offended local interest, but in all 
cases it was the ejidal assemblies who endorsed the process by fine-tuning the land 
petitions and voting on which government initiatives to accept.  Even though a majority 
of pueblos applied for restitution, most accepted a grant without protest and did not 
pursue lengthy and expensive quests for colonial and nineteenth-century land titles that 
might or might not qualify for restitution.  For the villages, the dotaciones were sufficient 
enough, because, above all, they gained control of the soils and now possessed a formal 
channel to raise a voice in Mexico City through the ejidal assemblies.  A dotación, then, 
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did not necessarily diminish the meaning of a pueblo’s past struggles and previous 
ownership of land.  Rather, it was a fast track to resolving the murkiness surrounding 
hundreds of years of land transactions.  By accepting grants and not protesting the lack of 
restitutions, the pueblos demonstrated that they had adapted their ideas, language, and 
philosophical understanding of the agrarian reform to the legal and political framework of 
the 1920s and 1930s.  What counted most for the vast majority of the communities was 
immediate control and access to surrounding natural resources—in any legal form.  In 
this regard, it meant more to a village that the government sent official representatives to 
attend the solemn ceremonies that accompanied the deliverance of lands to a pueblo than 
did any distinction between legal categories.  Official attendance at land ceremonies was 
really how elites recognized pueblo rights.  This is why, fifty years after the agrarian 
reform, the oldest inhabitants of Jiutepec fondly remembered the exact day when 
President Obregón stopped in to deliver the pueblo’s provisional grant.  Apparently, 
memories of any quibble over restitution or grant had long faded.190   
Adding to the predominance of grants in the redistribution process was the fact 
that the tumults of the revolution simply made it difficult to locate old documents, as 
many municipal archives, such as Cuautla, had burned during the fighting of the 1910s.191  
In other cases, disputes arose between villagers over possession of old land titles.  For 
instance, at the end of the nineteenth century, the residents of Yecapixtla sent a 
delegation to the Archivo General de la Nación to obtain a legal copy of their colonial 
                                                 
190 Stefan Krotz Heberle, “Cooperar y compartir: Antropología política de una asociación de arroceros en 
Morelos” (Master’s thesis, Universidad Iberoamericana, 1976), 24. 
191 AGA, Dotacíon de Tierras, Otilio Montaña (Cuautla), exp. 23/2966, leg. 1, f. 32, Vicente Vértiz to 
CLA, 4 April 1921.  De la Peña, A Legacy of Promises, 84 has also noted this observation. 
 84 
land deeds.  They entrusted the documents to one Juan Álvarez, “who religiously 
conserved them until his death” and salvaged them during the upheaval of the revolution.  
In the 1920s, however, Juan Álvarez’s son, Isidoro, came to possess the documents and 
refused to hand them over for inclusion in the pueblo’s petition for restitution.192  Thus, 
between vague colonial deeds, lost documents, conflicts over possession of land titles, 
and general confusion over pueblo boundaries, various obstacles forced most villages to 
receive a grant rather than earn restitution.   
Perhaps even more than the pueblos, Porfirian landlords had a stake in the 
distinction between grants and restitutions.  Restitution officially proved that an estate 
owner had illegally taken lands from a pueblo.  Luis García Pimentel Jr., the inheritor of 
the eastern haciendas of Santa Clara and Tenango, wrote to authorities that Jantetelco’s 
claim of possessing colonial land deeds from 1689 did not matter; he had documents 
from 1616 to show he was the legitimate owner.  “In addition, my father and his 
ancestors have not despoiled any sort of lands belonging to the pueblos,” García Pimentel 
asserted.193  Assertions such as these further muddied the waters of land claims in rural 
Morelos and presented another obstacle to pueblos seeking restitution.  Yet rather than 
interpreting these cases as evidence of a central state bent on usurping prior village rights 
in order to establish new political authority over the pueblos, they suggests that decades 
of conflict in the Morelos countryside—whereby control of land continuously changed 
hands—meant that establishing clear historical ownership of a given territory was a near-
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impossible task; hence, the CNA’s preference for a dotación rather than restitution.  For 
the pueblos, too, a grant accepted was an expedient but sufficient solution to heated legal 
battles involving hostile smallholders and former landlords.  Yecapixtla in 1923, for 
instance, demanded that the Local Agrarian Commission execute its provisional land 
grant as soon as possible, because the pueblo found itself “in difficult circumstances” 
with locals renting private lands and nearby pueblos gaining titles to their ejidos.194      
Similar to issues of grant or restitution, historians often point to the federal 
government’s unwillingness to take into account the 1915 zapatista agrarian reform as 
evidence that official agrarismo was a political project imposed to control the peasantry.  
Warman even goes as far as to contend that since the land reform of 1915 was carried out 
free of central governmental tutelage, it constituted an act of banditry under the new rules 
of the game.195  This assertion needs questioning.  How, if at all, did the pueblos refer to 
the zapatista land reform in the petitions of the early 1920s?  Is there any evidence to 
suggest that villagers considered the zapatista agrarian reform more legitimate than the 
redistribution of the 1920s?  In the petitions of post-revolutionary Morelos, there are few 
actual references to the land reform of 1915.  When the land-hungry provided the legal 
foundation for their petition, they knew they had to cite the agrarian decree of January 
1915 issued by Carranza, which had created the National Agrarian Commission.  By 
doing so, villagers showed they were willing to play by the rules of the post-
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revolutionary state and accept the new social order.196  Only the case of Tlaltizapán, the 
former headquarters of zapatismo, presents a situation whereby villagers cited the 1915 
agrarian reform and sought the restitution of the lands received under that law.  Yet the 
Local Agrarian Commission made it clear that documents from the 1915 zapatista land 
reform could not be used as legitimate proof of prior possession.197  Villages could only 
prove despoilment with documents that predated the revolution.  Tellingly, Tlaltizapán 
does not appear to have protested the decision and received its presidential resolution a 
year later in 1926.  In other instances, the land petitions cited the redistribution of 1915 as 
just another point of reference to further justify longstanding claims to specific fields.  
Such was the case of Tlalquiltenango’s petition, which included a document and map 
from 1915.  The residents of Tlalquiltenango made it clear, however, that they did not 
seek restitution, but rather a quick and simple grant that included plentiful pastures for 
their numerous livestock to graze.198  Most likely, then, if the ejido was a good size it 
already contained the lands given to the pueblo by Zapata; hence villagers had little 
reason to protest.  
Although depopulated and many cases demolished, pueblos across Morelos 
showed through the land petitions of the 1920s that they still possessed the seam that 
bound together life in the countryside—the collective memory of the village and a 
commitment to own land and farm as a pueblo.  Still, by no means were these 
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communities solely anchored to the past.  The majority of villages sought formal and 
immediate control of land rather than nitpicking legal distinctions between grant and 
restitution.  Jurisdiction over land provided the surest way to counter intrigues of the 
Porfirian landlords, who villagers still perceived as a threat in the countryside.  For those 
migrants who returned to their homes in the countryside, a new era had arrived in which 
peasants could use outside individuals and institutions to advance their interests.  The 
pueblos, in sum, were reconstituted in dialogue with the revolutionary laws.      
Ejidal Assemblies and Municipal Governments   
Post-revolutionary ejidal assemblies formed the institutional basis of rural state-
building in Morelos.  At the beginning of each year, villagers elected new representatives 
to serve as the executive president, the administrative president, secretaries, and board 
members (vocales).  The executive assembly was the legal representative of the ejido and 
managed land petitions, while the administrative committee assigned specific plots for 
villagers to work.  All assembly members were required to be local ejidatarios that held 
no other public office.  Before a pueblo received provisional titles from the Local 
Agrarian Commission, campesinos elected the committee members to receive the 
village’s grant.  Such was the case in Villa de Ayala, when on 27 September 1920 the 
inhabitants elected six members to the ejidal assemblies; a day later the community 
received its provisional titles from Governor Parres.199  The state governor or the 
president of the Local Agrarian Commission signed off on these elections and noted 
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specifically the names of the new executive committee president, who represented the 
pueblo before the agrarian bureaucracy.200  Excluding the mid-1920s, there is little 
evidence to suggest that state governors or the Local Agrarian Commission intervened in 
or opposed the outcomes of these contests, even though Calles decreed in 1926 that the 
CNA had the legal right to call new ejidal elections if the administrative committee 
“badly managed” the ejido’s wealth.201  Ejidal elections, therefore, were controlled by 
local actors in Morelos and outside agencies merely notified of the results.  
The growing involvement of Mexico City in rural affairs under President Calles in 
the mid-1920s added a new component to ejidal struggles, just as it did in the waging of 
electoral battles with Cuernavaca, when the federal government became an ally of 
morelense villages.  Inside the pueblos, too, conflicts beset the politics of the agrarian 
reform.  The electoral upheaval of mid-1920s Morelos between the state and municipal 
governments, for instance, was paralleled by similarly heated conflicts between ejidal and 
municipal councils over the rights to exploit village natural resources.  Given the ejido’s 
direct links to the National Agrarian Commission and state governors’ propensity to 
impose unelected town councils (consejos municipales) during the mid-1920s, it is 
probably not surprising that these institutions clashed over the rights to administer local 
natural resources.  Simply put, these conflicts pitted Cuernavaca and its appointed 
consejos municipales made up of the local elite, against Mexico City and the elected 
ejidal assemblies made up of local agraristas.  Power remained diffused among the 
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various competing factions at the ground level, but with the execution of the definitive 
land resolutions under Calles the ejidal committees and the national government were 
emerging triumphant in this struggle, thereby weakening the municipal and state 
governments in favor of both federal and local authority.        
Who exactly made up the local elite and how did they challenge the agrarian 
reform?  Briefly exploring these questions sheds light on why the Morelos peasantry 
sought a rapid land reform and how the ejidal assemblies defended pueblo sovereignty.  
Although they abandoned their properties after 1914, during the brief months between 
late-1919 and the beginning of the agrarian reform the following fall, the sugar planters 
began to make a comeback in rural Morelos.  As the revolutionary fighting waned, 
landlords deployed agents on their behalf to the countryside to revamp their haciendas.  
These tenants, known as arrendatarios, lived close by the burned out buildings of the 
haciendas and quickly arranged contracts to lease lands to destitute campesinos surviving 
in the villages.  It should be noted that the arrendetarios of 1920s Morelos represented 
hacendado interests in the countryside and were not themselves tenant farmers, which is 
the most common meaning of the term.  In December 1920, for example, an engineer 
from the CNA visited Puente de Ixtla and reported that the impoverished inhabitants 
“were forced to accept the land-leasing agreements of the haciendas [and] atrocious 
conditions that no man who prides himself on freedom can approve.”202  Old land 
arrangements between villagers and landlords thus began to resurface across Morelos 
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after Zapata’s death.203  We saw how in the eastern municipal seats of Tetecala and 
Puente de Ixtla land grabs by the hacendado Emmanuel Amor contributed to local 
tensions and instability, but in eastern Morelos, too, the sons of Luis García Pimentel 
made life difficult for agraristas in the region by seeking injunctions against provisional 
land grants and fielding white guards to intimidate peasants in the region.204  The 
landlords of Porfirian Morelos were not the only enemies of the ejidos, however.  
Smallholders and private commercial interests in most municipal seats were also hostile 
to the agrarian reform.  Many of these individuals’ fortunes could be traced back to the 
Porfiriato, when a few families within the pueblos accumulated resources by controlling 
local exports, such as fruits in the case of Coatlán del Río, pulque in Huitzilac, and meat 
in Yecapixtla.  They owned urban land, buildings, and small private agricultural plots.  
The little capital they accumulated allowed them to loan money at exorbitant rates.  The 
wealthiest of these comerciantes, as they were known in the villages, could speculate and 
corner local markets of peasant production.  Many of them were also of Spanish 
descent.205  And it was these individuals who clung to the municipal governments in 
opposition to the ejidal assemblies.   
                                                 
203 AGA, Dotación de Tierras, Jantetelco (Jantetelco), exp. 23/3029, leg. 1, f. 9, Report by G. de la Cerda, 
9 April 1921; AGA, Dotación de Tierras, Axochiapan (Axochiapan), exp. 23/3072, leg. 1, f. 93, Report by 
Gabriel de la Cerda, 22 April 1921. 
204 Emmanuel Amor was the proprietor of the San Gabriel and Actopan haciendas.  The San Gabriel de la 
Palmas hacienda possessed over 31,000 hectares of lands in 1910.  By 1927, however, the estate had lost 
overhalf its property to surrounding pueblos and would undergo further expropriation in the 1930s.  
González Herrera and Embriz Osorio, “La reforma agraria y la desaparición del latifundio en el estado de 
Morelos,” in Morelos: Cinco Siglos, 291,297. 
205 Horacio Crespo and Herbert Frey, “La diferenciación social del campesinado como problema de la 
teoría y de la historia, hipótesis generales para el caso de Morelos, México,” Revista Mexicana de 
Sociología 44, no. 1 (1982): 285-313. 
 91 
As early as 1920, the battle lines were drawn in Villa de Ayala.  After Villa de 
Ayala received its provisional land grant in October conflict brewed with the municipal 
president Feliciano Domínguez.  The leader of the ejido’s administrative committee, 
Rafael Cortéz, protested to authorities in the Local Agrarian Commission that Feliciano 
arbitrarily distributed ejidal lands to his close acquaintances from Temoac.  According to 
the local agraristas, the municipal president was little more than a cacique: “and if 
anything delays ejidal work it is the lack of support of Señor Presidente [Feliciano], as 
this Señor is an ambitious financier.  He has his own field of 70 tareas, 30 of those are 
not even cultivated, and yet he still wants more lands.”206  A CLA representative 
intervened on the ejidal committee’s behalf by speaking personally with Feliciano, who 
promised not to meddle in agrarian matters.  Apparently, this resolved the issue, because 
the agraristas in Villa de Ayala raised no further complaints regarding the pueblo’s 
municipal authorities.  In any case, the ejidatarios learned early on they could count on 
the backing of national institutions in local agrarian conflicts. 
Other cases, however, were not resolved so easily.  Consider Cuautla, which also 
lay in the heart of zapatista country.  In 1922, nearly five hundred individuals worked the 
town’s ejido of roughly 3,000 hectares, half of which was supposed to be irrigated land.  
Serafín Robles, a former worker in sugar mills at the Tenango and Sana Clara haciendas, 
and later a close confidant of Zapata, headed the Cuautla ejido.  There, Robles’s soldiers 
worked two hundred hectares as a military colony.  Robles and Manuel Contreras, who 
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headed the local agrarian committees, believed the municipal government had no right to 
intervene in ejidal affairs, and so refused to cooperate with the civil authorities.  “These 
individuals,” reported a CNA representative,  
boasted of not obeying or respecting any authority, justifying their behavior by 
virtue of having been zapatista revolutionaries and on the circumstance of almost 
always being armed.  For these same reasons they believe they are authorized to 
rule the ejido as they please.207   
Recall that Governor Velasco of the National Agrarian Party had imposed practically 
every town council in Morelos in 1925, the same year that the above document was 
written.  These unelected officials, for the most part, were not revolutionary veterans, but 
rather civilians loyal to the governor.  Ejidal assemblies, by contrast, largely consisted of 
elected individuals with agrarista credentials.  Thus, for Serafín Robles and countless 
other agrarian leaders, unelected municipal authorities without a revolutionary past were 
to be resisted when they tried to control ejidal affairs.  Conflicts such as that which 
occurred in Cuautla were common in all of Morelos, demonstrating how serious the 
question of rights to administer the region’s natural resources had become in the mid-
1920s.     
The ejidal assemblies were in fact counterweights to the illegitimately imposed 
town councils of the 1920s.   In 1927, for example, the agrarian committees in Jumiltepec 
battled the pueblo’s non-elected village officer (ayudante municipal) who was appointed 
by the municipal president of Ocuituco.  The difficulties, reported a CNA agent, “come 
from the unlawful intervention of the Ayudante Municipal in matters that are only of the 
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Agrarian Committee as the legal administrator of the ejido.”  It turns out that the local 
civil authority had colluded with smallholders in the pueblo to openly exploit the 
woodlands of the ejido, selling firewood and making a profit.  Jumiltepec’s agrarian 
leaders retained control of the ejidal administration, but “the cited Ayudante does not 
ease up in his exploitation of the said montes, and in addition he tries to extort the 
Committee, erecting all types of obstacles.”  The CNA bureaucrat exclaimed that in order 
to resolve the disputes Jumiltepec required a presidential resolution as soon as possible 
because, he believed, everyone must submit to executive authority.208  A signature by 
Calles, the CNA asserted, would close the case and give the ejidal assemblies presidential 
backing to hold dominion over the wooded hillsides.  Yet while the municipal officer 
who meddled in Jumiltepec’s agrarian affairs soon left office after his term expired, for 
unknown reasons the pueblo had to wait two years until it got its presidential signature in 
1929.   In any case, events in Jumiltepec reveal that both the pueblos and CNA saw the 
need for callista backing in conflicts with local elites as much as the national regime 
needed support from the morelense peasantry.  
On other occasions, however, not even agrarian bureaucrats abided by the new 
rules.  In the western municipal seat of Miacatlán, numerous forces collided in the 1920s 
to create deep divisions within the village.  The municipal president, Francisco Beltrán, 
led a small group of livestock-raisers and disobeyed orders given by the ejidal committee 
to stop cutting and selling firewood from the nearby woodlands.  The group even sought 
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to convert ejidal lands into pastures for grazing livestock.  Beltrán meddled in all agrarian 
matters, a CNA agent communicated, even permitting residents to plant small parcels of 
rice in urban garden plots, which jeopardized public health.209  Furthermore, the civil 
authority controlled one hundred and fifty hectares of good lands, including rice paddies 
and urban properties; and Beltrán was openly hostile to peasants: “for the most 
insignificant thing he orders them to be beaten and put in jail.”210  The pueblo of 
Miacatlán blamed the lack of a solution on stubborn bureaucrats in the Local Agrarian 
Commission, who consulted and sided with the municipal president rather than dealing 
solely with the ejidal committee.  Miacatlán’s agrarian leader wrote to the CNA: 
How many Delegates visit Miacatlán with the object of dealing with the pueblo’s 
agrarian matters?  Yet instead of addressing the ejidal committee, as they should 
in order to gather information and make reports, they address the Municipal 
President Francisco Beltrán, who is a landowner and the cacique of the place.  All 
agrarian proceedings affect his interests; and he seeks ways to confuse such-and-
such Delegate...[meanwhile] our complaints are not even heard or attended to.211 
Here, it should be noted that the Local Agrarian Commission worked closely with all the 
state governors of Morelos to execute the land reform.  Given its association with 
unpopular politicos in Cuernavaca, who in turn had links to the unpopular municipal 
presidents of the mid-1920s, it is therefore not surprising that the state agrarian 
bureaucracy failed to redress Miacatlán’s grievances at this time.  Thus the pueblo’s 
agrarian leaders bypassed the CLA and pleaded the pueblo’s case to national authorities 
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in the CNA, although it is not clear in this case if they received a reply.  In any case, by 
doing so, they demonstrated that village sovereignty concerns were vested in ejidal 
assemblies.   
The travails of the agrarian reform in Miacatlán also involved the politico Alfonso 
María Figueroa, who originally hailed from the village and briefly governed Morelos in 
1927.  Figueroa, like Governor Velasco, had served in the CNA before becoming the 
state executive.  While serving in the CNA, the ambitious Figueroa attempted to wrestle 
control of Miacatlán’s agrarian committees, and he allied with the unpopular municipal 
president, Francisco Beltrán, to oppose the ejidal leaders.  His actions provoked the ire of 
the pueblo’s campesinos.  Villagers accused Figueroa of arriving in the pueblo, spreading 
false information, and holding secret meetings to advance his political ambitions: “he is 
an agitator of the Pueblos of first order,” they wrote in 1926.212 
Miacatlán fits the pattern occurring throughout rural Morelos from 1924 to 1927 
of ubiquitous power struggles between unelected municipal authorities and the village 
land committees.  These consejos municipales imposed by provisional and interim 
governors could count on little bottom-up support.  Most, in fact, were allied with the 
rural elite.  The local ejidal committees, then, empowered villagers who struggled against 
the unelected town councils of the mid-1920s.  Municipal officers no longer wielded 
authority in agrarian matters and most behaved in ways that offended rural polities.  
These types of internal struggles over the ejido, furthermore, occurred particularly in 
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large municipal seats such as Cuautla, Miacatlán, Puente de Ixtla, and Tetecala, where 
civil authorities resided and the inhabitants possessed different economic interests.  In 
Miacatlán, the smallholders were ineligible to apply for an ejidal plot, hence their alliance 
with the municipal president, who colluded with the private holders to gain grazing 
pastures at the expense of the ejidiatarios.  Villagers with private commercial interests, in 
other words, repeatedly sought to undermine and overwhelm the ejido.  
This was particularly the case in Tetecala, which, as noted in the previous chapter, 
was the site of a political massacre involving PNA members in 1925.  Smallholders and 
the municipal government remained hostile to the agrarian reform, while the pueblo’s 
landless population petitioned constantly for provisional titles in the early 1920s.  The 
municipal president, Antonio Barrera, was even close friends with the local 
representative of the hacendado, Emmanuel Amor.213  The landless in Tetecala detailed 
this scenario to the Local Agrarian Commission and requested help to break the grip the 
local elite had on the land in Tetecala.  Specifically, they wanted provisional land titles in 
order to secure the community’s soils against municipal politicians and smallholders 
hostile to the ejido.  Finally, a year later in 1924 the pueblo’s requests were answered, 
and Tetecala received its provisional titles.  Although the village’s problems were far 
from over, possession of the provisional titles proved decisive when Calles intervened in 
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the local disputes in 1925 by ordering the CNA and the War Department to respect 
Tetecala’s land grant.214   
Agrarian bureaucrats, as the middle-men between the ejidos and the National 
Agrarian Commission, documented similar patterns of conflicts across Morelos.  In 
Yecapixtla, for example, one report observed that “local politicians frequently get 
involved in agrarian matters, and for this reason a permanent agitation of passions is 
maintained.”215  Municipal interventions in ejidal affairs, in other words, were a common 
source of the political instability in the mid-1920s.  What unfolded on the ground in mid-
1920s, then, was a political struggle for the rights to control the pueblos’ soils.  During 
this process, villages adapted to the post-revolutionary institutional landscape by using 
the ejidal assemblies to battle the local elite, which clung to weakened municipal 
governments.  Thus, similar to the way in which the pueblos sought to cast their political 
fortunes with the victorious sides in presidential politics, local agraristas realized that the 
ejidal committees, not the town councils, were now the vehicles to control surrounding 
natural resources.  More than just control of the land, however, the agrarian assemblies 
sanctioned by the CNA gave rural communities space to maneuver politically and the 
ability to weather the stormy waters of agrarian politics in the 1920s.   
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The Politics of Deforestation 
The same schism between the municipality and the ejido could be seen in local struggles 
to control forest resources, as the woodlands were vital to the economy of many pueblos.  
Charcoal production, in particular, attracted villagers into the woods because the industry 
required little start-up capital and just a few tools such as an ax, a shovel, and a machete.   
Campesinos made charcoal kilns in the forest by felling oak trees and chopping the trunks 
into logs a few feet long, then piling the logs upright and covering the structure with 
earth.  Once the kiln was lit and smoldering, villagers tended the fire for up to forty-eight 
hours in order to prevent too much air from entering the furnace, which would burn the 
wood rather than produce charcoal.216  The forests were of value especially to the 
highland communities of northern Morelos, where seasonal migration to the warm 
southern valleys during the sugar harvest had for centuries offered villagers an important 
way to earn money.  In the 1920s, however, with the haciendas lying in ruins, the sale of 
forest resources facilitated the revival of rural life.  “Pedro Martínez” (Lewis’s famously 
anonymous source) recounted how at the beginning of the 1920s residents of the 
Tepoztlán turned to making charcoal from the forests simply to earn money to clothe 
themselves.  Tepoztecans sold a sack full of charcoal for twenty-five cents and, free of 
taxes, prospered quickly: “I felt I was rich,” recalled Martínez after taking up the trade.  
“The whole village became charcoal burners.  We practically cut down the forests at that 
time...we finally began to eat decently…Now we began to come back to life…The forest 
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has brought me my freedom!”217  Exploitation of the woodlands thus lifted many 
villagers out of destitute poverty and facilitated reconstruction of the battered pueblos.  
For this reason, disputes over the woodlands were quite frequent even in lowland pueblos 
that possessed better quality soils in more abundance than their highland counterparts.  
Again, these conflicts often pitted local agraristas against smallholders and hacienda 
interests.   
Forests could generate as much internal discord as could arable land given that the 
wooded hillsides, like pastures, were part of the communal patrimony of the ejido, which, 
unlike individual family farms, every member had a right to exploit.  Until the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, the northern highland pueblos—Huiztilac, Coajomulco, 
Ocotepec, Santa María, Tetela, Buenavista, Chamilpa, Ahuatepec, Ajuchitlán, Tepoztlán 
and Temixco—had managed and conserved abundant forest resources.  By the 1900s, 
however, national and foreign companies such as Hampson and Staple had arrived and 
began to exploit forest resources without regard to conservation.  Villagers protested and 
even rose up to halt this process during the Porfiriato, but with little success.  And while 
the revolution may have temporarily slowed the cutting of the woods, in 1919, the 
Constitutionalist army, then occupying Morelos, established a military business with 
landowners in villages to exploit the old ejidos.  By the early 1920s, Santa María, as we 
have seen, controlled part of the northwestern forests and competed with communities in 
the region for territory.    Yet even in the lush valleys of southern Morelos, where rice 
was king, access to patches of the wooded hillsides provoked quarrels in pueblos, 
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because the sale of firewood, lumber, and charcoal—the main resources extracted from 
the forests—provided cash-strapped villagers with another source of income.218   
In both the lowlands and highlands, the ejidal assemblies clashed with municipal 
governments for control of the hillsides, as we saw in the cases of Miacatlán and 
Jumiltepec.  In Jojutla too, a burgeoning small town of over 6,000 inhabitants in 1930, 
the municipal government gave illegal licenses to private individuals that allowed them 
freely to exploit the forests.  The head of Jojutla’s administrative committee documented 
all this illicit activity to the Local Agrarian Commission, demonstrating that Francisco 
Calderón, a Spaniard, was unduly exploiting the hillsides.  The ejidal leader cited CNA 
circular number fifty-one that prohibited such activity without the authorized permission 
of the local land committee.  He also reminded the Local Agrarian Commission that the 
said circular prohibited foreigners from cutting the woods. Clearly, even by 1924, local 
agraristas were well-versed in the legal framework of the agrarian reform and knew how 
to appeal to state and national authorities for help, who backed Jojutla in this conflict.219 
Up in the northern highlands, where the woods were vast and the pueblos largely 
in control of their exploitation, the old elite could still threaten a community.  Soon after 
the revolution ended, for example, Huitzilac was confronted by Ángel Entrambasaguas, 
who had despoiled the pueblo of a piece of monte back in 1904.  The landowner still 
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considered the disputed hillside his property and demanded that the pueblo return the 
lumber they had cut on his former property.  He then denounced Huitzilac before 
government authorities.  This alarmed the leaders of Huitzilac, as the community in 1922 
had yet to receive a provisional land grant.  They urged Governor Parres to restitute their 
lands, but at the same time not to be burdened by legal distinctions.  “If we lack the 
documents to verify [our previous ownership of] the property,” Huitzilac’s agrarian 
leader wrote, “do not proceed and be hampered by restitution.  We request that you give 
us dotación.”220  They needed an ejido, in any form, to undercut the former landowner’s 
claims.  The government acted in response by delivering a definitive land restitution of 
440 hectares in 1929, while also recognizing the pueblo’s communal right to exploit 
11,611 hectares of wooded hillsides.221  
The rush to exploit the hillsides coupled with little government oversight in the 
1920s resulted in widespread deforestation with major ecological consequences.  
Agronomists and rural folks alike commented on the alarming rates of deforestation 
occurring in the 1920s.  Take for instance the agrarian representatives of El Hospital 
(Cuautla), who wrote to the CNA warning that “in this Ranchería the monte is rapidly 
being destroyed, and as there is no one to stop this, it is believed that within a short time 
not even the residents of this pueblo will have a place to cut wood for our needs.”222  
According to an agrarian regulation of 1922, a pueblo that possessed only a provisional 
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land grant had no right to cut fresh wood from the forests.  Villagers could, however, take 
dead wood for domestic use.223  But as El Hospital’s case illustrates, no authority, at the 
local or state level, exercised enough power to conserve forest resources and curb the 
logging in the 1920s.  Villagers were practically free to exploit the woods with no 
oversight.  Even travelers passing through Morelos noticed the deforestation occurring in 
the region.  Train passengers bound for Cuernavaca could not ignore the “the large 
deposits of firewood, railroad ties, and charcoal on both sides of the railway line” when 
crossing the Ajusco Mountains.224  As far as the southeastern municipal seat of Puente de 
Ixtla, an engineer noted that “clear cutting of the forests is being carried out.”225  This 
process was by no means isolated to Morelos, but the defeat of the landlord class and the 
decentralized agrarian reform in Zapata’s homeland allowed rural inhabitants to exploit 
the forests at will.    
Deforestation, in fact, became not just an environmental concern, but also a 
political and economic issue.  Tepoztlán is notable in this regard and also due to the fact 
that the pueblo lacked nationally-sanctioned ejidal assemblies in the 1920s because the 
village, unusually by local standards, did not receive provisional and definitive land 
restitutions until 1929.226  The bureaucratic delay was likely the consequence of the 
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pueblo’s request for restitution.  In any case, with no ejidal assemblies, former zapatistas 
and the sons of Porfirian caciques battled for control of the municipal government during 
the 1920s.  When Robert Redfield lived in Tepoztlán in 1926-1927, the town council, like 
most others at the time, was imposed by Cuernavaca, and the anthropologist described it 
as doing “little beyond the administration of routine matters” except regulating access to 
surrounding common lands.227  Yet sure enough, soon after the ejido was established in 
1929, Oscar Lewis noted that hostilities broke out between the new agrarian committees 
and the old municipio over the rights to control the communal lands.  The battle became 
so heated that the Agrarian Department threatened to send federal troops to resolve the 
matter if the municipality did not relinquish its rights to govern surrounding lands.  As a 
result, the ejidatarios won control of the pueblo’s soils, thereby weakening the town 
council.228    
The issue of access to the forests developed into a political identity marker in 
Tepoztlán.  In the 1920s, two political groups—the bolcheviques and the centrales—
arose to battle for command of the village’s municipal government.  Former zapatistas 
led the bolcheviques and controlled the municipal government from 1922 to 1928.  
Exploitation of the forests was the principal issue dividing these two groups.  The 
bolcheviques sought to defend the communal property of the village and limit the cutting 
of the woodlands, while the centrales, led by the sons of Porfirian caciques who owned 
private property in the pueblo, wanted to exploit the highlands on a massive scale.  
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Initially, the bolcheviques received support from the majority of Tepoztecans, but, over 
time, their influence decreased precisely because they opposed profiteering from the 
production of charcoal.  In contrast, the centrales began to win more sympathizers 
because of their desire to exploit the forests.  In 1928, the centrales won control of the 
municipal government and formed a cooperative to produce charcoal, which included up 
to 500 members from Tepoztlán and surrounding villages.  Members of the cooperative 
earned between twenty and thirty times as much money producing charcoal as they did 
working as daily agricultural workers.  Juan Hidalgo, leader of the centrales, became the 
most powerful figure in Tepoztlán until men from nearby San Pablo assassinated him in 
1935.  Shortly afterwards, President Lázaro Cárdenas visited Tepoztlán and declared the 
surrounding forests as a national park.  The production of charcoal decreased 
dramatically after Cárdenas’s intervention.229   
The forests, therefore, stood at the center of agrarian conflicts for many 
communities.  Yet the dynamics of these conflicts were different from village to village.  
For Tepoztlán, the woodlands represented a source of internal struggle.230  For Santa 
María, on the other hand, control of large swathes of the forests seemed to reinforce the 
pueblo’s internal cohesion and fed the village’s ambition to dominate neighboring 
communities.  In all cases, harvesting the riches of the wooded hillsides allowed rural 
inhabitants to generate internal sources of income.  At least in the 1920s, no local, state, 
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Parks. 
230 Competition for the forests also caused a boundary dispute with Milpa Alta, a highland pueblo located 
in the Federal District.  See AHIEDM, Tierras, caja 750, leg. 7. 
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or national authority possessed the power to prevent villagers from venturing into the 
woods.  The ejidal assemblies held sway. 
By 1929, the agrarian reform had radically transformed land tenure in Morelos.  
Whereas twenty-eight families owned three quarters of state’s total surface in 1910, in 
1930 over 20,000 families controlled the most productive soils.  Some 208,500 hectares 
of lands were transferred to over 180 pueblos in the 1920s.  In just ten years, then, the 
revolution redistributed close to half of the state’s surface and practically all the fields in 
the richest valleys.  These official figures, while not the most precise indicators of who 
commanded exactly which fields, nonetheless reflect the degree to which property 
ownership had been altered in rural Morelos.  Consequently, the hacienda was dismantled 
as an important economic unit in the countryside and eclipsed by the ejido.  Santa Clara 
hacienda, for example, the fourth largest estate on the eve of the revolution in Morelos, 
had by 1927 lost seventy-five percent of its total land and ninety-five percent of its 
irrigable fields.231  That same year, only four or five haciendas functioned in Morelos.  
Dozens of others were abandoned and decaying.  Considering the government’s duty 
finished, in 1929 President Portes Gil signed a law for Morelos that ended land reform in 
the state and disbanded the Local Agrarian Commission, at least for the next four 
years.232  The ejido in Morelos, national elites concluded, had been realized, and it was 
now time to pave way for a nation of small capitalist farmers.  Agrarian reform in Mexico 
subsequently declined for the remainder of the Maximato.  Village petitions for 
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additional lands, waters, and forests continued apace, however.  The pueblos’ constant 
demand for natural resources, in fact, led to a second stage of the agrarian reform under 
President Lázaro Cárdenas.        
The Second Phase of the Agrarian Reform 
Land redistribution in the 1930s Morelos was not as spectacular as the agrarian reform of 
the 1920s, but the political ramifications of the second phase, which provide a clear 
example negotiation between rural communities and Mexico City, were just as 
significant.  Cárdenas indeed toured rural Morelos on numerous occasions during his 
presidency.233   Between 1934 and 1940, Cárdenas responded to village petitions and 
doled out a further 70,000 hectares of land to agricultural settlements in Morelos, further 
cementing zapatista support for the federal government.  Admittedly, many of the ejidal 
extensions in the 1930s included only secondary lands such as pastures and rain-fed 
fields given that the richest soils had been redistributed in the 1920s.  In any event, over 
fifteen new agrarian settlements were established and officially recognized during the 
second phase of the agrarian reform, alleviating pressures in some overpopulated 
pueblos.234  Mexico’s agrarian bureaucracy was also reorganized, replacing the local 
executive and administrative committees with comisariados and consejos de vigilancia 
ejidales.235   Cárdenas then assumed office in December 1934; by this time, growing 
tensions in the Morelos countryside had led to the outbreak of El Tallarín’s rebellion.  
                                                 
233 Luis González, Historia de la revolución mexicana, 1934-1940, vol. 15: Los días del Presidente 
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Key to understanding those pressures was the growing landless population in the pueblos, 
many of whom were migrants from Guerrero searching for cultivable fields.  From just 
over 100,000 inhabitants in 1921, the population of Morelos grew to more than 132,000 
people by 1930.  Ten years later the state counted over 182,000 residents, slightly more 
than the number of persons living in Morelos in 1910.  As a consequence, the landless 
teemed in pueblos across the state—300 in Yautepec, 150 in Villa de Ayala, 125 in 
Totolapan, and eighty in Jonacatepec.236 
As the population increased so did the number of petitions for an ejidal extension 
(ampliación de ejidos).  From reading the documents, agrarian bureaucrats could see that 
more and more villagers were growing dependent on private rental lands for work, which 
strengthened the hand of local elites.  Meanwhile, landowners became increasingly 
hostile to landless campesinos because their petitions threatened to redistribute the last 
lands owned by the haciendas.  In Yautepec, for example, peasants wrote to Cárdenas to 
denounce the administrator of the Atlihuayan hacienda, who tried to intimidate them into 
signing an agreement before their land petition could be heard by agrarian authorities.237  
Likewise, more and more ejidatarios from Amilcingo (Cuautla) were forced to rent fields 
from the distant Tenango hacienda because what lands they did possess were insufficient 
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to sustain their families.  Every year people left the pueblo in search of cultivable soils.238  
Their experiences of dealing with landowners were seldom pleasant.  Chiconcuac 
(Xochitepec), for instance, had constant troubles with the nearby hacienda of the same 
name.  In 1938, while still trying to obtain more land, the leader of the ejido summed up 
the pueblo’s relationship with landlords and merchants by stating that because of “the bad 
deals we have received from past landowners, we sincerely believe that all the rich will 
betray us.”239  The ejidatarios wanted the governor to intervene and expropriate the 
hacienda’s remaining properties, including its buildings and casco in order to establish an 
agricultural school, public offices, and a rice mill.  Chiconcuac continued to send annual 
petitions to Cuernavaca until the early 1940s but they apparently received no response.  
Truth be told, even though Cárdenas heard Chiconcuac’s pleas on an official visit to the 
pueblo in 1935, there simply was no more surrounding land available to extend the 
ejido.240 
In other regions of Morelos, however, goods lands were still to be had, especially 
on the plains around the Tenango hacienda in the southeast, where the García Pimentel 
family still held abundant fields into the 1930s.  Tenango had been the second largest 
estate in Porfirian Morelos covering nearly 39,000 hectares in 1910 (7.8% of the state’s 
total surface), but by 1927 it had lost over half its lands to eastern pueblos.241  The 
Tenango hacienda nonetheless remained extremely large by local standards and its 
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administrators made agrarian life difficult for southeastern villages by diverting irrigation 
waters, opposing land petitions and titles in the courts, and even fielding white guards to 
intimidate campesinos.  In 1935, a group of agraristas from among the three hundred 
residents and peons of Tenango submitted a land petition to the governor and were 
threatened for doing so by the hacienda’s administrator.  The group then petitioned the 
governor to intervene and mobilized the Morelos Liga, proposing that the community be 
raised to the status of “congregation” and renamed “Lázaro Cárdenas.”242  Neither of 
these proposals materialized, but in 1938 Cárdenas intervened and broke up Tenango 
hacienda’s holdings; a year later the pueblo received its definitive land grant of 1,621 
hectares, while neighboring pueblos secured extensions of their ejidos from the estate’s 
lands.243  The cardenistas, thus, responded to mobilization in eastern Morelos by backing 
landless villagers in conflicts against one of the last remaining and most prestigious 
hacendado families from the Porfiriato.  
Yet it was not just the old elite that threatened to undermine the ejido in the 
1930s.  Politicians in both the state and the national regimes menaced the countryside by 
attempting to wrestle fields and waters away from communities.  This was particularly 
the case at the end of the Maximato, as Calles’s extended stays in Cuernavaca had 
naturally attracted more national politicos to the region.  Even Cárdenas owned a ranch 
                                                 
242 AHIEDM, Tierras, caja 752, leg. 6, f. 35, Tomás Vergara to Presidente del H. Congreso Campesino 
Revolucionario, not dated. 
243 Sinecio López Méndez, Laura Helguera Reséndiz, and Ramón Ramírez Melgarejo, Los campesinos de 
la tierra de Zapata, vol. 1: Adaptación, cambio y rebelión (Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones 
Superiores, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1974), 135-136. 
 110 
outside of Cuernavaca, although no disputes appear to have occurred over the property.244  
Once again, the ejidal committees and their links to the presidency assisted locals in 
defending village natural resources.  Such was the case in Panchimalco (Jojutla), where 
ejidatarios wrote President Rodríguez to denounce state congressman Jesús Gómez for 
taking irrigation waters from the community and for threatening locals who did not 
support his political campaigns.  Gobernación responded to these complaints by ordering 
the governor of Morelos to provide security and protection for the ejidatarios of 
Panchimalco.245  Likewise in Tlalquiltenango, the ejidal leader, Rubén Jaramillo, 
implored Cárdenas to intervene on behalf of the pueblo in order to prevent national 
Senator Alfonso Sámano and two state politicos from imposing erroneous taxes on local 
ejidatarios.246  Although the outcome of Tlalquiltenango’s case remains unclear, 
Cárdenas later backed Jaramillo and the campesinos in the southern hot lands in several 
disputes with political elites.247  Another similar case involved Carlos Lavín of 
Amacuzac, who at the time held a post in the state legislature.  The ejidal committees 
grew tired of honoring a contract with Lavín signed back in 1930, which gave the state 
congressman control of thirty-five hectares of the ejido.  Under any circumstances, such a 
contract violated official regulations governing ejidal lands.  After Amacuzac’s first 
protest, Lavín tried to have the agrarian committee leaders removed from their posts, but 
the Agrarian Department refused Lavín, instead siding with the elected assembly 
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members.248  Similarly in eastern Morelos, in 1934 then federal deputy Jesús Gutiérrez 
forged a deal with the administrator of Tenango hacienda to alter hydraulic works in the 
region in order to irrigate the hacienda’s fields.  Soldiers then appeared at the mouth of a 
canal named “Tequixquiapa” and installed works that deprived the pueblos of 
Jonacatepec, Huazulco (Zacualpan), and Chalcatzingo (Jantetelco) of their waters.  Only 
after Cárdenas broke up Tenango hacienda in 1938 did such abuses committed by the 
estate diminish.249  In another instance, even ejidatarios in a nearby community spoke out 
in defense of embattled neighbors.  The agrarian committee in Tetecala raised the alarm 
before President Rodríguez that a corrupt agronomist had forged documents pertaining to 
Coatlán del Rio’s agrarian files in order to favor national Senator Lamberto Hernández in 
a dispute that also involved the Cocoyotla hacienda.250  Thus, the experience of the ejidal 
committees during the 1930s was similar to that of the previous decade in that the 
nationally-sanctioned institutions offered the pueblos political space to defend natural 
resources from local elites and to establish direct channels of communication with a 
receptive presidency.          
Agrarian reform in the 1930s, therefore, eased tensions in the countryside and 
further solidified support for the national regime.  The cardenistas had responded to the 
petitions of the growing landless population and sided with the agraristas against 
Morelos’s rural elites and members of the national political elite.  By allowing the region 
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to carry out the first statewide land reform in post-revolutionary Mexico, national elites 
earned agrarian credentials they could use to bolster their legitimacy in the face of a 
mobilized society.  Even more importantly, they rallied the campesinos of the 
Cuernavaca and Cuautla Amilpas valleys to defend the federal government during the 
national crises of 1920, 1923-1924, and 1926-1929, when the Sonoran regime was at its 
most vulnerable.  The pueblo alliance with Mexico City would pave the way for the 
growth of the PNR in 1930s.  Then, in 1938, the post-revolutionary agrarian reform in 
Morelos was consummated when Cárdenas officially inaugurated the opening of the giant 
sugar mill at Zacatepec.251   
 For the zapatistas, most of whom eventually settled back in their villages to work 
ejidal plots, the federal government had provided effective leverage via the ejidal 
assemblies to prevent the old landlord class from making a successful combat in Morelos.   
One former combatant defiantly told an American visitor, Ernest Gruening, that “we are 
growing what we want to grow and for our own use.”252  Campesinos were now free to 
plant as they wished and no longer forced to toil in the cane fields of the great estates.  
Pedro Martínez remembered of the Porfirian days: “everything went to the rich, the 
hacendados…we were completely enslaved by the hacendados.  That is what Zapata 
fought to set right.”253  But if the planters had now retreated from the scene, the great 
agricultural enterprises they had built in the decades prior to the revolution had left 
indelible imprints on the physical geography of Morelos.  In particular, the network of 
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irrigation canals that once watered sugar cane fields was now taken over by the ejido to 
drench rice paddies.  Control of the irrigation system proved to be the decisive factor 
behind the pueblos’ green revolution in the 1920s and 1930s and so is the topic of chapter 
three. 
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Chapter III: Irrigation Waters, Rice, and the Pueblos’ Green 
Revolution 
Coupled with the rich valley soils, irrigation waters represented the most important 
natural resources for lowland pueblos in post-revolutionary Morelos.  Access to irrigation 
waters was crucial for the local economy because it provided ejidatarios with the 
opportunity to earn scarce cash in the 1920s by growing commercial crops for sale at a 
time when the sugar haciendas lay in ruins.  In fact, the cultivation of rice in rural 
Morelos boomed in the early 1920s, as farmers responded to rising market prices (see 
Appendix B).  In 1910, when the grain was second only to sugar in terms of annual 
production in Morelos, planters harvested 12,000 metric tons of rice.254  Twenty years 
later, the region produced 27,000 metric tons of rice, making the state among the top 
producers of rice in Mexico.255  Rice was grown on seventy percent of the irrigated lands 
in Morelos, while every type of rural settlement—pueblos, hamlets, towns, haciendas, 
ranches, agrarian colonies—planted the grain.256  In particular, ejidatarios cultivated rice 
for commercial sale.  This suggests that morelenses did not fight a revolution merely to 
retreat to their cornfields, as the closed communitarian model of zapatismo 
emphasizes.257  Instead, they often sought participation in the market economy, which in 
turn brought agricultural workers into direct contact with the state, because, unlike his 
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Porfirian and revolutionary predecessors, President Calles attempted to regulate the sale 
of rice.  Access to irrigation waters indeed allowed ejidatarios to redefine how the land 
was cultivated.  Thus to a significant extent a pueblo “green revolution” took hold in the 
countryside, which was marked by increased village control of the hydraulic system and 
the reorientation of local agriculture to serve both the commercial and subsistence aims 
of the peasantry.  With the assistance of the callista state in the form of agricultural 
credit, irrigation works, and a rice regulatory board, villagers took advantage of the 
agrarian reform to rebuild and restructure the economy of Morelos.  The pueblos’ green 
revolution, that is to say, was the real agrarian revolution. 
Meanwhile, in 1926 the federal government under President Calles established 
Juntas de Aguas (water juntas) to administer Morelos’s principal rivers, reconstruct the 
semi-destroyed hydraulic system, and arbitrate disputes between users of the canals.  The 
debut of these federal water councils added a new component to the agrarian struggle, 
and rural receptions to them varied according to the historic water rights of individual 
pueblos, their geographical locations along the canal network, the strength of local elites, 
and the conduct of junta personnel.  Overall, however, the evidence reveals that 
communities that controlled large quantities of waters often ignored decisions made by 
the federal water juntas in regards to distribution of the liquid.  These “strong,” often 
older villages, such as Anenecuilco, Tezoyuca, and Tlacotepec, were usually among the 
first users of a shared canal, enabling them to stop the flow of waters to lower elevation 
pueblos.  By contrast, communities that lacked sufficient irrigation waters, such as 
Chiconcuac and Zacualpan actively sought the intervention of the federal juntas as 
leverage to gain access to more water.  Complicating this situation was the fact that 
proprietary smallholders and hacienda interests were often hostile to the water juntas, 
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driving local ejidatarios to seek the councils’ arbitration in disputes with local elites.258  
The federal juntas, that is to say, were the sites of different kinds of negotiations between 
local and national actors involving inter-pueblo feuds.   In turn, these struggles involving 
rival villages and the federal water juntas reveal just how important rice cultivation had 
become for post-revolutionary pueblos, who, by 1940, still maintained de facto control of 
the region’s irrigation waters. 
Only with the opening of Mexico’s Archivo Histórico del Agua (AHA) in 1994 
have thorough histories of water in the Mexican countryside begun to trickle forth.  Laura 
Valladares’s study of water in Morelos before and after the zapatista revolution, for 
example, has shown the ubiquity of conflicts between villages for control of the liquid 
resource and argued that haciendas managed the irrigation system better than did 
ejidatarios.259  This chapter uses new sources recently cataloged in Mexico’s national 
water archive to corroborate Valladares’s findings by demonstrating that the equitable 
distribution of water stood as the greatest challenge to post-revolutionary governments in 
rural Morelos.  In so doing, it contributes to a small body of literature that focuses on the 
struggle for water as the main engine of unrest in the countryside.260  The widespread 
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cultivation of rice explains in part why water was so contentious in Morelos.  In the forty 
years before the 1910 revolution, the wealthiest hacendados invested hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to construct new hydraulic works in order to channel waters to 
formerly rain-fed fields, increasing the amount of irrigated land in Morelos by over 
20,000 hectares (a 180 percent increase).  This process, according to Horacio Crespo, was 
directly responsible for the conditions that led to Zapata’s rebellion, because it decreased 
the amount of rain-fed plots available for rent to pueblos, thereby depriving rural 
communities of the means to sustain a livelihood.261  Alejandro Tortolero has gone one 
step further than Crespo and argued that the diminishing access to water, as much as if 
not more than unequal land tenure, led the campesinos of Morelos to take up arms.262  
Recent scholarship has thus placed water at the center of the zapatista struggle, yet these 
works have barely focused on the different rural responses to the centralization of water 
management in the 1920s and 1930s and its political consequences.  This study, then, 
answers Luis Aboites’s call to take into account relationships between the town councils 
and local elites; municipal seats and subject pueblos; and ejidal assemblies and municipal 
governments when studying water.263  
The chapter begins with a discussion of Morelos’s damaged hydraulic system 
circa 1920, arguing that deforestation shrunk the amount of available water at a time of 
rising commercial demand, intensifying agrarian conflicts.  The second section examines 
the spread of rice cultivation in post-revolutionary Morelos, with a particular focus on 
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callista attempts to regulate the sale of the grain and eliminate middlemen and 
speculators.  A third section examines efforts by the federal juntas to administer the 
region’s waters equitably, followed by a section exploring the patterns of village 
struggles over irrigation waters.  The chapter concludes with a section highlighting the 
power struggles between the federal, state, and local governments for control of the 
hydraulic system.   
The Hydrology of Post-revolutionary Morelos 
Agriculture thrives year-round in Morelos thanks to the various sources of water that 
bathe the rural landscape.  Apart from the annual rainy season running from May to 
September, water originates from mountain precipitation in the state’s northern highlands 
and flows southward to numerous river basins, while also feeding bountiful springs that 
arise at the base of the Ajusco Mountains.  The hydrology of Morelos is truly favorable to 
commercial agriculture.  On the one hand, the Amacuzac River enters from the west and 
serves as the riverbed for a network of streams and rivers that traverse the region, and as 
part of Morelos’s southern boundary with Guerrero.  In the east, meanwhile, the 
Amatzinac River originates in the southern foothills of the Popocatépetl Volcano and 
irrigates the fields of communities bordering Puebla.  The Cuautla and Yautepec Rivers 
slice through the heart of Morelos and provide irrigation waters to the most populous 
valleys; while the Tembembe and Chalma Rivers flow southward along the western edge 
of the state.  Smaller networks of rivers, streams, brooks, and ravines feed these principal 
veins.   
Before the revolution, these waters were loosely centralized by municipal 
governments, individual villages, haciendas, private interests, or associations of users.  
While the question of who exactly commanded which waters in Morelos over the 
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centuries remains unstudied, it is clear that local actors controlled the liquid.  Pueblos 
possessed the oldest rights to the rivers and springs in the form of colonial titles; with the 
establishment of municipal governments after Independence in the 1820s, local councils 
continued to control natural resources, on paper at least.264  As is well known, however, 
in Morelos haciendas came to dominate municipal governments and the countryside’s 
riches by the end of the nineteenth century.  Henceforth, the right to license local 
irrigation waters constituted an important source of revenue for municipal treasuries and, 
as we shall see, opposition to the federal government’s attempts to centralize water 
management often came from village political and economic elites who were also hostile 
to the ejidos.     
Yet at the same time, the expansion of commercial agriculture and the 
establishment of industries such as electricity generation and petroleum production at the 
national level prompted Mexico City to assert more control over the country’s waters.  In 
1888, the federal government passed the first legislation to regulate the nation’s oceans 
and navigable rivers.  Subsequent legislation, including the 1917 Constitution, gave the 
national government additional powers to oversee and allocate the rights over waterways.  
On the one hand, continuity in terms of centralization characterized federal laws 
pertaining to water both before and after the revolution; but on the other hand, the 1917 
Constitution broke with the past by emphasizing public over individual ownership of the 
nation’s natural resources (Article 27).  The Mexican Revolution, that is to say, 
centralized water management under a different legal basis than had Porfirio Díaz’s 
government and stressed the social function of water and land.   
                                                 
264 Gisela von Wobeser, “El uso del agua en la región de Cuernavaca, Cuautla durante la época colonial,” 
Historia Mexicana 32, no. 4 (1983): 467–495. 
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Presidents Carranza and Obregón, however, barely legislated in water affairs.  
Instead, mounting conflicts between irrigation users in Morelos in the 1920s prompted 
President Calles to act further.  “The multiple difficulties that constantly arise between 
water users of the same current…are fundamentally due to the lack of regulation,” 
opened the government’s 1925 plan for increased involvement in agrarian matters.265  
Shortly afterwards, in January 1926 the Calles regime passed the Irrigation Waters Law: 
this created the National Irrigation Commission, which operated under the Ministry of 
Agriculture and gave the Commission the power to regulate and intervene in the 
administration of Mexico’s irrigation waters.  The legislation established who exactly 
was eligible to receive official water concessions and authorized the federal government 
to invest in irrigation projects.  Villages received water rights in the form of “dotación” 
rather than “restitución,” which shows that that a new configuration of water distribution 
was established in Morelos.  Hydrology was central to callista agrarian policy because it 
was assured that irrigation works would modernize the Mexican countryside and the pave 
the way for the creation of a nation of proprietary smallholders.  Later in 1926, the 
Ministry of Agriculture established juntas in Morelos to oversee the region’s distribution 
of irrigation waters, resolve conflicts between users, and clean and maintain hydraulic 
works.  Federal investment in irrigation projects also increased from almost five million 
pesos in 1926, to thirteen million pesos in 1927, and to twenty-one million pesos a year 
later.266  These investments were part of a larger national strategy focused largely in the 
northern states to convert secondary lands into irrigated fields, but in Morelos, where 
water was relatively abundant, allocation rather than supply presented the main 
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challenge.  As one agronomist told the governor in 1931, for six years many engineers 
from the National Irrigation Commission had been in Morelos studying the water 
question in order to find new resolutions to old problems.267  Morelos, therefore, appears 
to have been one of the few states targeted for hydraulic reform. 
Adding to this dilemma was the fact that the fighting of the 1910s left Morelos’s 
hydraulic system badly damaged and in need of expensive investments if the irrigation 
network were to be reconstructed.  Zapatistas had targeted and destroyed not only 
hacienda buildings but also the hydraulic infrastructure that fed waters to cane fields, 
showing that they considered water distribution as unjust.  The hacendado Luis García 
Pimentel, Jr., seeking tax exemptions while he attempted to revamp Tenango hacienda in 
1919, wrote to the agrarian authorities to describe the extent of damage suffered by his 
properties.  Between 1912 and 1914, he said militants destroyed sections of a fifty-seven-
kilometer canal that carried waters from Agua Hedionda.  Insurgents used dynamite to 
blow up the dam on the Agua Hedionda and what parts of the canal still functioned were 
clogged with silt, weeds, and trash.  Zapata himself had ordered the pueblos to clean the 
waterways; yet as late as the early 1920s, sections of the canals had become clogged with 
sediment measuring nearly one meter deep.  The land redistribution in the 1920s, 
meanwhile, forced García Pimentel to postpone plans to reconstruct irrigation works, 
which still remained damaged at the end of the decade.268  Across Morelos, the badly 
damaged irrigation system leaked large quantities of water.  The abandoned ditches 
around the hamlet of El Hospital (Cuautla) caused water to overflow and flood close-by 
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irrigable fields, forcing the hamlet to plant crops in neighboring Cuautla’s ejido.269  Even 
as late as 1938, a government engineer noticed that around Jiutepec “the loss of liquid is 
so evident that even the roads are overrun [with water] and almost impassable.”270   
Damage to Morelos’s hydraulic infrastructure, however, only partially explains 
why water contributed to such upheaval in the countryside.  A second factor was that 
during the provisional agrarian reform of the early 1920s, villagers simultaneously 
acquired land and water rights through the Local and National Agrarian Commissions.  
The agrarian reform therefore altered rural property boundaries to the point that they 
were no longer congruent with how Porfirian haciendas had designed the hydraulic 
system to allocate water.  Consequently, quarrels between communities over water usage 
arose.  As Valladares has convincingly argued, hacienda management of the irrigation 
network before the revolution produced a more efficient system of water distribution than 
did the post-revolutionary ejido, when command over natural resources resided in the 
villages.  The construction of unauthorized irrigation hydrants along the canals, for 
example, became a notorious problem for agrarian authorities and a source of tension 
between villages.271  Post-revolutionary reconstruction, therefore, involved not only 
rebuilding Morelos’s irrigation network but also putting back together a system of land 
and water rights that had been consolidated during the Porfiriato and disarticulated during 
the Mexican Revolution.  
A third factor exacerbating water problems was the scale of deforestation 
occurring on the hillsides, which caused erosion, flooding, and top soils to wash away 
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while also decreasing the amounts of water available for irrigation.  In 1923, engineer 
Felipe Ruiz de Velasco lamented this ecological disaster in a twenty-five page pamphlet 
entitled Bosques y manantiales del estado de Morelos.  He argued that the richness of the 
state was not due to its lands, but rather to the numerous sources of streams, springs, and 
rivers that bathed the valleys.  Without them, Ruiz de Velasco asserted, the sugar industry 
would not have thrived as it did during the Porfiriato.  As we have seen, however, during 
this time individuals in the pueblos made good money exploiting and selling forest 
resources, and therefore the rapid rate of deforestation continued with no oversight.  The 
solution, Ruiz de Velasco concluded, was to stop cutting down live tress, allow the barren 
hillsides to recover their vegetation, and conserve forests resources.272   
Ruiz de Velasco analyzed the decreasing amounts of water available for irrigation 
during the 1920s; but he did not blame the depletion of the liquid on the semi-destroyed 
irrigation system or bad management by ejidatarios.  Instead, Ruiz linked the lack of 
irrigation water to the destruction of forests: 
 
The cry of alarm must be given: water is disappearing because the forests 
continue being destroyed!  Water is everything and no one worries about it, 
because no one worries about the forests…they [the forests] are the great 
condensers of the water vapors that float high in the atmosphere, and the bearers 
of the springs, streams and rivers that give life and joy to the cane fields and rice 
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paddies.  Without the forests there are no waters and without these irrigation is 
not possible.273  
According to Ruiz de Velasco, mountain precipitation was the principal source of the 
region’s waters.  Bald slopes, moreover, encouraged erosion and run-off onto cultivable 
fields.  Ruiz de Velasco was thus able to see the larger ecological picture and the 
interdependence of the region’s natural resources.  Yet the engineer was not the only 
figure to raise a red flag regarding the state of the woodlands.  Luis García Pimentel Jr., 
who was also familiar with the regional climate, himself warned that giving the villages 
control of the countryside would allow rural communities to clear cut the forests and 
plant crops on lands unsuitable for agriculture.  The scion of Porfirian Morelos argued 
that the hacienda system was less destructive of the environment than the ejido: “it is the 
FORESTS that the Hacienda has always undertaken to conserve in order to protect the 
climatic conditions of the region.”274  Put another way, decentralized management of the 
region’s natural resources led to increased exploitation of the lands, waters, and forests; 
hence, the recovery of natural resources by the pueblos threatened an ecological 
catastrophe.   The hacendado indeed had a point.  As Valladares has recently shown, the 
hacienda system annually rotated the planting of fields and only grew crops on a third of 
the available lands, allowing the remaining two-thirds of the plots to lay fallow for a 
period in order to replenish the soil’s nutrients and conserve water.275  Ejidatarios, by 
contrast, simultaneously sowed and irrigated the plots they controlled, disregarding any 
system of rotation.  The pueblos, that is to say, tried to commercialize all their available 
resources at once without necessarily seeing the need to balance exploitation and 
conservation.  To be sure, it was not that rural inhabitants lacked the knowledge to live in 
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harmony with their surrounding environment, but rather that the exigencies of their 
poverty and the need to earn quick money and produce food overrode any long term 
vision of conservation.276 
The Rice Boom 
The main reason why water became a source conflict between pueblos was due to the fact 
that the expansion of rice cultivation on ejidal lands increased the demand for irrigation 
waters.277  By 1928, the grain accounted for nearly twenty percent of the land cultivated 
in the state and over forty percent of the total value of its harvest that year.278  Like 
growing sugar cane, rice cultivation also requires significant agricultural expertise on the 
part of the farmer but has clear advantages as a crop.  Unlike sugar cane, which must be 
irrigated for twelve months out of the year, rice paddies only need four months of steady 
water supply.  The plant matures in five to six months, which means there can be two 
annual seasons; one beginning in March and April and another in June and July.  After 
the clearing and sowing of the fields and the cleaning of the canals, the maintenance of 
rice paddies involves close attention by the agriculturalists and a delicate flooding 
technique that must spread and drain irrigation waters evenly across the land.  A watchful 
eye must always be kept for the growth of fungi on the sprouting grains, while plagues 
and hail can quickly destroy an entire crop.  The planting and harvest seasons are the 
busiest of the year, when the farmer is bent over with hands and feet immersed in the 
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mud all day.279  During these months, especially in the 1920s, families with children 
often required young ones to lend a hand in the fields, keeping them out of school.     
The demand for water was particularly high in post-revolutionary Morelos 
because so much of the liquid used to soak rice paddies leaked out of the canals before it 
arrived in the fields.  Shortly before the arrival of the federal water juntas in 1926, a 
government bureaucrat estimated that rice farmers used four times the amount of water 
needed to cultivate the grain given that so much of it was wasted, “for which reason 
everyone complains about the lack of water.”280  Countless quarrels arose between 
neighboring communities due to this situation.  In 1922, the small congregation of El 
Higuerón, for instance, sought temporarily to halt the flow of water into a canal in order 
to clean and reconstruct irrigation works for their fields.  Jojutla, the neighboring town of 
3,000 people, refused to allow El Higuerón to interrupt the water flow on the grounds that 
fifteen days without the fluid would cause their rice paddies to dry up and mean that their 
crop would be lost.  The conflict pitted a large municipal seat against a smaller neighbor 
and both communities lobbied Governor Parres to intervene.281   
In geographical terms, rice grew best in the soils around Jojutla, Cuautla, 
Cuernavaca, and Tetecala, but pueblos in Yautepec and Jonacatepec also reaped good 
harvests.  The evidence suggests that different groups in every type of rural community 
cultivated rice in these populous regions, but especially the ejidatarios, who planted as 
much of the grain as possible.  Pueblos were raising so much rice in the mid-1920s that it 
prompted agrarian officials to issue a state-wide circular that reminded villagers to not 
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use more water than they were allocated.  Campesinos in Xoxocotla (Puente de Ixtla), for 
instance, were growing ninety hectares of rice in the middle of 1927 in an ejido that was 
granted only thirty-six hectares of irrigated lands.282  It is worth stressing that elite 
coercion or an official federal plan to promote rice cultivation does not appear to have 
been a factor in rural inhabitants’ decision to plant the grain.  Rather, high market prices 
for rice, which peaked in the mid-1920s, drove the rise in production.  Demand for rice 
was high in the 1920s given that the country suffered from low agricultural output as a 
consequence of the revolutionary war.  Perhaps also explaining the increasing prices paid 
for rice was the fact that a shortage of malts forced the brewing industry to use the grain 
as a primary material for beer production.283  In any event, where rice could be sown, the 
ejido became an economic asset for rural folks, and villagers sought high profits from 
their harvests.  Between 1921 and 1923, before the state began purchasing the harvest, 
the annual production of rice almost tripled to nearly 3,000 metric tons: “data that 
completely refutes the endless assertions in regards to the failure of agrarismo in 
Morelos,” noted a federal inquiry.284  The national regime, in other words, applauded the 
spread of rice cultivation in Morelos ejidos.  Meanwhile, the state served as the principal 
supplier of rice to Mexico City and helped the country to become a net exporter of the 
grain in the 1920s, sending its products to Cuba, the United States, and Europe.285  
Campesinos’ decision to grow rice, therefore, was fundamentally an economic decision.   
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The rice boom, however, faced old problems, as local speculators, who provided 
growers with credit, purchased the harvests at low prices.  Since the first rice harvest of 
1921, a federal study noted that the most difficult challenge “that had to be immediately 
overcome…was the unaffordable price that speculators paid to small producers…[as] the 
state government lacked resources to confront the situation.”286  Spanish merchants based 
in Mexico City continued to capture the Morelos rice market and pay half the market 
value of the crop.  Governor Ambrosio Puente explained the situation to Calles in 1927: 
“Speculators purchase the rice harvest at laughable prices, as some deals are made as 
soon as the fields are plowed or others when the ear begins to sprout.  In both cases, the 
producer commits the majority of his harvest.”287  The “foreign speculators,” the 
governor proposed, could  be cut out of the distribution process by the creation of a state-
sponsored Regulatory Board that would organize all the rice farmers into cooperatives, 
provide credit to ejidatarios, and offer the growers double what the speculators paid.  In 
sum, the state government would become the middleman of ejidal rice production.  
Calles appears to have approved the plan since it epitomized callismo in Morelos 
by using the power of the state to cut out middlemen.  In August 1927, shortly before the 
harvest season, the state government established the Rice Regulatory Commission by 
decree.288  A month later Governor Puente pronounced in the national Senate that farmers 
would receive fifteen pesos per carga of 138 kilograms.289  In the beginning, however, 
the project was controversial, because the government could not pay the high prices for 
rice it promised to farmers, and the plan threatened to further undermine the economic 
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power of local elites.  Moreover, Puente circulated orders to police and municipal 
authorities not to allow any trains at the stations with carloads of rice to leave for the 
refining mills in Mexico City without registering with the government and providing 
proprietary evidence of the harvest.290  This angered the residents of Tenextepango, who 
wrote to the Ministry of Agriculture to declare that they had no need for a cooperative at 
the moment, but rather in February during the preparations for the planting season.  They 
remained wary of the governor’s guarantees to pay them thousands of pesos for their 
rice.291  Puente’s political enemies cited multiple cases whereby he imposed the 
regulatory board by force, threatening some resistant farmers with jail, fines, and land 
dispossessions.  Numerous cases centered on the state government taking over 
warehouses at haciendas by force, violating lease contracts.  The main victims of this 
repression were local elites linked to Spanish merchants, who stood to lose the most from 
the new system.292  Campesino rice growers, in other words, found themselves caught 
between the state government, which they feared would never pay fair prices for their 
crop, and the old speculators, who remained hostile to any institution favorable to the 
ejido.    
Puente in fact admitted to being only able to pay ten pesos per carga and blamed 
part of the problem on the inability of campesinos to adapt quickly to the new system.  
He also cited delays in providing credit and hard cash to agricultural workers before and 
after the harvest.293   A year later, in 1928, the bank paid rice growers just twelve pesos 
per carga of 150 kilograms, and portions of this were discounted for insurance, loan 
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interests, and taxes.294  Regulations even prohibited growers from selling rice to private 
individuals.  The traditional creditors, such as Spaniards Manuel Alverdi and José 
Cuetara, now fought the state monopoly by offering higher prices than the government at 
thirteen pesos for each carga of rice.  In any event, the Regulatory Commission did 
undermine the influence of the old speculators even if it did not eliminate them 
altogether, as local complaints of abuses committed by these individuals decreased during 
into the early 1930s.295  A federal official noted in 1933 that in Morelos “favorable and 
unfavorable opinions can be heard” regarding the agrarian credit bank: “The eternal 
exploiters of the campesino—the speculator, the comprador al tiempo, and the 
established merchant—are the ones that frequently speak badly of the Bank and its 
operations.”296  Now growers centered their complaints on the government and corrupt 
individuals employed by the state bank that purchased the rice harvests.  This was only 
made worse when market prices for rice started to fall in 1927, then plunged in 1930, and 
finally bottomed out in 1933, losing more than two-thirds of their peak values in the mid-
1920s (see Appendix B).  As a result, serious tensions arose between farmers and the 
state monopoly.  In August 1935, representatives from sixty-eight local credit societies 
met in Jiutepec to rally against the state monopoly.  The assembly sought direct control 
over the production and distribution of rice and proposed to break away from the 
government-sponsored rice growers’ union.297  Only when market prices for rice began to 
climb in the late-1930s did officials describe villagers as content with the cash received 
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for their harvests.298  Given that the struggle over prices occurred at the height of the 
Great Depression, it is therefore not surprising that the state agricultural bank could never 
offer satisfactory compensation for the growers’ harvests.  In the end, however, the state 
monopoly was a better shock absorber for the fall in rice prices than the old speculators, 
who remained unwilling to negotiate with ejidatarios to the degree that the state did in 
the post-revolutionary period.  Indeed, official regulation of the rice market represented 
only one way in which the callista state sought to win support in the countryside, as it 
also established new institutions in Morelos charged with resolving village conflicts over 
water distribution.      
Federal Water Juntas  
The political chaos of Morelos’s gubernatorial politics in the mid-1920s opened the door 
for the arrival of national institutions in rural areas; 1926 witnessed the establishment of 
federal water juntas and federal primary schools in the countryside.  By the early 1930s, 
up to eleven federal water juntas functioned in Morelos, while fifteen similar councils 
operated in neighboring Estado de México.299  Some half dozen of these institutions in 
Morelos were established in 1926 and operated under the Ministry of Agriculture; they 
were thus key institutions of callista centralization.  The two most important juntas would 
attempt to govern the Cuautla and Yautepec Rivers, close to where a majority of the state 
population resided.  All the juntas were founded according to a set of federal regulations 
known as the reglamento, or ordinance, which every user of a given source of water was 
required to obey. The ordinance that in 1926 established the Cuautla River water junta, 
for example, listed every spring, ravine, and river that fed the historic waterway.  It 
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registered the volume of water granted to each ejido, municipality, military colony, 
hacienda, and group of smallholders and stated exactly from which source or canal the 
liquid came.  Each group of Cuautla River water users (there were some seventy-five in 
total) would send a delegate to represent their interests before the junta and annually elect 
the president of the organization.  The council was based in Cuautla and charged with 
resolving conflicts over water usage, maintaining and repairing hydraulic works, and 
assigning and authorizing delegates to open and close the water valves and hydrants.  The 
junta would also collect taxes, or cuotas, from each group of users to pay the salaries of 
the institution’s president, his secretary, and treasurer, and to purchase construction 
materials for irrigation works.  Water users themselves would perform the arduous labor 
of cleaning the canals and reconstructing the irrigation system.300   
Yet simply establishing the juntas as the legitimate institutions to administer 
Morelos’s waters was a challenge.  It could take repeated efforts by bureaucrats to 
persuade villagers to recognize the authority of the water councils.  In 1928, for instance, 
an inspector from Mexico City went to Cuernavaca to report on the Apatlaco River junta 
and found it practically nonexistent because none of the users would send delegates to 
represent their interests before the council.  The institution had no secretary or treasury 
and could not appoint personnel to these posts for lack of funds.301  Some pueblos would 
not even respond to the junta’s inquiries, circulars, or debt notices.302  Five years later in 
1933, an inspector returned to Cuernavaca and found the Apatlaco River junta still 
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disorganized and without sufficient office space.  He learned that the council had not 
operated for the past three years.  The federal bureaucrat was finally able to gather 
representatives of the water users to reorganize the junta, but only after he promised to 
lower the debts owed by the groups of farmers.303  Further investigations into the status of 
the juntas revealed that the national institutions charged with governing the waters of the 
Xochicupan, Hedionda, and Duraznotla Ravines had never been organized at all.304  
Where the federal government did channel its resources and establish viable juntas was 
along the principle waterways in Morelos—the Cuautla and Yautepec Rivers and the 
Amatzinac Ravine.   
Ejidatarios responded in different ways to the arrival of the federal water juntas.  
On the one hand, pueblos that controlled sufficient irrigation waters, such as Anenecuilco 
and Villa de Ayala, saw little need for more bureaucracy and taxes.  Francisco Franco, 
Anenecuilco’s agrarian leader, grumbled about the incompetence of agronomists, 
alleging that the water council imposed high taxes on the pueblos without regards to what 
types of fields received irrigation waters.  Franco wrote to the president of the Cuautla 
River junta declaring that the humble inhabitants of Anenecuilco “found the water tax 
strange,” and that they refused to pay any debts on the grounds that the “waters belong to 
the nation.”305  Here, the pueblo interpretation of “national waters” stood in stark contrast 
to elite conceptions of public property.  Villagers considered Mexico’s natural resources 
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as first and foremost a source of wealth to serve the inhabitants of the nation—a pueblo-
centric view of public property.  Likewise, Anenecuilco justified their opposition to taxes 
“because they say the waters and lands were given to them by the Revolution.”306  Put 
differently, shared sovereignty over the Cuautla River did not include federal water taxes.  
In contrast, elites in Mexico City, who wrote the 1917 Constitution and subsequent 
agrarian legislation, possessed a state-centered conception of the Mexican Revolution and 
public property, which placed the federal government as the ultimate proprietor and 
arbitrator of natural resources.  Disagreements over water taxes boiled down to these 
conflicting interpretations of “public property.”   
On the other hand, many newer villages and hamlets that lacked ancient rights and 
sufficient irrigation waters lobbied the federal juntas to intervene on their behalf against 
larger communities such as Anenecuilco and Villa de Ayala, both of which were accused 
of taking neighboring pueblos’ waters.307  These smaller pueblos, such as Chinameca and 
Moyotepec (Ayala), were often located at lower elevations along the canals and 
vulnerable to head towns situated closer to the mouths of the irrigation system.  Thus 
shortly after the Cuautla River junta was established in 1926, the rice-growing villages of 
Ticumán (Tlaltizapán) and Moyotepec lobbied the Cuautla River junta to intercede on 
their behalf.  Authorities wrote of the need to “force those in Villa de Ayala to free the 
passage of the waters that the ejidatarios of Ticumán need.  They [Villa de Ayala] as well 
as Anenecuilco have obstinately refused to allow the water to pass to Ticumán.”308  
Similarly, in Tecajec (Yecapixtla), residents protested that people in Ocuituco, with a 
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population of over 1,000, prevented water from passing to the tiny pueblo of some 200 
inhabitants.309  For these newer and smaller pueblos, then, the federal juntas served as a 
potential counterweight to larger and more powerful neighbors.  Yet in all of these cases, 
although their circumstance and strategies differed, both older and newer pueblos were 
haggling over the extent of federal oversight; some needed very direct federal support if 
there was to be a green revolution, while others simply wanted the juntas to maintain the 
status quo.   
In other cases, ejidatarios lobbied the federal juntas to intervene in disputes with 
local elites.  The hamlet of Caracol (Yautepec), for example, counted on the Yautepec 
River junta to force the tenant of the Atlihuayan hacienda, Adolfo Aguirre, to allow 
waters to pass to the tiny community of fewer than 100 inhabitants.  The junta responded 
by ordering the construction of irrigation works that would distribute the liquid evenly.310  
Likewise, in eastern Morelos, where Luis García Pimentel Jr. clung to the last land 
holdings of Tenango hacienda, ejidatarios in Huazulco, Chalcatzingo, and Jonacatepec 
requested that Mexico City intervene to stop the tenant of Tenango hacienda from 
altering irrigation works in favor of the estate.  Residents in Huazulco wrote, “The man 
who is in charge of administering the land of the Tenango hacienda, who has always been 
an enemy of the revolution, frequently cuts off our water [supply], which causes us 
serious harm.”311  The state and national governments answered these petitions by further 
redistributing Tenango hacienda’s lands in 1938, although the shortage of irrigation 
waters in eastern Morelos remained a perennial problem. 
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In general, however, it was municipal governments, most of which were run by 
local elites during this time, who most opposed the centralization of water administration, 
and they did so primarily in the form of non-cooperation with the juntas.  Taxes on water 
usage, we may recall, had served as an important source of revenue for municipal 
treasuries before the Mexican Revolution, but the federal water juntas deprived the town 
councils of this possible income.  One case of opposition involved municipal authorities 
sabotaging irrigation works.  The inhabitants of Huejotengo wrote that the civil 
authorities of Ocuituco “had defied the provisions dictated by the Engineer who came 
from the Ministry of Agriculture” by destroying and constructing irrigation channels that 
diverted waters from the hamlet.312  In Cuautla also, the municipal government 
appropriated water for public and domestic use without the authorization of the federal 
junta, which deprived nearby ejidos of the liquid.313  Ejidatarios from Cuautlixco wrote 
to the junta president, who relayed the message to Mexico City and requested help to 
force the municipal authorities to comply with junta regulations.314  There is indeed little 
evidence to demonstrate cooperation between the federal juntas and town councils.  
Rather, municipal governments ignored the federal juntas’ dominion and attempted to 
retain local control of the irrigation system.  Such was the case of Jonacatepec’s 
municipal president, who sought to establish the Amatzinac Ravine junta headquarters in 
his own office, which in turn would give him leverage to intervene in the affairs of the 
water council.315  The president of the Cuautla River junta lamented “that without the 
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help of the Civil Force to subdue disobedient pueblos, nothing will ever be able to get 
done.”316  Non-compliant town councils controlled by local elites, therefore, posed an 
obstacle to federal authority, an equitable distribution of water, and ejidal rice farming.   
Who exactly were the junta presidents?  In theory, waters users would annually 
elect an executive to preside over the council.  Yet if the users failed to hold an election, 
agrarian authorities in Mexico City could appoint the council’s president, secretary, 
treasurer, and distributor delegates.  In Morelos, it appears that the first council leaders 
were elected not by the water users but rather appointed by officials in the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  Some junta presidents in fact were frankly unwilling to back ejidatarios in 
conflicts with local elites.  For example, the small hamlet of San Antón (Cuernavaca) 
accused the Rio Apatlaco junta president, Ignacio Loza, of favoring hacienda interests 
above those of the pueblos.  Loza would not give San Antón permission to shut off the 
water flow in order to clean its canal.317  Even when water users did elect a junta 
president, that person was likely not an ejidatario.  Such was the case of Refugio 
Bustamante, who was elected as the Cuautla River junta executive in 1931 and later won 
the governorship in 1934.318  Operating the federal water councils, therefore, were 
individuals with no ejidal membership, which subjected the juntas to less village control. 
Some junta authorities were downright hostile to campesinos.  Nicolas Oropeza, 
president of Amatzinac Ravine junta, served as the executive for five years.  Villagers 
declared that Oropeza and his secretary “have extorted us, charging us completely 
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onerous fines, taking away our right to the waters.”319  Officials in Mexico City had 
already once warned Oropeza of imposing erroneous fines on villages.320  This time the 
villagers’ lobbying efforts paid off.  Weeks later a representative from the Ministry of 
Agriculture arrived to depose Oropeza and hold a vote to elect a new junta president.321  
In other cases, the junta presidents often referred to the need to use “a strong hand” to 
force villagers to submit to the junta’s authority.322  In 1932, the secretary of the 
Amatzinac Ravine junta simply gave up and resigned his position because he had not 
been paid a single peso in nearly five months.  “I see apathy or defiance to a large extent 
among pueblo users to pay this [water usage] tax.”323  The disparaging behavior of the 
junta presidents was, therefore, a cause of tension between rural communities and the 
water councils, because junta leaders served their own financial interests above the 
pressing needs of agricultural communities.  The fact that the councils’ committee 
members earned their income from water usage fees rather than directly from the federal 
government reinforced this behavior.    
Given this scenario, coupled with constant village complaints of insufficient 
water, it is thus not surprising that dozens of communities openly refused to pay junta 
taxes, especially as these cut into rice profits.  Meanwhile, the federal juntas devoted an 
enormous amount of effort and documentation to their accounting books, as they were 
keen to keep detailed records of pueblo water debts.  By 1929, for example, Yautepec’s 
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ejido—the largest in Morelos—owed the Yautepec River junta 877 pesos.  Smallholders 
in the same municipality owed the council an additional 210 pesos.  Even nearby 
haciendas had not paid their dues.  The Yautepec River junta then sent letters to each of 
the users, giving each debtor fifteen days to pay off their accounts or else their water 
rights would be suspended.324  The Cuautla River junta also listed over two dozen users 
of the waters that owed taxes to the federal institution.325  José Parres, the former 
governor of Morelos and later assistant secretary to the Minister of Agriculture, wrote 
that the Cuautla River junta president “complains that the majority of ejidal groups 
neither pay their outstanding debts nor want to contribute with their corresponding quotas 
for expenses to implement the current Ordinance.”326  Without the support of the civil 
authorities, the junta presidents found there was little they could do to force villagers to 
pay up.   
Federal officials and campesinos even used different terminology to describe 
water usage fees.  Whereas junta employees referred to the payments as cuotas (quotas), 
which indicated a shared responsibility to cover the expenses of the irrigation system, 
villagers called them contribuciones (taxes), which reflected a burdensome charge 
demanded by government.  Many agricultural communities already paid local 
associations of users and some taxes to the state government for the management of the 
irrigation system.  “We believe it very onerous,” the residents of Villa de Ayala wrote, 
“to make three payments to plant our irrigable ejido; that is to say, one for the Water 
Junta, another for the aguador (water operator), and the third to the State Government, 
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being that the first in no way benefits us.”327  Agronomists recognized these differences 
of interpretation over payments and attempted to explain to peasants that quotas were not 
the same as taxes, but rather like gabelas, or duties.328  Despite any efforts to reconcile 
these different terminologies, pueblos believed that the waters already belonged to them 
and therefore should not be taxed by the juntas. 
Village pressure to make the federal juntas change tack prompted the state 
government to take a greater role in resolving water disputes between rival pueblos.  For 
instance, the author of a memorandum on the Apatlaco River junta noticed in 1929 that 
an official engineer had cooperated with Governor Ambrosio Puente to construct splitter 
boxes in the irrigation network while disregarding the provisions of the junta.  According 
to the report, the agronomist  
 
has held several juntas in different places with [water] users and the governor of 
the State without letting the Junta know of the agreements made, with the result 
that the Junta does not know which [irrigation] works have been completed and 
which pueblos have contributed to those works and to what degree.  
Consequently, those pueblos have no appreciation for the Junta’s orders and 
summons, because matters related to the Apatlaco River’s waters are made 
directly between the cited Engineer or with the Governor of the State, who 
resolves everything without taking in to consideration the Juntas.329 
Governor Vicente Estrada Cajigal also forged agreements between villages and 
advocated for reforming the water juntas.330  In a 1931 letter to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the governor stated first that the majority of the juntas neglected their 
principal objective of establishing an equitable distribution of water.  Junta committee 
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members instead focused on collecting taxes rather than cleaning the canals and repairing 
irrigation works.  Furthermore, Estrada Cajigal accused the council presidents of 
channeling rural funds to pay their own salaries over the needs to purchase construction 
materials for hydraulic system.  The governor concluded by stating that the juntas had 
turned into “real red tape and inexorably weigh down on the scarce resources of the 
peasant Class, spending the totality of the money they collect on employee salaries, office 
expenses, and general expenses, always delaying construction works and silt removal 
from the canals.”331  If the Ministry of Agriculture would not step in to resolve the 
situation, Estrada Cajigal believed, then the federal government should retreat from its 
attempts to control Morelos’s abundant water resources.  Exercising restraint, the 
governor stopped short of making an argument for retaining local control of springs and 
rivers.    
Yet the pressure placed on the federal government by both villagers and the 
governor did force the water councils to change course in the 1930s after realizing that 
the issue of taxes was alienating farmers from the juntas.  In response, Mexico City sent 
Francisco Souza, an agrarian inspector, to the countryside to investigate the matter.  
Souza reconvened the Rio Apatlaco junta after several years in which it had not 
functioned and found the most pressing topic that farmers wanted to discuss was the over 
$5,000 pesos of debt owed to the junta.  Souza agreed to cancel nearly all the user debts 
and begin anew.332  He then moved on to Cuautla and had success rallying campesinos to 
support the council’s efforts.  The junta president agreed to lower the entire debts of the 
users from $5,741 to $1,455 pesos.  “All the attendees expressed their gratitude for the 
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economic relief they received and promised to be punctual thereafter in their payment of 
their quotas.”333  Thus, it was not that campesinos rejected any form of taxation, but 
rather the financial burden imposed by the juntas was too disproportionate for them to 
sustain given their constant struggle to obtain good prices for the rice crop.  When the 
Yaueptec River junta gathered in 1933 to discuss the issue of debts, farmers did not even 
seek to cancel all the accounts, because they recognized it would be unjust not to pay the 
employees of the juntas and the administration of the waters would be a disaster.  For 
instance, the hamlet of El Higuerón, which howled constantly concerning its lack of 
water, owed a total of 1,104 pesos to the Yautepec River junta.  Yet the hamlet’s 
representatives showed more gratitude when the assembly agreed to lower their debt by 
nearly half the total amount.  In all the junta gatherings, Souza noted that some 1,500 
campesinos attended the assemblies and that “perfect order always prevailed, everyone 
behaving, without exception, eloquently disciplined and respectful.”334  By negotiating 
these debts with ejidatarios, the fiscal basis of the juntas was diluted, allowing a greater 
degree of ejidal control over Morelos’s waterways.   
Another way the juntas learned to earn pueblo approval was by helping to 
reconstruct the irrigation system, especially since Porfirian engineers had articulated 
Morelos’s hydraulic works in the nineteenth century to the state’s sugar haciendas.  Many 
conflicts indeed arose in the 1920s and 1930s because the hydraulic infrastructure lacked 
splitter boxes (cajas repartidoras) to evenly distribute the liquid among villages, whose 
borders did not always align with former estate fields.  The irrigation network, that is to 
say, was designed to serve a few dozen haciendas, not a hundred ejidos and thousands of 
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users.  An engineer noted that Anenecuilco’s control of large amounts of water was due 
above all “to the lack of splitter boxes, and having no way of making the distribution 
properly proportionate, no one can be found responsible because it is not known which of 
all the users takes a larger amount.”335  Authorities thus admitted that the unequal 
distribution of water was not just due to villages taking the liquid resource (although this 
still occurred in numerous instances), but also to the lack of a fully articulated hydraulic 
infrastructure.  In turn, the juntas often heeded village calls for construction of irrigation 
works.  For example, Bonifacio García (Tlaltizapán), a new pueblo founded in the 1920s, 
complained that it received little water for its crops from the Temilpa canal.  The 
Yautepec River junta responded by constructing hydraulic works that would bring the 
hamlet thirty more liters of water per second.336  A year later, in 1929, the president of the 
Yautepec River junta noted that “construction of some [hydraulic] works have been 
carried out that tend to improve the distribution system of waters…something which until 
now had not been implemented.”337  The evidence also suggests that the construction of 
irrigation works ended long-standing conflicts between pueblos.  After the Apatlaco 
River junta installed a splitter box to separate waters between San Marcos (Mazatepec) 
and Mexquemecan (Yecapixtla), even the municipal seat of Yecapixtla had fewer 
difficulties with distribution afterwards.338  Similarly, the construction of a splitter box 
resolved a dispute between Cocoyoc (Yautepec) and the Atlihuayan hacienda.339  The 
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construction of splitter boxes, in other words, had a rippling effect across the irrigation 
network that allowed the waters to flow more evenly.  Villagers were thus not innately 
opposed to the central management of local waters; rather, different pueblos sought to use 
the federal juntas in different ways to manage their interests more effectively.  What they 
all resisted, however, were abusive junta authorities, inept agronomists, and burdensome 
taxes placed on the usage of waters, especially when communities did not receive their 
allotted quantities of the liquid and the juntas were co-opted by local elites.   
Patterns of Village Struggles for Water    
 The more water a pueblo could obtain, the more rice it could grow.  This obvious fact 
explains why no issue caused as much conflict between villages as did the control of 
irrigation waters.  Unlike demarcated lands and forests, water is of course a fluid 
substance, and therefore several communities must share a single source of the liquid.  
While the elevation of a village could influence whether or not a pueblo possessed easy 
access to large quantities of water, topography was not the only factor explaining 
struggles between rural communities.  Internally cohesive villages, as this section will 
show, were better equipped to control large amounts of the irrigations waters at the 
expense of weaker and internally divided neighbors.  It was these older “strong” pueblos, 
such as Anenecuilco, Tezoyuca and Tlacotepec, which wanted the federal juntas to 
maintain the status quo.  In contrast, weaker and more divided pueblos, such as 
Chiconcuac and Zacualpan, actively sought the intervention of the juntas as leverage 
against powerful neighbors.  By doing so, these communities dragged the federal juntas 
into local quarrels.  Sometimes the councils diffused tensions among rival villages, while 
other times official involvement deepened the conflicts.    
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Such was the struggle between Tezoyuca and Chiconcuac.  In the 1920s, both 
communities possessed between 200 and 300 inhabitants, and although they were located 
only three kilometers apart in the middle of the rice-growing country between Jojutla and 
Cuernavaca, Chiconcuac was part of the Xochitepec municipality, while Tezoyuca was 
located in the municipality of Jiutepec (today Emiliano Zapata).  Despite the similar size 
of the two communities, Chiconcuac had formed as a settlement for a racially diverse and 
permanently settled working population on the hacienda of the same name during the 
nineteenth century.  In other words, Chiconcuac was not a free village before the 
revolution, but rather an appendage of a hacienda and now officially a “congregation.”  
Tradition did not bind its inhabitants together to the same degree that it did in older 
neighboring communities.340  There were over twenty new villages of this type in post-
revolutionary Morelos, and they almost always inherited the name of the ex-hacienda 
from which they were built.341  By contrast, communities such as Tezoyuca possessed a 
pre-Hispanic past and displayed a high degree of cohesion.  Tezoyuca was unlike most 
villages in that its displayed few signs of internal discord or of abusive individuals 
dominating the village.342  Meanwhile, in 1925, campesinos in Chiconcuac complained of 
the land committee president who was not fulfilling his duties and who distributed the 
best lands to his friends and relatives.343  Both villages, of course, cultivated rice in the 
1920s and constantly wrote to officials regarding the lack of water required to supply 
their paddies. 
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 Chiconcuac did not even have enough water for domestic use, and the liquid it did 
possess was highly sulphuric and not the desired fresh water (agua dulce).  The village’s 
plants did not grow properly with the sulphuric water, making some fifty hectares of their 
ejido unsuitable for irrigation.  Meanwhile, Chiconcuac’s search for water had brought 
the community into conflict with neighboring villages from as early as the early 1920s.  
The pursuit of water even led to a tragic story of a fifteen year-old girl falling to her death 
while carrying buckets of water from a distant well.  “The engineers of the Local 
Agrarian [Commission],” Chiconcuac’s residents lamented, “did nothing but come and 
take notes (echaban trazos), but they did not take note of the type of lands or if we 
enjoyed waters or not.”344  This situation turned desperate in 1925 when Chiconcuac lost 
its rice harvest for lack of irrigation.  After investigating the matter, agrarian authorities 
soon singled out Tezoyuca, which had placed armed guards along several hydrants of a 
canal, as the culprit for numerous village complaints in the region regarding the lack of 
waters.  The Local Agrarian Commission and the state governor ordered Tezoyuca to 
respect other pueblos’ water rights and to construct its own canal to carry the liquid to the 
village.345  Tezoyuca balked at the orders.  Chiconcuac then turned to the federal junta 
that administered the Tetecalita Ravine and requested intervention on the community’s 
behalf.  In February 1927, the junta invited users of the ravine’s waters to an assembly in 
order to resolve the region’s irrigation difficulties.  Tezoyuca, despite the official 
invitation, did not send representatives to the meeting and later refused to sign an accord 
that would have enforced each village’s rights.346   
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 Chiconcuac’s leaders then decided to resolve the matter themselves after learning 
that officials could do little to force Tezoyuca to refrain from taking canal waters.  Less 
than a month after the junta gathering, on 10 March 1927, the president of the 
Chiconcuac administrative committee, Marcelo García, and several villagers went to the 
countryside to close the hydrants from where Tezoyucans diverted the flow of the water.  
While sealing off an outlet at an irrigation ditch named San Agustín, the group from 
Chiconcuac was ambushed.  Several armed Tezoyucans suddenly appeared and fired on 
the group, killing the land committee president and injuring three or four others.347  Two 
villagers, Ramón Resendes and Roque Jaime, died later from their wounds.  A 
detachment from the federal army was deployed to establish a neutral zone between the 
two pueblos, but no one from Tezoyuca was punished for the killings.  To make matters 
worse, over the summer Tezoyuca still continued to take the region’s waters.  Meanwhile, 
Chiconcuac persisted in its pleas to officialdom, employing vivid language to describe its 
fields as “sown with corpses and the wounded.”  The aggrieved clamored for justice by 
concluding that “we have irrigated our homeland soil with blood.”348  Morelos’s agrarian 
authorities indeed sympathized with Chiconcuac’s plight, stating that “the petitions they 
make to the National Agrarian Commission are absolutely just.”349  Still, little was done 
to alleviate the pueblo’s sufferings.  Nearly fifty years later, villagers from Chiconcuac 
could still recall the tragic day of 10 March 1927.350 
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In eastern Morelos, where water was less plentiful, Tlacotepec (Zacualpan) was 
another community that controlled large amounts of irrigation waters.  The pueblo not 
coincidentally possessed a sizable militia that allowed the village to claim lands and 
waters beyond its borders.  Zacualpan’s residents complained that villagers from 
Tlacotepec illegally occupied their grazing lands, which forced herdsmen to search for 
pastures far from the village.  Residents of Zacualpan wrote to President Ortiz Rubio in 
1930: 
 
We say that Tlacotepec is so ambitious and not only towards us, but also towards 
other Pueblos such as Hueyapan-Alpanoca and even in the State of Puebla they 
have taken lands.  Our situation is so pitiful that we have seen with sadness that 
we are now worse off than in the time of the Hacendados.351  
Zacualpan’s statement that its plight had deteriorated to a condition worse than the pre-
revolutionary period reveals with what bellicosity some villages behaved towards other 
communities in rural Morelos.  If we are to believe Zacualpan, pueblos such as 
Tlacotepec now behaved like the “mini-haciendas” of post-revolutionary Morelos.  This 
account is also surprising because Zacualpan, as the cabecera and a more populated 
settlement, had official administrative authority over the subject pueblo of Tlacotepec.  
The junta in charge of the Amatzinac Ravine ordered the municipal governments of 
Zacualpan, Jantetelco, and Jonacatepec to intervene and force Tlacotepec to stop 
hoarding water, but none of the local authorities would comply.352   
 Struggles over waters also occurred between different groups in the villages.  
Here again, as in the case of land disputes, local divisions emerged between ejidatarios 
and proprietary smallholders for access to hydraulic resources.  Previous chapters have 
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shown how conflicts between these two distinct socioeconomic groups politically divided 
the lowland western municipal seats of Tetecala, Miacatlán, and Puente de Ixtla in the 
mid-1920s.  Hueyapan (Tetela del Volcán) and Popotlán (Zacualpan), located in the 
northeastern highlands with smaller populations, also suffered the same divisions.  For 
example, in Hueyapan, a conflict between private holders and the ejido over control of 
waters began in the 1920s and dragged on well into the mid-1930s without resolution.  
The disputes involved a group of rancheros taking irrigation waters allotted to local 
ejidatarios and lowland villages in Puebla.  Then in 1936, campesinos accused the 
president of the Ventanas Ravine junta, Félix Soberanes, of favoring his brother with 
large quantities of water at the expense of the ejidatarios.353  Similarly, in Popotlán, 
owners of small private farms were known for their hostility to local members of the 
ejido and for preventing lowland villages in eastern Morelos from accessing water.354   
 These eastern pueblos suffered more frequent water conflicts when compared to 
the southwestern region of the state due to the reduced availability of water and also to 
the presence of the García Pimentel family, which fielded white guards in the region 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s.355  For these reasons, eastern pueblos frequently 
appealed to the federal water juntas to arbitrate local disputes.  In the east, tensions over 
access to water led both ejidatarios and the hacendado to destroy newly constructed 
irrigation works in order to prevent the other from accessing the liquid.356  And even after 
the Tenango hacienda’s lands were redistributed in 1937, conflicts persisted.  Worse still, 
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in March 1940, during the dry and hot season, the lack of water in eastern lowland 
pueblos created a state of emergency.  Agrarian authorities called on the federal army 
detachment to guard the hydraulic works in order to prevent highland communities from 
manipulating irrigation works, but six months later the soldiers had still not arrived.357  
Ubiquitous water conflicts in eastern Morelos such as these may help to explain 
why the Amatzinac Ravine junta is the only one of the eleven councils in the state to 
produce a significant amount of documentation after 1934.358  On the other hand, the 
remaining junta files in the AHA, including the Cuautla and Yautepec River juntas, house 
very little papers pertaining to the years after 1934, which is due probably to the 
reorganization of the agrarian bureaucracy under President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940).  
It is therefore plausible that the Ministry of Agriculture relinquished de facto control of 
the juntas to local and regional actors.  In eastern Morelos, however, where the García 
Pimentel family posed a threat to villages and the state government, the Amatzinac 
Ravine junta remained under close federal tutelage.  Thus, it may be that the Amatzinac 
Ravine junta was left intact under federal supervision in order to counter the influence of 
the García Pimentel family by giving the ejidatarios of eastern Morelos an ally in their 
struggles against local elites.   
The Federal Army 
The great question looming over the water conflicts in post-revolutionary Morelos 
revolved around who had the ultimate authority to control and manage the region’s rivers 
and springs.  Before the revolution, as noted, local actors exercised oversight over the 
region’s waters, be they haciendas, municipal councils, or individual villages.  With the 
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establishment of the federal water juntas in 1926, however, the national government 
made a move to exert real power over Morelos’s hydraulic system, prompting ejidos to 
enlist its support when they could.  What developed then was a struggle between the 
different levels of government and their rural allies centered on water rights.  The federal 
juntas, when repulsed by municipal obstinacy, called upon the army to force pueblos to 
pay their water taxes, which were so controversial that often the law could only be 
imposed at gunpoint.  Meanwhile, some villages bypassed the juntas and sought to forge 
agreements with the state government concerning the administration of the waterways.  
Pueblos thus strategically used various levels of government to pursue their local 
interests.   
The very fact that the junta presidents requested the federal army to intervene in 
irrigation conflicts reveals the importance of water in rural areas.  But mobilizing troops 
to enforce junta regulations carried the risk of alienating locals from the water councils.  
The sight of soldiers in pueblos often frightened rural inhabitants and revived memories 
of the federal army pillaging and burning villages during the revolutionary campaigns of 
the 1910s.  Agustín Aguilar, president of the Cuautla River junta, on several occasions 
considered using the army to force Anenecuilco, Villa de Ayala, and other pueblos to 
submit to federal authority but refrained from doing so because “to request it would 
resolutely break off relations between the said Junta and the [ejidal] committees and give 
rise to a series of difficulties and retaliations that could cause more than a serious 
accident.”359  Instead, Aguilar called on the state governor, Ambrosio Puente, to exercise 
his personal influence and prestige to persuade pueblos to submit to the council’s 
authority.    
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Unfortunately, the majority of the junta officials did not think in such strategic 
terms as did Aguilar.  The bureaucrats’ will to enforce the water ordinances, rather, led 
them to call on the assistance of the federal army and risk troubled relations with rural 
communities.  Junta presidents were sometimes accompanied by a detachment of troops 
when they entered rural communities because they aware that water issues could cause 
violence.  Ten federal troops, for instance, accompanied the Amatzinac Ravine junta 
president to meet with villagers in the northeastern highland communities in 1931.360  
Still, mobilizing troops on behalf of the juntas was no easy task, especially during the 
Cristero War (1926–1929), when the federal army was occupied with the more urgent 
assignment of suppressing rebels rather than enforcing water regulations.  Such was the 
case in 1928, when the Apatlaco River junta president lamented that “due to the great 
activities that the 33rd Chief of Operations is deploying against the gangs of bandits that 
invade the region, it has not been possible to continue applying the water suspension 
penalty for lack of the necessary escort.”361  The mobilizations during the Cristero War 
left the entire Jojutla region without a single soldier to assist in enforcing irrigation 
ordinances.362  Absent a show of force, junta presidents were weakened in their ability to 
resolve conflicts between rival users of the hydraulic system.   
In nearly all cases, the most cited reason the junta presidents sought the 
intervention of the federal army was to force villages to pay their water taxes.  The 
councils would first send written debt notices to individual pueblos threatening to cut off 
a community’s water supplies if they did not pay up.  If no response were made, the junta 
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executive would then meet with a federal officer and request that troops accompany him 
to the countryside in order to close the community’s canal hydrants.  Such was the case in 
1928, when the Apatlaco River junta shut off water to the ejidos of Xoxocotla, 
Atlacholaya, El Puente, Temixco, the Acatlipa military colony, and Temixco hacienda.  
The maneuver produced the desired results, and each of the above communities handed 
over hard cash to cover their debts.  “In the face of this severe approach,” the junta 
president proudly wrote to his superiors, the water users “immediately paid their quotas 
and respected all the provisions of the Junta.”363  The Apatlaco River junta had won a 
victory, but the show of force risked further estrangement of villages from the councils, 
and verbal promises to cooperate with federal officials in the management of the 
irrigation system were hallow.  The fact remained that only on occasion could the water 
council presidents coordinate their efforts with the federal army to enforce the payment 
of debts.  Most taxes went unpaid. 
Mobilizing the army to enforce water regulations of course led to abuses and 
violence against villagers.  Moyotepec, for instance, refused to obey the Cuautla River 
junta’s orders to clean nearby canals.  Troops afterwards went to the village and yanked 
peasants from their homes, forcing them out into the countryside to clear the waterways.   
The same federal officer went to San Vicente de Juárez and Tecomalco and “made them 
work by force,” reported the junta president.  All this occurred in the weaker and smaller 
pueblos of the Ayala municipality, which were easier to pick on than either Villa de 
Ayala or Anenencuilco.  For their part, junta employees did little to aid the cause of 
centralization by employing the army in water disputes.  Rather than attempting some 
form of negotiations, the resentments forced officials to dig in and shift blame to the 
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villagers themselves for the state of affairs: “it is not the fault of this Office that they had 
not received their volumes of water,” concluded the Cuautla River junta president.364    
Another danger of the army becoming involved in water conflicts was that troops 
could easily be drawn into disputes between ejidatarios and smallholders, who could 
offer bribes to soldiers in exchange for ensuring access to water.  Take for instance the 
case of Popotlán.  Eastern lowland villages cried foul when they learned that smallholders 
in Popotlán had paid off five or six soldiers in order to gain access to large amounts of 
water.  When ejidatarios confronted the soldiers and inquired as to why they had made a 
deal with private holders in Popotlán, the troops responded by stating that “in a word, 
they were only here to support and sustain the said ‘Smallholders,’ threatening us with 
their carbines.”365  The campesinos, outnumbered by arms, retreated to their lowland 
pueblos and proceeded to lobby federal authorities.  Their cries were heeded, because a 
month later the Amatzinac River junta president informed federal officials that the 
dispute in Popotlán had been resolved after the ejidatarios and smallholders agreed to 
share equal amounts of the irrigation waters.366  To what degree and frequency troops 
became involved in backroom deals to distribute water remains murky, but, at least in this 
case, ejidiatarios could count on national officials to back them in disputes against local 
elites.    
A detachment of soldiers could indeed regulate the flow of waters.  By guarding 
strategic points along the canal network, specifically at irrigation works where valves 
could be altered to divert water away from a community, the juntas did have limited 
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success with using the army to lessen abuses.  Experience had shown that the junta 
delegates charged with opening and closing irrigation valves could not be trusted to 
perform their tasks.  These individuals, representatives of the pueblos, may in fact have 
been the central actors in illicitly controlling the flow of the waters.  In any event, when 
federal troops guarded irrigation works, lowland pueblos complained less of shortages.  
During a brief four-day period, for instance, when soldiers stationed at the mouths of 
Amatzinac Ravine oversaw the distributor valves, lowland villages finally received their 
allotted amounts of water.  But as soon the soldiers were removed from the network, 
troubles reemerged: “knowing that the said force retired,” grumbled an official, “the 
water detentions by highland pueblos have begun again.”367  Using troops to intervene in 
water conflicts was, then, a temporary yet inadequate solution to a perennial problem.  It 
carried the risks of alienating villagers from federal projects, but, if troops were deployed 
to simply guard the mouths of the canals, it could also benefit lower elevation 
communities.    
 Despite these efforts to federalize water management, the rush to make a green 
revolution in Morelos had mixed results by 1940.  That year, village ejidal leaders and 
state officials met at a state agrarian congress held in Cuernavaca to discuss the most 
salient problems facing agricultural workers.  An agrarian commission stated before the 
attendees that since the revolution, pueblos had planted their fields without regards to 
market fluctuations or a system of crop rotation.  Some years the harvests were so 
abundant with foodstuffs that it drove down prices and lefts farmers demoralized.  
Moreover, absent a centrally planned system of crop rotation, the valley soils would soon 
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began to lose their fertility.368  But most of all, the issue of irrigation waters dominated 
the topics of discussion.  Governor Elipido Perdomo admitted to the attendees that “the 
waters have been a very difficult problem in communities.”  Like other officials at the 
congress in Cuernavaca, Perdomo cited the hacienda’s system of organized cultivation as 
the model to build the ejido.  He told the village agrarian leaders gathered in the hall that 
“the use of waters should be carried out like the Hacienda did it.  The hacienda, we have 
understood, irrigated all the fields with canals by the hour and it was the hacienda that 
was the only landlord (patrón) that distributed the waters.”369  The governor promoted a 
new system of crop rotation and advocated for further water regulations.  Rather than 
continue the disorganized practice of higher elevation pueblos appropriating waters at 
will, the governor proposed to lead an effort that would permit each village to open its 
hydrants at certain hours of the day.  It was an acknowledgment by the political elites that 
the hacienda had managed the state’s hydraulic resources more efficiently than the ejido.  
The governor’s plan, of course, whiffed of centralization and more meddling in pueblo 
affairs.  Whether Cuernavaca was able to establish an irrigation model in the 1940s and 
1950s based on the Porfirian hacienda’s usage of water remains unclear; but the concerns 
at the convention reveal that even by the end of the post-revolutionary period, de facto 
control over Morelos’s waters still resided in the locales. 
The issue of water continued to dominate the discussions at the 1940 convention.  
Village after village expressed their concerns over never having enough of the liquid for 
their plantings and animals.  Finally, an official tired of discussing the topic declared, 
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“look, compañeros, the water problem is widespread across the State…[but] I believe we 
have sufficiently discussed the matter, right?”370  The official thus admitted tacitly that 
the dilemmas involving water distribution had overwhelmed the state government.  The 
failure of the Cuernavaca and Mexico City to provide equal access to the irrigation 
network thereby posed the greatest obstacle to fulfilling the agrarian ideals of the 
zapatista revolution.  Yet the national state, like callista policy required, had overseen 
ejidal efforts to shake off municipal control and become rice-growing, petty commercial 
entities, which strengthened pueblo control over Morelos’s natural resources at the 
expense of local elites.  
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Chapter IV: Federal Schools and the Segunda Cristiada in Morelos 
As part of President Calles’s state-building drive in the mid-1920s, Morelos became one 
the first entities to establish a federal primary school in all its villages, further 
demonstrating both the callista commitment to the region.371  By 1940, 194 rural schools 
functioned in the state.372  For villagers, federal schools promoted by the Secretaría de 
Educación Pública (SEP) facilitated reconstruction of the pueblos in the 1920s, and in the 
mid-1930s public classrooms became the sites where rural inhabitants demanded a place 
for local religion within the anticlerical state.  Schools, moreover, provided rural women 
with a forum to participate in the public affairs of the pueblos and to engage the post-
revolutionary state.  Beyond imparting basic skills such as reading and writing, many 
school-sponsored cooperatives raised enough capital to create micro-industries and sell 
goods to villagers at lower prices than could local merchants.  School gardens, in 
particular, thrived in many morelense pueblos and served as laboratories for rice 
cultivation.  The SEP thus facilitated the pueblos’ green revolution and benefitted 
women, and through participation in education committees many locals exercised control 
over village pedagogy.  For these reasons, campesinos in Morelos largely welcomed 
federal schools and teachers in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  In 1934, however, during 
the rise of cardenismo, national politicians reformed the curriculum of primary schooling 
and introduced anticlericalism into rural classrooms under the guise of “socialist 
education.”  The government’s action provoked a backlash in the countryside, as 
attendance in classrooms plummeted and religious fervor within pueblos boiled over.  To 
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make matter worse, a small-scale but significant rebellion erupted in eastern Morelos, 
where on various occasions insurgents killed several teachers.  This “Second” Cristiada 
in Morelos, or “La Segunda” as the religious upheaval of 1930s came to be known in 
Mexico, contributed to President Lázaro Cárdenas’s decision in 1936 to roll back 
anticlericalism in schools, thus recreating the pact between the federal government and 
zapatismo.373  As a result of the struggle, the pueblos forced the government to make a 
place for local religion to coexist alongside secular schools, and attendance in classrooms 
resumed normal levels.   
Recent literature on post-revolutionary schooling has emphasized the negotiated 
character of the SEP’s project in the countryside, but these studies use either political or 
cultural approaches to explore rural schooling,374 and few discuss the case of Morelos.375  
Cultural historians see the school as a meeting point in which a hegemonic revolutionary 
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culture was created, while political studies tend to see a struggle of interests.  This 
chapter, by contrast, integrates political and cultural approaches to show that federal 
schools were both economic and cultural assets for morelense pueblos.376  The first 
section demonstrates the various ways in which federal schools promoted rural 
reconstruction and community revival.  Specifically in the case of Morelos, SEP gardens, 
where rice and other commercial crops were grown, developed into valuable economic 
assets for campesinos and served as unique laboratories where locals learned new 
agriculture techniques.  Meanwhile, village women, the subject of the second section, 
actively supported federal schools and SEP campaigns to improve classroom attendance, 
organize village festivals, promote public health, establish kindergartens, and purchase 
corn mills.  Women’s contributions to pueblo education enhance our understanding of 
their roles in the zapatista movement—a topic relegated to the background in most 
histories of the local revolution.377  During the Segunda, village women in Morelos 
emerged as one of the main antagonists of the government’s anticlerical policies, the 
subject of the third and final section.  Pious women did not join the armed rebels in the 
mountains, but, like their predecessors of the 1910s and later the jaramillistas, women in 
the pueblos formed clandestine cells to organize the campaigns against socialist 
education. Examining the federal campaigns to “nationalize” the countryside and 
“defanaticize” campesino culture by discouraging popular devotions will also allow for 
some analysis of the neglected subject of local religion in rural Morelos.378  The absence 
of scholarly attention to religion as a component of zapatismo is surprising given that 
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Morelos had a history of religious dissidence and became a hotbed of opposition to 
federal anticlerical policies in the 1930s.379  It may seem odd that Morelos reacted against 
state anticlericalism in the 1930s but not the violent persecution of Catholics in the 
1920s, but, as we shall see, the antireligious policies of 1934 affected the state in a 
manner that those of the 1920s did not, during the Cristero War especially, which 
explains the region’s hostility to socialist education.     
Federal Schools and Village Reconstruction 
To many villagers the establishment of a SEP school symbolized the physical and 
cultural resurrection of a pueblo.  Until then, decay and the struggle for subsistence had 
marked rural communities since the end of the armed revolution.  Such was the case in 
Tlaltizapán, where Zapata once headquartered his army.  Before the construction of a 
SEP school in 1926, a federal employee observed that “this pueblo is a pile of ruins, 
being inhabited by very few people, as its sources of work, plantings and fruit orchards, 
are almost abandoned.”380  Observers again and again commented on the poverty of the 
region in the 1920s: “The eternal and stifling economic problem of the state prevents us 
from deploying a greater impulse to our propositions,” the head of the SEP in Morelos 
typed.381  State and municipality-run schools in the pueblos were little more than 
makeshift shelters.  In the village of Cuentepec (Temixco), one report described the 
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classroom where two teachers taught thirteen boys and thirteen girls as a “corridor with 
bad roofing made of palm leaves.”382  The old school building had no roof, doors, or 
windows.  In Tepoztlán, the federal school was an annex of the parish church in good 
condition and with plumbing, but the site was not even big enough to house all the 
students, and one teacher held class on a patio outside of the building under a leafy plumb 
tree.383  That parents sent their children to learn in such inadequate classrooms reveals the 
local commitment to education, since this was all they could afford to build by way of 
schools.  Yet at the same time, villagers actively petitioned national officials for greater 
involvement in pueblo education, and once again the callista system responded.   
Before the federal push to construct new educational facilities in Morelos in 1926, 
it was not uncommon for village parents’ associations to lament to national authorities 
that the state and municipal governments lacked sufficient income to sustain teachers’ 
salaries and fund schools.384  In fact, rather than simply appropriating a pre-existing state 
education system, as Rockwell claims occurred in Tlaxcala, the SEP built more schools 
in rural Morelos than it took over.385  This of course was probably due to the 
disintegration of the state and municipal governments during the fighting of the 
revolution, which in turn obliged the Sonoran regime to reconstruct the region’s primary 
school system.  In any event, in 1923, a year after the first few federal educators arrived 
in Morelos, the state recorded a mere thirteen teachers in twelve rural schools and an 
enrollment of only 744 students.  Thus, while well-intentioned, Obregón’s commitment 
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to rural education in the state was negligible; in January 1926, at the height of the state’s 
electoral upheaval, Morelos still only had thirty-two federal rural schools.386  Later that 
year, however, President Calles and the national authorities responded to morelenses’ 
petitions by increasing the funds and resources allocated for new classrooms in Morelos.  
From 1930, when the state government’s finances returned to order, Cuernavaca also 
began to promote and build village classrooms.  By 1934, the number of rural schools in 
the state reached over 140.387  That year Cuernavaca and Mexico City also signed an 
agreement to federalize the remaining thirty-two schools functioning under the state 
government’s jurisdiction.  Official records, meanwhile, claimed that ninety-nine percent 
of the school-age population attended federal classrooms.  Although this official figure 
probably exaggerates the percentage of enrollment in SEP classrooms, it is clear that the 
post-revolutionary schooling system was outperforming its Porfirian predecessor, which 
enrolled less than half of Morelos’s school-age population.388   
Constructing a site for the school and furnishing it laid the groundwork of the 
federal project.  Usually the SEP invested roughly 1,500 pesos in materials per school, 
while the villagers themselves volunteered to build the edifice.  After 1927, the state 
government also donated to federal schools materials such as Mexican flags and 
construction supplies.389  In general, national officials reported that villagers were “eager 
to have a school for the education of their children, promising to give security for the 
teacher, supplying him with a house and room, a site for the school, furniture, and fields 
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for sports and cultivation.”390  Likewise, after visiting forty-two federal schools in 
pueblos around Cuernavaca and the southern hotlands, the SEP inspector commented,  
 
In each visited place I gathered together the Authorities and a majority of parents, 
holding very crowded Juntas at nights to explain the needs of the schools and how 
to fulfill them…In all places I was received with shows of joy, by the children and 
the [adult] residents, as well as I was sent off with cheerful demonstrations.391    
Perhaps the inspector exaggerated the warmth he received from the villagers in order to 
please his superiors, but the description of his visits stands in stark contrast to the 
reception given concurrently to teachers in other regions of the country such as 
Michoacán, where villagers sometimes chased federal teachers out of the pueblo.392  In 
places where the federal project did not go well in Morelos, the SEP said so; thus not all 
positive reports were fabrications.  Events surrounding the actual opening of the school 
were similar to what occurred when a community received its land grant: locals gathered 
for an official ceremony and gave speeches to celebrate the revival of a pueblo 
institution.  The inhabitants of Tlacotenco, for instance, invited neighboring residents in 
the municipality of Tepoztlán and also the governor to attend the school’s inauguration.  
Although unable to attend, the governor sent representatives to join municipal authorities, 
agrarian committee members, and militia chiefs in the inaugural ceremony, which 
included singing, musicals, sports, and speeches in both Spanish and Náhuatl.393  Like the 
celebration of a land grant, the festivities marked a new chapter in a village’s institutional 
life and represented public displays of the alliance being forged in the 1920s between 
rural Morelos and Mexico City.   
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After the construction of the school, the acquisition of benches, desks, 
blackboard, and chalk, and a library were the first necessities to fill the edifice.  The SEP 
recorded Morelos as having not a single library in 1920, but by 1923 the state possessed 
seven public libraries together containing over 1,000 volumes.394  Although print media 
continued to trickle into rural communities, many schools still lacked book repositories.  
In order to provide at least some sort of current literature for classrooms, the SEP director 
of federal education stationed in Morelos made sure the official rural school magazine, El 
Sembrador, circulated to the distant villages of the region.  If communities lay off the 
mail route, teachers collected the magazines at the SEP meeting held in Cuernavaca every 
fortnight and carried them back with them to the distant classrooms.395  El Sembrador 
contained all types of official advice with illustrations for campesinos, such as how to 
improve agricultural techniques, raise livestock, and fight smallpox.  It also included 
poetry that celebrated Mexico’s Indian heritage; articles that touted women’s roles in 
national history, and even sheet music to learn patriotic songs.396  Once the school was up 
and running, locals took pride in the new facility by beautifying the school’s property.  In 
Amatlán (Tepoztlán), for example, the teacher sent the children out to the countryside 
one day to gather plates of red tile (teja) to adorn the grassy area around the school 
garden.397  Federal schools thus were designed to assist villagers in reconstruction of the 
countryside and especially emphasized good farming practice.  
Official reports indeed painted a rosy picture of the SEP’s early accomplishments 
in rural Morelos, which in turn presents methodological issues for historians interpreting 
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the rural reception of federal schools, given that teachers and inspectors had clear 
motivations to want to appease their superiors in Mexico City.  The aggregation of 
dozens of reports by different SEP inspectors and state directors, however, suggests that 
the reports were not just empty rhetoric, especially when they can be corroborated with 
letters written by campesinos themselves.  In many respects, primary schooling in post-
revolutionary Morelos—be it under municipal, state, or federal jurisdiction—formed a 
component of the pueblo’s institutional identity.  Put another way, elementary schools 
provided a sovereign space for parents to control children’s pedagogy and reach out to 
the federal state.  Support was palpably real.  In Morelos, for example, it was not unusual 
for local families to supplement a federal teacher’s pay, even if the amount they offered 
was little more than a peon’s wages.  Such was the case in San Andrés Cuauhtempan 
(Tlayacapan) and Tepetlixpita (Totolapan), where residents subsidized the maestras’ 
daily one-peso federal salaries with an additional daily peso in the first case and $12.50 
per month in the second.398  Meanwhile, in the hamlet of San Antonio (Ayala), parents 
gave the instructor fifty cents per day in order stimulate her dedication to the 
classroom.399  Locals therefore considered the teacher as a member of the community, 
deserving of community assistance, and it was also not uncommon for them to build a 
new house for instructors, or in the case of Popotlán, simply to convert an old jail into a 
home for the federal teacher.400  In order to flourish, then, federal schools required and 
often received collective support from a pueblo’s residents, not just national funding, to 
ensure that classrooms were furnished with adequate supplies and the teachers were paid.   
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Another crucial source of funding for local education came from SEP-sponsored 
cooperatives, which were successful particularly in Morelos, where most schools 
controlled garden plots.  Parents took the lead in raising money to purchase new 
technologies and manufacturing materials from the city in order to produce and sell 
goods locally.  Some cooperatives even purchased entertainment devices to enliven the 
cultural atmosphere of the pueblo.  An inspector visiting San Gabriel (Amacuzac) noted 
that the village school building   
 
was perfectly repaired, being very agreeable for its latrine and all its whitewashed 
walls…this improvement was achieved with the cooperation of the adults and the 
community.  With the help of the adult cooperative, the school itself bought a 
Victorola [phonogram] which is very useful to liven up the festivals and social 
reunions.401 
The novelty of radios, too, attracted newcomers to the schools.402  Beyond music for 
leisure, cooperatives acquired items for homemade industries.  In the highland pueblo of 
Hueyapan (Tetela de Volcán), members of the local education committee purchased 
looms so the students could learn to make blankets and cambaya fabric.  They even 
brought in an “expert worker in textiles” from the industrial town of Atlixco, Puebla to 
show the students how to operate the looms.403  Finally, material necessary for soap 
production was another common item that early schools promoted.404   
 By the 1930s, many of the SEP-sponsored cooperatives were selling enough 
goods locally that they began to cut into the profits of privately-owned village stores. 
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Lucrative cooperatives, in other words, were freeing campesinos from dependency on 
merchants, who often doubled as rural money lenders.  The economic power of several 
profitable cooperatives in fact angered rural elites involved in village commerce.405  In 
this regard, the schools generated conflict.  Opposition was strong enough in several 
communities that the school cooperatives, such as the one in Emiliano Zapata, were 
liquidated after local merchants confronted and threatened teachers and parents.406  In 
Bonifacio García (Cuernavaca) one day in 1936, a group of men armed with machetes 
confronted the federal school teacher over the SEP cooperative.  The men were not 
ejidatarios or parents of school children, but rather individuals with a stake in the village 
store.  Armed with machetes, the assailants demanded that the teacher relinquish control 
of the school, declaring that it was not a business and that it cut into the sales of the local 
store.  The teacher, who claimed the municipal president of Tlaltizapán had sent the 
assailants, fled the pueblo as the group proceeded to remove all supplies from the 
school.407  This type of heated local opposition to federal schools shows that the 
educational system in Morelos was working well economically by cutting out the 
traditional middlemen of the pueblos, thereby undermining their roles in the community. 
The federal campaign to construct public works began in earnest under Calles and 
was also embraced by rural Morelos, even though public investment facilitated political 
centralization.  Communications between the state and the rest of country, for example, 
expanded with the spread of telephone lines, radio equipment, and the mail service during 
the 1920s and 1930s.408  In Chavarría (Coatlán del Río) residents were able to build a 
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school after an electric company paid the village over 1,000 pesos to allow electric lines 
to pass over the community’s ejido.409  On the other side of the state in the northeastern 
highlands, Tlacotepec’s control of abundant irrigation waters and extensive lands allowed 
the village to open a technology museum to teach science to the region’s students.410  
With more resources in the 1930s, the state government went beyond donating furniture, 
Mexican flags, and supplies to schools and helped pueblos such as Anenecuilco and 
Tlacotepec obtain telephone lines.411  Yet perhaps most important to the integration of 
rural communications were roads, which reduced the cost of transporting goods and 
provided villagers with easier access to national markets.  As a sign of their desire for 
paved roadways, pueblo inhabitants often volunteered their labor to assist the federal 
government in constructing nearby highways.412  A report in 1929 noted that all over the 
state campesinos worked to pave the roadways in order to make them passable during the 
rainy season.413  These activities show that villages sought to interact with the outside 
world rather than isolate themselves from it.  By doing so, rural inhabitants helped to give 
Morelos one of the best statewide communication systems in Mexico.414   
 SEP schools in the 1920s encountered “bottom-up” support in Morelos because 
they went beyond imparting basic classroom skills such as reading and writing and also 
taught children the latest agricultural techniques and market skills.  Put differently, the 
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SEP facilitated the pueblos’ green revolution.  In most villages, the agrarian committees 
reserved a plot of the ejido so that students could cultivate a garden and sell the harvest in 
order to raise funds for the classroom.  Again, this contrasted with the experience of 
teachers and inspectors in Michoacán such as María del Refugio “Cuca” García, who 
often had to request ejidos on behalf of villagers.415  Many schools even obtained an 
irrigated field on which they experimented with and grew lucrative commercial crops, a 
fact which made federal pedagogy in Morelos truly unique, because these gardens were a 
far cry from the digging patches of Michoacán and elsewhere.  Twenty-nine schools in 
the Cuautla region, for example, possessed an average of two and a quarter hectares of 
cultivable fields.416  In Oaxtepec (Yautepec), a pueblo rich in water resources, the 
president of the ejidal administration gave the local federal school what appears to have 
been a state high of seven and a half hectares of irrigated soils.417  Negotiations between 
the SEP and the ejidal assemblies over these plots usually involved little haggling.  Such 
was the experience of the SEP inspector of the Cuernavaca zone, who convinced the 
residents of Chapultepec (Cuernavaca) to persuade the local agrarian leaders to turnover 
to the school two hectares of land with twenty-seven fruit trees for the students to 
attend.418  This was a generous offer, and something similar occurred in Xoxocotla 
(Puente de Ixtla), where the municipal authority (who did not speak Spanish), village 
agrarian leaders, and the local education assembly met and agreed to allow the school to 
manage two irrigated hectares.  Several farmers even volunteered to plow and sow the 
field at the soonest opportunity.419  Such cooperation between different actors in the 
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pueblos signifies the degree to which villagers shared a common view that SEP schools 
were important assets to reviving rural communities.  By 1933, three quarters of 
Morelos’s rural schools possessed a good plot of land.  An official report boasted that 
“the plots our schools possess have been cultivated in the smartest way possible,” adding 
that official personnel always encouraged locals to make it the best kept garden in the 
community.420     
Cash crops, such as rice, peanuts, and fruits, were planted on the valuable 
irrigated plots, further revealing the morelense dedication to commercial agriculture.421  
In 1940 alone, the school gardens in Morelos raised a total of 20,833 pesos.422  The 
schools garden program thrived in especially water-rich pueblos that could grow rice: in 
1935, the SEP garden in Tezoyuca raised 200 pesos, with an additional 292 pesos raised 
in Tenextepango (Ayala), 350 pesos in Temimilcingo (Tlaltizapán), and 400 pesos 
Tepetzingo (Emiliano Zapata).423  Hence, it was not so much the actual sums raised that 
were impressive but that they could be used to buy useful school items and give students 
farming apprenticeships.  As early as 1926, residents in Tilzapotla (Puente de Ixtla) had 
reserved an irrigated two-hectare field for students to grow peanuts.424  In 
Tlalquiltenango, students cultivated rice on the school’s plot in order to raise money for 
the construction of an open-air theatre.425  Meanwhile, in San Juan Ahuehueyo (Ayala), 
villagers donated profits from the rice harvest to purchase carpentry tools required to 
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maintain the school edifice.426  Ahuehueyo’s school raised another 125 pesos to purchase 
new furniture for classrooms after selling the garden’s harvest.427  The school in 
Tepoztlán, located at the base of the Ajusco Mountains, possessed one and a half hectares 
of land, of which a full hectare was devoted to cultivating mulberries, cotton, and 
bananas.  Teachers and parents also led efforts to build henhouses and dovecots to 
produce eggs and meat and apiaries for bees’ honey and pollination.  Even in the northern 
highlands, where a lack of irrigation waters made the school gardens less lucrative, 
villagers planted vegetables and corn on the plots.  Moreover, SEP instructors taught 
reforestation techniques to combat the destruction of wooded hillsides.  In 1940, 800 fruit 
trees were planted on the deforested slopes of northern Morelos and 254 more in the 
villages to adorn the streets.428  SEP schools in every region of the state, then, had 
developed into laboratories for pueblo agriculture and conservation.  Federal schools in 
Morelos, that is to say, were more advanced than in many other states and had a petty but 
real commercial orientation.   
 The school gardens were truly experimental, because the profits derived from the 
harvests were sometimes used to create village kindergartens (Jardines de Niños) where 
mothers could leave their infants while helping their husbands in distant fields.  The idea 
for this type of rural childcare service had been around since the creation of the SEP in 
1922, but it was not until the mid-1930s, when school gardens across Morelos had 
become lucrative activities, that an official project to expand the number of Jardines de 
Niños materialized.  In 1935, SEP officials planned to use two-thirds of the earnings from 
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each school’s plot to fund the Jardines de Niños.  They proposed planting a hectare of 
sugar cane on the school plots to earn more money than even rice could bring in.429  That 
same year, locals built sites for daycares in Oaxtepec, Cuautla, and Tepetzingo.  Then, 
after these initial successes, in 1936 the director of education in Morelos gained approval 
from officials in Mexico City to found fifty-two new Jardines de Niños in the 
countryside.  Over the summer, the director planned to provide two courses for teachers 
in order to instruct them in management of the Jardines.430  To what degree these dozens 
of new daycare services were successful is difficult to gauge given the shortage of 
documentation, but the expansion of the program in the mid-1930s showed that the 
schools plots produced an important source of income for rural communities.  
Furthermore, the Jardines de Niños promised to free village women from the extra 
preoccupation of watching over their children while toiling in the fields.   
 There were, of course, official complaints that teachers lacked adequate training 
for their many duties; that some local inhabitants were apathetic about education; that a 
few children never advanced academically; and that schools still needed better facilities, 
but rare is the village that consistently sought to resist the arrival of the SEP for an 
extended period of time.431  Indeed, in the hundreds of files documenting the 
establishment of rural schools, in only one village does the evidence suggest that a local 
cacique controlled the village classroom and blocked the federal initiative for several 
years.  It is worth examining this unusual instance of indifference to the SEP in 
Cuentepec (Temixco) to stress its singularity when compared to the rest of rural Morelos.  
Cuentepec, a pueblo of 625 inhabitants in 1930 (mostly Náhuatl-speaking Indians), was 
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isolated by deep ravines in the mountains north of Cuernavaca.  When the SEP inspector, 
José Pedro Durany, first arrived at the village in 1926, a guide led him on a four hour 
hike across various rivers.  Upon arrival in the village, the inspector learned that the two 
federal teachers, Luis Sámano and Carlota Vázquez, both lived with the local municipal 
authority, José Urbano Berruecos.  Few students attended classes and only one of them 
spoke Spanish.  The municipal authority’s assistant, Marcelino Olivares, happened to be 
the only one in the village who apparently knew how to read and write.  With no federal 
teachers in the state from 1910 to 1926, Oliveras had taught many of the residents reading 
and writing skills, and by doing so he was able to gain control over the federal school.432  
The SEP inspector, who noted the unsociable characteristic of the pueblo, could do little 
to wrestle control of the school from Oliveras.  Cuentepec’s residents could not be 
gathered to meet and discuss educational matters, and many looked upon the SEP 
employees with suspicion.  The inspector left the village believing he was lucky to not 
have been attacked by locals, as there were reports that travelers would disappear upon 
leaving Cuentepec.  The pueblo’s physical isolation, the cacique’s dominance, and 
linguistic barriers are among the reasons why the SEP failed to launch a successful 
campaign in Cuentepec.433  Eight years later, in 1934, low attendance and little popular 
support still characterized the pueblo’s school. That year, a newly arrived SEP teacher 
complained that few of the residents spoke Spanish and the school did not have access to 
a bus service that could take children to nearby museums in Cuernavaca.434  Yet 
Cuentepec, of course, is notable for its prolonged indifference to the SEP initiative.  By 
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contrast, the vast majority of pueblos—whether cohesive or divided, highland or lowland, 
large or small—displayed little such hostility to SEP teachers and visiting inspectors 
before 1934.     
Women and Village School Boards 
Women represented the most numerous and active members of the pueblos in the day-to-
day functioning of schools, as federal education offered them new spaces to participate in 
public matters.   As they did with the parish church, women converted the school into 
social capital and gained influence in the community through these institutions.  More 
than any other group in the villages, women gave the SEP project the “bottom-up” 
support that federal schools needed in order to succeed.  Their commitment to pueblo 
schooling and later withdrawal on religious-political grounds would also make women 
key actors in contesting socialist education.  It is also worth noting that female teachers 
outnumbered their male counterparts in Morelos.435  Because the SEP emphasized 
women’s participation in the schools, mothers of school children encountered new 
institutions to engage the national government.  One official document stated that the 
post-revolutionary woman “is intimately linked with the social and civic life of the 
community,” noting their social influence “inside and outside of the home,” and the need 
for “the formation of clubs for the protection of the woman.”436  Specifically, women 
began to exercise a greater public voice as members of village education assemblies.  In 
1926, the SEP mandated the creation of education boards in every federal school to serve 
as interlocutors between rural communities and the state.  They also joined the SEP’s 
campaign to combat alcoholism and promote hygienic habits, sports, public sanitation, 
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and vaccinations.  Women, therefore, were integrated into the state-building process as 
components of the SEP’s agenda in rural Mexico.437  
The ubiquitous involvement of Morelos women in rural education also sheds new 
light on their role in post-revolutionary zapatismo.  Mentions of women’s participation in 
the zapatista revolution often note their roles as soldaderas (female combatants and camp 
followers), couriers, spies, propagandists, and curanderas (traditional healers).438  The 
1930s documentation on schooling, however, reveals that campesinas were also central to 
the defense of the pueblo’s religious integrity, which did not come under attack until 
1934, when anticlerical reforms to the primary school curriculum attacked village 
religious practices.  Zapatismo’s religious component is usually stereotyped as 
guadalupanismo, but here we will explore in more detail how local women took the lead 
in keeping their children out of federal classrooms and confronted teachers over the 
content being taught to students.  Their actions, we shall see, show that post-
revolutionary zapatismo did not possess an anticlerical component.  Quite the contrary, 
the villagers of Morelos would defend their Catholic beliefs when the state attempted to 
ride roughshod over pueblo religious culture.  It was during this process of resistance to 
SEP-sponsored anticlericalism that morelense women took center stage to negotiate a 
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place for pueblo religion alongside federal schools, doing so primarily by participating in 
local education committees (comités de educación). 
Village education committees, like the ejidal assemblies, bypassed municipal 
power and fostered political centralization, as the municipal government had no 
representation on the local school board.  With the arrival of federal schools, the town 
councils also lost the power to appoint and remove local teachers.  Village actors, 
however, continued to exercise significant influence on pedagogy through pueblo 
education assemblies.  The director of the school served as the secretary of the education 
committee, while the pueblo’s inhabitants elected the assembly’s president, treasurer, and 
board members.  Board members were in charge of maintaining and improving the school 
edifice; providing supplies and equipment for the classrooms; planting the school garden; 
and ensuring children attended classes.439  While men constituted the majority of 
participants in these associations, women occasionally gained key spots on the boards as 
secretaries and vocales (committee members).  The education committees in Tepoztlán, 
Totolapan, and Puente de Ixtla, for example, had women serving on the boards as 
“secretaries” in the first two cases and a vocal in the third.440  These specific cases could 
perhaps be among the first instances of women’s elected participation in federal 
institutions.  In any event, the education assemblies often went beyond their required 
duties to ensure schools possessed what they needed.  Members of the education 
assemblies, for example, made trips to Cuernavaca to lobby the governor of Morelos to 
support rural classrooms,441 and they could be entrusted to run schools during a teacher’s 
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absence from a pueblo.442  By the early 1940s, village school assemblies served more 
than just local interests: they had developed into the bedrocks of a centralized 
bureaucracy that connected national politicians and bureaucrats to rural Mexicans.  In 
1942, a federal employee concluded that “almost all [village] Education Committees [of 
Morelos] are a strong source” of support for not only local schools, but also the 
government’s national and international policies.443  While this observation exaggerates 
the degree to which village education committees supported the entire federal agenda, it 
does indicate that local school boards were key sites of dialogue between rural Mexicans 
and national politicians.    
Operating in tandem with the education committees were SEP-sponsored 
mothers’ associations (sociedades de madres), which formed in villages across Morelos.  
While some schools had only one general parents’ association (sociedades de padres) in 
which men dominated the board membership, over time separate mothers’ associations 
formed in most communities, demonstrating that women had a right to be heard in the 
community and a forum to express their opinions regarding pedagogical matters.  Only 
mothers of children enrolled in the school were allowed to join these organizations.  The 
mothers’ societies elected their own board members, with each possessing a presidenta, 
secretary, treasurer, and three vocales.  The support these maternal societies lent to 
teachers was crucial to establish functioning schools.  A federal inspector typically noted 
that the “Mothers Societies and Education Committees deserve a special mention for their 
enthusiasm for helping teachers.”444  The organizations met regularly to enquire what 
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classrooms needed.  Another SEP report recorded that the mothers societies’ “are the 
spokespersons of the school” and “their influence is felt in the community.”445  Similarly, 
in Tilzapotla (Puente de Ixtla), a group “made up mostly of mothers of families, is 
beyond praiseworthy, as the enthusiasm of the teachers and the perseverance of the 
señoras promises excellent results.”446  Mothers, in short, were among the SEP’s most 
devoted allies in the pueblos, and to which the SEP wished to confine them to their 
stereotypical role as child-bearers for once translated into a measure of political power.  
The mothers’ associations undertook numerous activities to improve schools, such as 
raising funds to purchase desks to fill classrooms and lanterns to illuminate night courses.  
Others, such as the mothers’ union of Temoac (Zacualpan), wrote to officials in 
Cuernavaca to request books for the local library.447  Also reflective of women’s genuine 
commitment to education was the fact that more women than men attended night classes 
for adults.448  Clearly, campesinas had as much of a stake in rural schools as did men. 
Through the mothers’ associations, women could veto the school’s personnel by 
lobbying federal officials to remove specific teachers.  Such was the case in 
Tenextepango (Ayala), where a federal inspector observed low attendance in the village 
classroom.  After consulting local parents, he learned that the community considered the 
federal teacher in Tenextepango lazy and unwilling to work with the students’ families; 
“they cited concrete cases in which the teacher had punished the children with violence 
and respectfully requested a change of teachers.”449  The federal inspector agreed to do 
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so, believing that the assignment of a new teacher to the pueblo would resolve the 
problem, which it did.  In Huazulco (Zacualpan), the problem of low attendance was not 
that of an abusive teacher alienating parents but rather a feeble instructor who could not 
maintain control over the children.  Mothers and fathers in Huazulco told a visiting SEP 
inspector that the maestra was too old to enforce discipline in the students, who never 
advanced in their learning.  Given this situation, and the fact that the teacher herself 
wanted to be transferred out of Huazulco, the following week the SEP inspector replaced 
the maestra with a younger and more energetic male instructor, increasing rapidly 
attendance in the federal school.450  These cases demonstrate that education committees 
and parent associations provided rural women with formal channels to negotiate the 
character of federal schools, and also that the SEP was responsive to such overtures if it 
meant better attendance in classrooms.  In significant ways, then, the rural schools 
empowered women to have a say in exactly which outsiders would be allowed to work 
and live in the community.      
The influence of the mothers associations was felt particularly in the campaigns to 
combat alcoholism, which gave local merchants involved in the sale and distribution of 
booze a good reason to hate the schools.451  Given the domestic problems and economic 
costs associated with alcohol and abusive husbands, however, women were attracted to 
such causes.  The SEP’s anti-alcohol campaign kicked-off in Mexico in 1929 during the 
celebrations of the November 1910 revolution.  Mothers’ associations across Morelos 
helped to publicize the initiative, and on the día de la revolución, educators, parents, and 
students held events all over the region to speak out against alcoholism.  The ceremonies 
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in Cuernavaca, Cuautla, Puente de Ixtla, and Tepoztlán “were truly solemn,” noted the 
director of education in Morelos.452  In Cuautla, the inspector gave a detailed account of 
the day’s festivities.  During the morning, students, teachers, parents, and others from the 
public marched through the town’s principal streets to the accompaniment of a music 
band.  The demonstrators carried tricolored flags and banners that denounced alcoholism.  
In the afternoon, countering the theme of alcoholism with health, the students played 
soccer and basketball on the sports field with the public attending the games.  Large signs 
along the field’s side carried more anti-alcohol slogans.  Afterwards, teachers organized a 
play in the open-air theatre titled “Juana the Adulterous Drama” and one of the female 
teachers led an anti-alcohol conference.453  We can assume the moral of the story was that 
Juana’s infidelity was caused by her husband’s boozing and neglect.  In any case, these 
events set a pattern for anti-alcohol drives to take place every year thereafter in 
November, and mothers were always enthusiastic about their children partaking in such 
events.454  The festivities grew in popularity to include thousands of participants, and by 
1932 the state government subsidized anti-alcohol drives.455  Even more importantly, 
these anti-alcohol campaigns appear to have had some success.  In 1934 a SEP inspector 
noted a “decrease in the percentage of individuals that enjoyed alcohol” at social 
gatherings.456  The influence of village mothers could also be seen in the SEP-sponsored 
vaccination campaigns.  Personal visits by teachers to the homes of families often 
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convinced rural women of the need to vaccinate children.  These efforts also appear to 
have paid off, as cases of small pox, which could devastate a pueblo, decreased during 
the 1930s.457  In short, women had their own gendered notion of the village as 
sovereign—free of free of booze-peddling caciques—that sometimes resulted from SEP 
support. 
An additional reason for why school associations turned into hubs of women’s 
organization was that in the mid-1930s SEP cooperatives in Morelos began purchasing 
mechanized corn grinders (molinos de nixtamal), precisely when the Agrarian 
Department made them widely available by offering credits and donations.  Until the 
mid-1930s, only private individuals in larger villages such as Tepoztlán had operated 
mills, which did not necessarily reduce the cost of ground corn.458  By 1935, however, the 
machines grew in popularity and were brought under community control through the SEP 
cooperatives.  The cooperatives in Anenecuilco and Villa de Ayala, for instance, were 
among the first to acquire corn grinders powered by newly installed electrical turbines.459  
The machines would eventually make the ancient metate (stone grinding tablet) obsolete.  
For millennia, the women of rural Mexico had spent four to six hours every day bent over 
the metate in order to grind corn for tortillas.  But between 1935 and 1940, the number of 
molinos de nixtamal in Mexico increased from 927 to 6,000, exemplifying the integration 
of women into the state’s modernization project.  These industrial goods, if anything, 
allowed mothers, wives, and daughters more free time they could dedicate to social 
affairs such as local pedagogy and commercial activities.460 
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In most cases, members of the local SEP cooperative operated the mill, but there 
were a few instances when federal teachers attempted to exercise control over the 
molinos, which could anger locals, who believed educators should stick to teaching 
students how to “read, write, and count.”461  The corn mills, campesinos asserted, 
belonged to members of the cooperatives.  At least in the late 1930s, control over the 
mechanized grinders does not appear to have divided communities in Morelos to the 
degree that it could in the northeast, suggesting that it would be the SEP’s religious 
policies that sowed discord in the morelense countryside, not material items promoted by 
the schools.462  Rather, opposition to women’s use of the mills came from husbands and 
fathers, who considered tortillas made from machine-ground corn inferior.  The men were 
also convinced that extra leisure time would promote female infidelity.  Women, over the 
objections of their husbands, patronized the corn mills anyway, leading one man to 
inform Oscar Lewis in the 1940s that the success of the corn mills represented “the 
revolution of the women against the authority of men.”463  While crude, the quote 
nonetheless reflects the degree to which the corn mills were changing gender relations in 
the pueblos.  Lewis also noted that technological advances such as bus services, roads, 
sewing machines, and commercial corn mills had a greater affect on women’s lives than 
those of men.  For these reasons, it was the women of Tepoztlán who promoted the 
establishment of four commercial mills in the village by 1942, and every campesina in 
the pueblo would soon patronize the mills regularly.  As a testament to the importance of 
women’s public and private labors, Lewis, who was not the most optimistic observer of 
pueblo life, also observed that “without exception, every man who has been able to 
                                                 
461 AHSEP, Escuelas Primarias, caja 5811, exp. 13, f. 6, Report by Leopoldo Carranco Cardoso, March 
1936; ASHEP, Escuelas Primarias, caja 5811, exp. 13, f. 65, Report by Eliseo Bandala, 1937. 
462 Olcott, Revolutionary Women, 144-153. 
463 Quoted in Lewis, Life in a Mexican Village, 323. 
 184 
improve his economic situation since the Revolution has done so with the help of his 
wife, and in all the more prosperous homes the wives are known to be unusually capable 
and industrious.”464  Village women, of course, still remained largely in the shadows of 
public affairs, but reconstruction and SEP schools redefined their work practices, and 
mothers, daughters, and wives took advantage of it.  The federal educational project, that 
is to say, made women more visible in the community, which in turn enhanced village 
clout in pedagogical matters and made Morelos pueblos more sovereign.    
The presence of a federal school was indeed changing relationships between men 
and women, just as parents encountered new issues that involved gender relations and 
primary education.  Specifically, the SEP’s policy of holding coeducational classrooms 
often alarmed parents with enrolled daughters, and it would take years of daily 
negotiations between teachers and parents before the Morelos school system was fully 
integrated.  In Xochitepec, for example, two female teachers, Luz Montes and one known 
as Señora Millán, taught two grades of segregated classes, when each educator should 
have only instructed one grade of mixed classes.  Reporting on Xochitepec, a SEP 
inspector explained that this was the case because “the parents of families refuse to send 
their daughters if the school is mixed.”465  Meanwhile, in Coatlán del Río, parents wrote 
to the SEP requesting the suspension of integrated classrooms; but when the inspector 
arrived in the village shortly after the pueblo’s request, he met with the president of the 
local parents’ committee, Amado Batalla, and convinced him of the merits of a 
coeducational system.  At a nationwide education conference in Cuautla in 1929, the 
governor of Morelos and teachers from all over the state and region held a lively debate 
on the issue of a coeducational primary school system.  With only six opposing votes, the 
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organization passed a resolution to integrate both sexes in Morelos’s elementary 
schools.466  Yet a year later, the SEP chief in Morelos could only boast that “our schools 
have little by little been entering the coeducational system, as it has been necessary to 
destroy not just a few prejudices.”467  Thus, the actual implementation of both sexes 
sitting together in class required constant dialogue with village parents, but year by year, 
at least until 1934, enrollment and attendance improved in the classrooms.   
Parents’ decision to send their children to attend classes regularly demonstrated 
one of the strongest ways a family voiced support for a local school.  Yet teachers faced 
an uphill battle against the demands of the agricultural cycle given the fact that nearly all 
of Morelos’s rural families were occupied in the fields each year during the plantings 
season from May to July.  During these months, parents required both boys and girls to 
work ejidal lands.468  “It didn’t matter whether the child was a boy or girl,” Esperanza 
Martínez remembered before the birth of her daughter in the early 1920s, “all children 
mean money, because when they begin to work, they earn.”469  The issue of classroom 
attendance, that is, brought into focus the paradox of rural poverty: parents knew well 
that education led to greater economic opportunities, but children also needed to learn 
cultivation techniques and lend a hand with the plantings.  The state government 
responded to this problem in 1931 by reforming the school calendar.  From then on, 
school vacations in Morelos would no longer be held in November and December, but 
instead in June and July, when children were toiling in the fields.470  It remains unclear to 
what degree the official decree improved daily attendance.  Overall enrollments of 
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school-aged children in the villages stood strong at just under ninety percent according to 
official school censuses, but only sixty-nine percent of those children showed up for 
exams in 1933.471  There was always a significant discrepancy, in others words, in the 
number of enrolled students compared to the number that actually attended classes.  
Nonetheless, the reform of the school calendar demonstrates that authorities were willing 
to modify the federal school program in order to meet the circumstances of morelense 
families; hence, we see that the SEP sympathized with at least some local objectives.  By 
early 1934, SEP inspectors boasted of the progress primary schools were making each 
year.  One official concluded that “teachers and communities have entered an era of full-
blown activity…as the most difficult step of persuasion and convincing [villagers to 
participate in the schools] has come a long way.”472  Educators could now devote more 
attention to actual pedagogy.   
Federal schools were also sites where villagers came into contact with female 
educators.  Teaching was in fact the only profession that women practiced in rural 
Morelos, and they made up over half of the labor force.  Most, presumably, underwent 
training at one of the normal schools operating in Mexico City.  Of thirteen such schools, 
nine were exclusively for women.473  Under Calles, however, normal schools were 
regionalized; in 1928, the SEP established the Escuela Normal Rural de Oaxtepec, 
Morelos, to instruct the state’s future teachers.  By 1933, despite a constant lack of 
resources, eighty percent of the state’s primary instructors had been trained at the 
Oaxtepec Normal School, although it is not clear if they all hailed originally from 
Morelos.  Yet the teachers instructed at Oaxtepec, according to SEP inspectors, lacked 
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sufficient training for their many duties in the pueblos, which posed “one of the greatest 
obstacles” to achieving the SEP’s goals in Morelos.474  In 1934, for example, sixty-four 
federal teachers working in the state had yet to take their certification exam at the normal 
school.  The SEP tried to remedy teachers’ lack of training by offering special courses for 
instructors on socialist doctrine, rural health and housing, physical education, and 
agricultural techniques.475  If anything, then, teachers’ inadequate schooling gave 
villagers more opportunity to mold the federal project to meet local needs.  In any event, 
it would be these teachers who dialogued with village parents regarding the content of 
classroom pedagogy.   
Federal instructors, in general, did not interfere in local political struggles before 
1934.  Rather, there is some evidence that teachers took steps during the heated electoral 
battles of the 1920s to ease tensions within and between communities.  Such was the case 
in February and March 1926, when three factions declared victory in the first and only 
gubernatorial election of the decade.  During a visit to Tlaltenango (Cuernavaca), the SEP 
inspector found the federal maestra alarmed by the village’s violent political conflict with 
neighboring Santa María, Chamilpa, and Tetela, which had resulted in injuries and 
death.476  Shortly afterwards, in order to seek a rapprochement between the politically 
divided region, the inspector led a field trip for the students of the Chamilpa school to 
visit Tetela.  After a walk whereby the inspector gave “simple talks of geography and 
knowledge of nature, provoking questions” from interested pupils, the students arrived in 
Tetela where a group of school children awaited and greeted them with “applause and a 
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choir song.”477  Promoting reconciliation between rival villages, such as occurred in this 
case, reveals one way how the SEP was able to stay above the fray of inter-pueblos 
rivalries.  Consequently, SEP employees in Morelos were not polarizing figures to the 
degree that they were in other states.  Rather, through local education committees and 
mothers associations, villagers exercised control of village pedagogy, while teachers 
generally worked in tandem with the community to pursue mutual goals.  It was in 1934, 
however, with the introduction of an anticlerical curriculum into rural classrooms, when 
villagers lost say in what students learned.  Consequently, SEP schools were 
delegitimized in the eyes of rural folks and attendance in federal classrooms dropped 
precipitously.  
Pueblo Religion & Socialist Education 
The year 1934 saw a national campaign to reform the constitution and teach “socialist 
education” in federal primary schools.  Until then, federal teachers possessed modest 
resources and focused on imparting basic knowledge such as mathematics and grammar; 
they sought to integrate rural communities into the national market economy and instill 
new behaviors and skills.  Yet come 1934, instructors were expressing a new missionary 
zeal and stepping deeper into village politics and agrarian matters.  Educators wanted to 
nationalize the ethnically diverse countryside and forge one popular Mexican culture 
(albeit one defined by urban intellectuals), and they considered the Catholic Church their 
primary nemesis.  The Church posed an obstacle to a secular state attempting to instill 
civic patriotism and nationalistic values, especially in the rural population.  One the one 
hand, official rhetoric repeatedly referred to the need to “defanaticize” “superstitious” 
Mexicans, whose ultimate loyalty, authorities assumed, resided in Rome with the Pope, 
                                                 
477 AHSEP, Escuelas Primarias, caja 44, exp. 16, ff. 4-7, Report by José Pedro Durany, 15 February 1926; 
AHSEP, Escuelas Primarias, caja 44, exp. 16, ff. 19-23, Report by José Pedro Durany, 8 March 1926. 
 189 
and not with the Mexican nation.  Yet educators now also viewed the Church not just as 
anti-national but also as a class enemy of the proletariat, making the curriculum reforms 
more radical.  Socialist education, in other words, would liberate the peasantry of clerical 
tutelage and false consciousness.478  Back in Morelos, in August 1934 the state and 
national governments signed an agreement to federalize the remaining thirty-two schools 
under Cuernavaca’s jurisdiction, many of which were in the southeast, resulting in 
stronger central control of pedagogy in distant rural areas.479  Meanwhile, the 
unionization of teachers in Morelos accompanied the process of federalization. To 
accompany the pedagogical reforms, in August 1934 the state legislature in Cuernavaca 
passed harsh anticlerical legislation, limiting the number of priests to one per 75,000 
inhabitants and requiring clergymen to register with the state government.480  These 
events unfolded within a short window of time and tipped the balance of power in the 
Morelos countryside heavily in favor of centralized government, especially regarding 
local religious practices.   
Opposition to the curriculum reforms came from the villages—primarily among 
parents of school children.  While an isolated and small-scale armed rebellion led by 
former zapatista militant Enrique Rodríguez “El Tallarín” would menace authorities 
from 1948 to 1938, it was his supporters in the villages that enabled his revolt to endure, 
throwing into question the alliance between Mexico City and zapatismo.  Underground 
Catholic cells and organs of the conservative press such as La Opinión and Hombre Libre 
heightened anxieties among parents by exaggerating abuses committed by the federal 
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government, and the Church warned mothers and fathers not to send their children to 
schools that adopted socialist education.  Quarrels over religion and the school began to 
surface in SEP reports in the spring of 1934 as the national debate over socialist 
education spread.481  Then, in the fall, conflicts boiled over, because the government’s 
attack on pueblo religion violated its pact with rural Morelos.  In the face of such 
opposition, the state was especially feckless and provoked a battle that was unexpected, 
even though it did not confront a powerful Church in Morelos 
Historically, the Church could not flex its institutional muscle in Morelos to the 
degree that it did in states such as Jalisco or Michoacán.  During the eighteenth century, 
the districts of Cuernavaca and Cuautla—then part of the Archdiocese of Mexico—had 
been had hotbeds of village anticlericalism and regions of poor church attendance.482   
Although Bourbon anticlericalism in the eighteenth century was different from 
revolutionary anticlericalism in the twentieth century, the pueblos had a historic tendency 
to resist secularization and attacks on Catholic practices.  Not until the creation of the 
Diocese of Cuernavaca in 1891—making it one the newest in Mexico—did the Catholic 
Church strengthen its hand in the pueblos, although we should remember that it was most 
likely formed to weaken the Archdiocese of Mexico rather than as a laboratory of socially 
militant Catholicism.  The diocese covered the entire state of Morelos, contained twenty-
six parishes, and was led by Bishop Hipólito Vera until 1898.  Both Vera and his 
successor, Francisco Plancarte y Navarrete (1899-1912) were pious theological 
conservatives—experts on, and defenders of, the apparitions of the Virgin of Guadalupe.   
Plancarte y Navarrete focused his energies on training the local clergy, made pastoral 
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visits to the parishes, and did not shake up the Church in Morelos.483  In his words, the 
Mexican clergy and laity made up “a school that we can call conservative, whose 
principal tendency was to preserve the usages, customs, and let us also say it, the abuses, 
of the old regalistic Spanish church, in the ceremonies of worship, in religious practices, 
and in the education of children, in schools, colleges, and seminaries.”484   Plancarte y 
Navarrete, that is to say, bemoaned the lack of sacramental piety and was only partially 
successful in changing it.  Yet hacendados, local merchants, and caciques backed the 
Porfirian Church in Morelos and made it into a stronger force in the locales by using 
coercion to promote pompous village fiestas.  In Tepoztlán, the cacique collected 
unlawful religious taxes and threatened residents with punishment if they did not perform 
certain tasks for the festivals.  One Tepoztecan later recalled that “people participated in 
religious fiestas much more than today because they believed attendance was 
compulsory.”485  In general, then, religion in rural Morelos was more festive than 
sacramental, or, as Redfield put it, “Mexican folk enjoy a great number of festivals which 
are in part worship but in greater part play.”486  Thus the clergy did not control religious 
life in Morelos to the degree that it did in the other regions such as the Bajío region.  
Rather, local devotions, such as the famous Cristo of Totolapan, have strongly 
characterized religious practices in Morelos.487 
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Added to this, the Mexican Revolution shattered any gains made by the 
institutional Church in Morelos during the Porfiriato.  In 1912, Manuel Fulcheri y 
Pietrasanta (1912-1922) assumed the episcopacy of Cuernavaca, but he did not take up 
residence in the town until 1919 due to the revolutionary upheaval.  Meanwhile, the 
Church languished, though it never suffered attacks by zapatistas during the fighting and 
acted with independence towards the revolutionaries.  Some zapatista ideologues, in fact, 
justified the redistribution of land according to the Catholic principle of natural law.488  
Of course, plenty of priests denounced the zapatistas, but many also communicated with 
insurgent leaders and sought to maintain the prestige of the Church in the countryside.  
One famous case included the heroic story of a martyred priest in Tepalcingo.  The cleric 
rang the parish bells to warn of approaching federal soldiers, who later killed him.489  
Bishop Fulcheri could devote little time to the spiritual reconstruction of Morelos because 
in 1922 Bishop Francisco Uranga y Sáenz (1922-1930) was appointed to the Diocese of 
Cuernavaca.  Uranga activated catechetical teachings in all of Morelos’s parishes, but, 
again, the Cristero War forced the bishop and the region’s priests to flee to Mexico City 
in 1927 and most did not return to Morelos until 1929.490  Recurrent crises, in other 
words, prevented the Church from exerting more influence in the countryside.  Still, the 
periodic absences of the clergy did not necessarily disrupt the religious customs of 
Morelos as local people enjoyed them.  If anything, it exacerbated a ritual autonomy in 
the pueblos not constrained by official doctrines, allowing local cults to thrive in the 
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1920s.  In short, holy life fell into the hands of village institutions and coexisted 
somewhat uneasily with official theology.491 
Socialist education threatened the religious effervescence of the pueblos.  The 
reforming of the Constitution amounted not merely to an official assault on the 
institutional Church but on popular religious beliefs because it sought to secularize 
village life.   This offensive against the cyclical customs and rituals in rural communities 
had not occurred in Morelos during the Cristero War of 1926-1929.  Then, teachers 
abstained from religious discussion in classrooms, and many priests left temporarily to 
reside in Mexico City while the body count rose in the centre-west states.  In 1929, for 
example, only four priests officially registered with the state government, although others 
likely operated clandestinely in Morelos.492  No cleric resided in Tepoztlán while North 
American anthropologist Robert Redfield carried out research in the large village 
between 1926 and 1927, yet the local cult flourished.493  Nor is there any evidence that 
the religious festivals of rural Morelos were disrupted or generated discord during the 
Cristero War.  At the height of the conflict, a Gobernación agent even noted that “there is 
not a State in the country as peaceful as Morelos.”494  Clergymen returned to the state at 
the end of the conflict and resumed their roles of administering the sacraments and acting 
as moral authorities in the pueblos.  All seemed quiet until teachers introduced socialist 
education into the classrooms.  After the state legislature limited the number of priests in 
Morelos in August 1934 to one per 75,000 inhabitants, that fall, teachers organized into 
the Bloque Radical de Maestros Socialistas de Morelos and declared support for the 
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PNR’s Six Year Plan.  The union declared the Catholic clergy as the prime obstacle to 
implementing socialist education.495  The SEP offered new courses for teachers in 
socialist doctrine and organization and discussions on “the influence of religion on social 
structure.”496  The state, therefore, now set out to eradicate religious beliefs all together, 
not just clerical influence.  In sum, whereas anticlericalism in 1920s Morelos constituted 
high range ecclesiastical persecution and prompted informal evasion of the law, the 
antireligious policies of the 1930s used federal schools to broadcast secular values into 
the heart of rural communities and attacked religion’s role in everyday life, flying in the 
face of tradition.     
The upheaval in Morelos also sheds new light on the understudied Second 
Cristiada of the 1930s, or La Segunda.  This matters because historians have 
underestimated the importance of the Segunda and the extent of violent opposition to 
President Lázaro Cárdenas that originated in the state.  Morelos, in fact, produced one of 
the largest segundista rebellions outside of the Bajío region.  This was not due to top-
down clerical support, though parish priests were more active in Morelos pueblos in the 
1930s than they had been in the late 1920s.  In contrast to the previous decade, the 
Catholic Church of the 1930s condemned violence by any organization that tried to claim 
the Church’s mantle and punished clergy who aided pious insurgents.  Instead, the 
Segunda included a diverse array of revolutionary chiefs, and its strength lay in the 
diffuse opposition to central impositions throughout rural Mexico.497  Most importantly, 
the anticlericalism of the 1930s impacted rural communities in Morelos in a way that 
anticlericalism had not during the previous decade, which explains zapatista hostility to 
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cardenismo.  In the 1920s, indeed, former zapatista militants, such as Genovevo de la O, 
had defended the federal government and hounded cristeros in the centre-west states; 
village militias in Morelos also mobilized to fight invading cristero cavalry from 
Guerrero.498  The segunderos of Morelos were also unlike those in Michoacán and 
elsewhere in that they had not revolted during the major religious conflict of 1926-1929.  
In other words, the Segunda in Morelos does not represent a classic or monocausal 
cristero rebellion.  Rather, in religious terms, the segunderos of Morelos tended to defend 
a local religion based on devotions to village saints instead of the institutional Catholic 
Church.  It was state-sponsored attacks on these local practices, not a defense of universal 
and doctrinaire Catholicism, which fanned the flames of dissent in Morelos.  In political 
terms, the case of Morelos shares some characteristics with the segunderos of the Sierra 
Madre in Sonora, where inhabitants of the mountains resented the growing presence of 
the national government.499  In both Morelos and Sonora, local grievances went beyond 
religious matters and included calls for democracy, clean elections, and local sovereignty.  
The Second Cristiada, therefore, encompassed various critiques of an expanding federal 
government.   
The immediacy of protest tells its own story.  As soon as the 1934-1935 school 
year began, descriptions of religious divisions within pueblos filled the reports of federal 
bureaucrats.  On Monday 6 November 1934, in Amacuitlapilco (Jonacatepec), a village 
of some four-hundred persons, only six students appeared in class. The teachers 
proceeded to visit the homes of those absent in order to persuade parents to return their 
children to school.  In several homes SEP representatives were greeted with hostile words 
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and threats.  Still only ten children presented themselves in class on Tuesday.  That 
afternoon at around six o’clock, the federal zone inspector attempted to gather villagers 
together and convince them of the educational project’s merits.  After nearly giving up on 
the meeting, the municipal officer backed by twelve men armed with machetes 
confronted the inspector, Juan Ponce, and two teachers.  The municipal representative’s 
hostile approach alarmed Ponce, since he had held cordial meetings in the pueblo on 
previous occasions with the same individual.  The inspector calmly sought to explain the 
SEP’s intentions and purposes, but the party exclaimed to the cry of “Viva la Religión”  
“that they did not want the school because it combated priests and religion,” Ponce 
recalled.  Within moments, a person struck bells, alarming the villagers.  Men and women 
armed with machetes, pistols, and rifles surrounded the SEP personnel.  Several persons 
in the mob began to shout denunciations of the federal and state governments.  The angry 
crowd attempted to grab the teachers and threatened to kill them.  Shots were fired into 
the air.  Alarmed at the potentially tragic situation unfolding, authorities in the village—
the municipal representative and the militia chief—and several individuals attempted to 
calm the mob and protect the SEP employees.  Inspector Ponce and the two teachers 
managed to escape in a car and flee to Jonacatepec for safety.500       
Similar events to those in Amacuitlapilco occurred in nearby communities.  In 
Tetelilla, a pueblo of some nine hundred inhabitants, the residents split between 
supporters of the government and a religious faction.  The SEP inspector admitted that “it 
has not been possible to control the school population, as clerical agitation has provoked 
a crisis in the attendance of children whose parents are fanatics.”  In the district seat of 
Jonacatepec, one of the local clergymen was openly hostile to the school.  The same 
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priest made frequent visits to neighboring Chalcacingo, where “residents comply with the 
pulpit’s propaganda and, under pretexts, withdraw their children from school.”  An 
inspector visiting Huitchila proudly wrote that the teacher controlled the pueblo and had 
even “saved several residents from being dragged into the armed struggle by deception 
carried out and achieved by the criminal Enrique Rodríguez.”501  Several residents had 
committed themselves to a rebellion with El Tallarín, but the maestro convinced them of 
their imprudence.  Rodríguez indeed actively recruited villagers in eastern Morelos on 
religious grounds. 
In other cases, pious individuals regularly placed printed flyers under the doors of 
villagers’ houses during the nights.  The small pamphlets attacked the educational 
reforms, extolled religious principles, and called upon parents to not send their children 
to federal classrooms.502  A group of residents in Yecapixtla complained that socialist 
education offered them little.  The teacher did not instruct children how to pray or how to 
make the sign of the cross.  Parents refused to send their young ones to school “until the 
Ejecutivo Federal is changed, for it is its ideology that makes teaching in the schools 
different from its previous form.”503  They saw President Cárdenas as the culprit behind 
the new curriculum.  Mothers and fathers resisted by sending their children to private 
schools that three local women had established.  The director of the school in Yecapixtla 
accused several in the group of hiding the local priest, who changed homes frequently.  In 
the eastern highland pueblo of Tetela del Volcán, parents of children fervently protested 
the introduction of sexual education into classrooms—another example of the aggressive 
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purging of local religious beliefs.  After endless discussions on the topic, the adults of the 
village wrote that “there remains no other path for us parents of families than to unite in 
order to defend our children from the prostitution that threatens them.”504  Sex education, 
parents asserted, would lead children down a slippery slope of immorality.  Procopio 
Mendieta, father of a young daughter, also spoke out against the SEP curriculum in the 
highlands around Tetela del Volcán.  He specifically condemned educators for preaching 
atheism to children and for targeting women with their propaganda during local religious 
festivals.  Authorities accused Mendieta of colluding with El Tallarín and eventually 
jailed the agitator.505  Local devotees, in other words, not just the clergy, presented a 
grassroots bulwark against anticlerical impositions from the outside.506 
The anticlericalism of socialist education offended villagers who feared that their 
children would not receive a proper religious upbringing.  In particular, educators faced 
difficulty when asked questions on the origins of man and the universe.  Following a 
classroom lecture on geography given by a SEP inspector, “questions and discussions 
came up about the origins of the Universe and our planet Earth, discussions of great 
interest,” he recalled.  The majority of teachers, the official explained, did not know how 
to respond to such religious questions.  Campesinos would nonchalantly ask educators 
such loaded questions when performing services for the school or when dining with the 
maestros.  The inspector proceeded to elaborate on the theories of the origins of man.  He 
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discredited the religious explanation and extolled a scientific approach to such issues.507  
These arguments, however, did little to convince concerned villagers.  Pious women from 
across the state met in Cuernavaca and Cuautla in 1935 to discuss how best to combat the 
educational reforms.508  The content of classroom teachings was not the only source of 
discontent.  A teacher upset the residents of San Pablo Las Huertas (Cuernavaca), when, 
for lack of a location, a classroom was set up in the village church, which locals 
considered a profanation of sacred space.509  Instances such as this demonstrate that SEP 
employees in the mid-1930s showed little regard or respect for local customs.  At best, 
some teachers simply ignored the new SEP curriculum and stuck to old ways.  The 
religious maestras of Quebrantadero (Axochiapan), for example, avoided official rhetoric 
that would offend the local population, while the teacher in Atotonilco (Tepalcingo) 
refused to shed her religious beliefs, “obeying the current of her community.”510  Some 
teachers, therefore, were unwilling to tow the official line because they themselves found 
the anticlerical reforms repugnant.   
Village conflicts over socialist education could involve the highest authorities in 
Morelos.  In May 1935, the indigenous highland pueblos around the Popocatépetl 
Volcano revolted against SEP schools, and thereafter armed rebels roamed the region.  
The situation forced the SEP director in Morelos and Governor Bustamante to travel to 
the area accompanied by an escort of federal soldiers and calm the unrest themselves.  In 
Hueyapan, residents had taken away the keys of the school from the inspector and forced 
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the teacher to leave the pueblo.  The governor managed to calm the situation when he 
promised to substitute the federal teachers for educators employed by the state 
government.  The indigenous of Hueyapan, the SEP director lamented, “wanted teachers 
from the State ‘because they do not teach socialist education.’”511  By the end of the 
1934-1935 school year, the head of the SEP in Morelos admitted that “the struggle has 
been hard” to sway children back to the classrooms after “attendance in 
schools…decreased notably in the entire state.”512     
It was only after President Cárdenas began to scale-back official anticlericalism in 
1936-1937 that reports of empty classrooms in Morelos subsided and a sense of normalcy 
returned to rural schools.  Popular opposition to socialist education across Mexico, which 
reached a bloody climax in 1936 after Catholics rioted in San Felipe Torres Mochas, 
Guanajuato, coupled with the armed rebellion in the Morelos hills and peaceful resistance 
in the valleys forced the president to avoid further confrontation with Catholics.  Soon 
after, state governments followed the federal lead and began to repeal harsh anticlerical 
legislation.513  Although the anticlerical provisions of Article three of the Constitution 
would not be reformed officially until the early 1940s, antireligious teaching in rural 
classrooms faded in the late 1930s, helping to recreate the pact between zapatismo and 
the federal government.  Thus, parents of school children had won a victory by 
negotiating a place for pueblo religion to coexist alongside secular schools.  The 
particular case of Morelos reveals that anticlericalism in the form of socialist education 
during the mid-1930s projected secularism into the heart of rural communities, which 
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offended popular religious beliefs.  This explains why Morelos, a state where the 
institutional Church was historically weak, became a battleground in the Segunda 
Cristiada.  Moreover, as the next chapter will show, the rebellion led by El Tallarín from 
the mountains of eastern Morelos played a crucial role in forcing Cárdenas’s hand on the 
religious question. 
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 Chapter V: El Tallarín and the Revival of Zapatismo, 1934-1938 
The previous chapters’ focus on the political, agrarian, and religious questions as they 
pertained to pueblos in post-revolutionary Morelos is important to understand the 
rebellion led by Enrique Rodríguez, because his struggle correlated strongly with the 
agrarian debacle of the mid-1930s, callista political corruption, and the rise and fall of 
official anticlericalism in federal schools.514   In other words, Rodríguez was a proxy of 
the pueblos and waged war on their behalf during the breakdown of the pact between 
rural Morelos and the national state.  Indeed, the narrative shifts in this chapter from the 
pueblos’ post-revolutionary experience to the individual struggle of Rodríguez, whose 
1934 uprising provides a window into how exactly his rebellion forced President 
Cárdenas to renegotiate the terms of the region’s loyalty to the national state.   
 By the end of the rebellion in 1938, Enrique Rodríguez was well known.  Time 
magazine likened the battle-hardened rebel to a western cowboy in the United States at 
the turn of the twentieth century: The “swashbuckling hold-up man who confined his 
depredations mainly to big banks and railroads was at least half hero.”515  A year before, 
the New York Times called Rodríguez “one of Mexico’s most noted bandits” and reported 
periodically on his rural attacks.516  The Mexican press, meanwhile, described Rodríguez 
as a “famous rebel,” who possessed a network of supporters to “outwit the persecution of 
federal troops.”517  Friend and foe alike referred to the skinny Rodríguez by his 
nickname, El Tallarín (“the noodle”).  Yet despite such attention in the national and 
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international press, historians know relatively little about Enrique Rodríguez Mora, or the 
rebellion he led in Morelos.  This is surprising because, long before Rubén Jaramillo took 
up arms against the Mexican state in the 1940s and 1950s, Rodríguez, also a former 
combatant under Emiliano Zapata, headed the first prolonged guerilla insurgency in 
Morelos (1934-1938) since Zapata’s death in 1919 and the end of the Mexican 
Revolution.  Yet while scholars have published works in both Spanish and English on 
Jaramillo, Rodríguez does not even have a page dedicated to him in the collected 
biographies of former zapatista militants, which include over 150 different entries of men 
and women in three volumes.518  Both Rodríguez and Jaramillo shared an antipathy 
towards the corruption of the state government and expressed similar agrarian grievances, 
but their movements were distinct, especially in terms of the national political contexts of 
their revolts.  Rodríguez operated before and during the leftist presidency of Lázaro 
Cárdenas (1934-1940) and Jaramillo during the more conservative administrations of the 
mid-twentieth century.  The rebels of the 1930s targeted school teachers in their attacks, 
whereas educators in the countryside often sympathized with Jaramillo.  This fact has led 
many contemporaries and some historians to label Rodríguez as a cristero – a religious 
militant and defender of the Catholic Church.  Jaramillo, for his part, adopted and 
preached Methodism, but religious issues seemingly played no overt role in his 
movement.  Politically, El Tallarín did not offer a clearly articulated political alternative 
as did the jaramillistas, who gained more support and longevity in the pueblos by 
establishing an electoral platform and participating in elections.  Rodríguez, however, 
remained isolated, armed, and mobile in the sierra for four years.   
                                                 
518 López González, Los compañeros; Arredondo Torres, Los valientes de Zapata, vols. 1 and 2.  For a 
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Whereas Tanalís Padilla emphasizes the compatibility of the cardenista project of 
national agrarian reform with Jaramillo’s quest for justice in the countryside, El Tallarín 
represents a clash between zapatismo and the cardenista state.519  El Tallarín, rather, 
resembles the diverse groups in Mexico which combated and opposed Cárdenas, such as 
small property owners, the middle class, industrialists, and Catholic groups.520  As 
previous chapters have shown, before 1934, the peasantry of Morelos had served as a 
crucial block of support for weak federal regimes.  In exchange for land and electoral 
loyalty, former zapatista troops had mobilized to defend the national government during 
the De la Huerta rebellion of 1923-1924 and the cristero war of 1926-1929.  As the case 
of El Tallarín shows, this alliance broke down in 1934 for three reasons.  First, the 
federal government stopped redistributing land in Morelos in 1929, although landless 
peasants from neighboring Guerrero continued to settle in the state.  Overpopulation, 
bureaucratization, and corruption put new pressures on natural resources and villages.  
Second, by 1934, a stronger regime in Mexico City and Cuernavaca tolerated less 
independent political organization than in the 1920s.  Civilian politicians used an 
increasingly heavy hand to deal with former zapatistas such as El Tallarín who would not 
fully support the official Partido Nacional Revolucionario.  Finally, the widespread 
hostility in Morelos to Cárdenas’s educational reforms led to violence and attendance in 
federal classrooms plummeted.  Enrique Rodríguez headed a three-pronged rebellion and 
in defense of agrarian self-reliance, traditional chieftainship, and religious liberty.  His 
movement evolved into a broad critique of the post-revolutionary state’s trajectory in the 
                                                 
519 Padilla, Rural Resistance, 55-84. 
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mid-1930s.  By 1938, the revolt had forced Cárdenas to renegotiate the terms of zapatista 
loyalty to the federal regime in order to secure peace in Morelos.521  
Agrarian Upheaval 
Little is known of Enrique Rodríguez’s early life.  Born circa 1900 in the small Morelos 
community of San Pablo Hidalgo (Tlaltizapán), Enrique grew up in a ranching family 
that possessed private land before the revolution.  San Pablo Hidalgo had formed as an 
agricultural colony in the second half of the nineteenth century, but the expanding sugar 
estate of the Chinameca hacienda threatened to push the pueblo’s families on to sterile 
                                                 
521 Historians have speculated and offered various interpretations to explain El Tallarín’s rebellion.  For 
most, Rodríguez is relegated to a footnote in a larger story of the tumultuous and transforming presidency 
of Lázaro Cárdenas.  Luis González cites news of the “crimes of El Tallarín” as proof of the uncertainty 
faced by Cárdenas during his first days in office.  Luis González, Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, 
1934-1940, vol. 15: Los días del Presidente Cárdenas (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1981), 21.  
Perhaps most influentially, Jean Meyer has argued that Rodríguez fought for religious freedom against a 
secularizing state and that he represented a classic cristero insurgent.  Meyer omits a discussion of Morelos 
politics from his analysis and cites just one manifesto issued by the insurgent in 1937, found today in the 
archive of Aurelio Acevedo, a former cristero leader.  In the manifesto Rodríguez declares that “although it 
might be a little late, we struggle as much for religion as for all the rights of the fatherland in order to 
defend the true reason of the pueblos.”  Quoted in Meyer, La cristiada, vol. 1, 378.  Only when President 
Cárdenas reopened the churches did Rodríguez surrender, according to Meyer.  Jean Meyer, “El zapatismo 
va a la cristiada,” Revista Nexos, Marzo (1997), 37-38.  Arturo Warman’s classic work on zapatismo, 
meanwhile, emphasizes the similarities between El Tallarín and Rubén Jaramillo’s uprising: the post-
revolutionary Mexican state betrayed the ideals of the revolution, forcibly opposed any groups that 
attempted to organize against the government, and drove Rodríguez and Jaramillo into revolt. Warman, 
“We Come to Object,” 190-192.  Studies dedicated specifically to Rodríguez’s rebellion are rare, however.  
A brief article by Sosa Elízaga places the 1934 revolt in south-eastern Morelos within the larger framework 
of the failed presidential bid of Antonio I. Villarreal and considers El Tallarín a social bandit with agrarian 
grievances.  Raquel Sosa Elízaga, “Pequeña historia de una rebelión agraria durante el cardenismo: El caso 
de Enrique Rodríguez, El Tallarín,” Latino América, 1995, 28 (1997), 91-103.  The most thorough study of 
the rebellion is a recent undergraduate thesis at the state university of Morelos.  Aguilar Domínguez argues 
that Rodríguez initially took to the sierra in 1934 after a shoot out with the local municipal president and 
gubernatorial candidate forced him to seek refuge in the hills.  The main cause for the rebellion, then, 
resided in Rodríguez’s personal conflict with local members of the official PNR, rather than religious 
freedom, which Aguilar Domínguez discounts as a main factor in the revolt.   Ehecatl Dante Aguilar 
Domínguez, “‘Enrique Rodríguez “El Tallarín’ y la denominada Segunda Cristiada en el Estado de 
Morelos, 1934-1938,” undergraduate thesis, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Morelos, 2007.  
Historians, in other words, have tended to identify El Tallarín with various critiques of the maturing 
revolution.  Hence, we currently possess a contradictory image of Rodríguez as failed mutineer, 
discontented agrarista, religious leader, and conservative member of the PNR.  Yet as this chapter will 
show, the political, agrarian, and religious questions cannot be divorced from each other when considering 
the 1934 rebellion. 
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secondary lands usable only for livestock grazing.  Enrique’s three older brothers – 
Marcelino, Leonardo, and Félix – led him to join the revolution in 1911 at the young age 
of eleven, when he was already an orphan.  His uncle, Catarino Perdomo, became one of 
the first zapatista colonels in the Liberating Army of the South, and his first cousin and 
the future governor of Morelos, Elpidio Perdomo, also rose to the rank of colonel.  
Enrique’s eldest sibling, Marcelino, was promoted to general in 1914 by Zapata after 
fighting valiantly against Huerta’s forces.  Enrique, however, commanded troops under 
General Felipe Neri until the latter’s death in 1914.  He then joined his three brothers – 
known as los tallarines or the Rodríguez Brigade – fighting in eastern Morelos, where the 
seventeen-year-old gained intimate knowledge of his future theatre of operations.  
Marcelino was killed in combat in 1917, and shortly thereafter carrancista soldiers 
assassinated Enrique’s brothers Leonardo and Félix.522  By then, Enrique had obtained 
the rank of colonel and following his brothers’ deaths probably joined General Francisco 
Mendoza’s forces.  Rodríguez had allies and family members across Morelos.  He knew 
people throughout his home municipality, Tlaltizapán, located in the southern hotlands.  
In the east of Morelos along the border with Puebla, locals assured a government agent in 
1934 that Rodríguez had many friends and relatives around Zacualpan and Tlacotepec.523  
This provided El Tallarín with a crucial network of support in eastern Morelos because 
Tlacotepec was home to a sizable militia and controlled large quantities of irrigation 
waters and fertile lands.524  Experience in the revolution had taught Rodríguez to survive 
as a guerrilla fighter.  Hiding in the mountains, hit and run attacks, sabotage, burning 
                                                 
522 For a brief biography of Marcelino Rodríguez, see López González, Los compañeros, 221. 
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archives, and political assassinations were the hallmarks of zapatista militancy that 
Rodríguez successfully employed two decades later.  In the 1920s, Enrique and the 
zapatistas joined Álvaro Obregón’s federal army and El Tallarín later returned to San 
Pablo Hidalgo to grow rice for commercial sale.525  By 1934, Rodríguez had settled in the 
south-eastern municipal seat of Tepalcingo, where he cultivated a plot of ejidal land – a 
common occupation of former combatants in Morelos.  A large village by 1940, some 
three thousand people inhabited Tepalcingo, most of whom were agricultural workers.  
Also like many former revolutionaries, Rodríguez now partook in local politics, and he 
probably held a position in the local militia. 
Rodríguez’s decision to launch his revolt from Anenecuilco – Zapata’s home 
village – demonstrates the importance of the agrarian question.  On Independence Day 
1934, two months before Cárdenas’s inauguration, numerous rebels symbolically 
gathered in the famous pueblo to pronounce the Plan Revolucionario Anenecuilco.  
Commencing the revolt from the cradle of the agrarian revolution allowed El Tallarín to 
link the rebellion to a grander struggle for liberty, land, and pueblo sovereignty that 
began two decades prior.  Who exactly gathered that day at the revolutionary assembly in 
Anenecuilco remains unclear, although Francisco Franco, the pueblo’s elder leader, likely 
attended the meeting.  The village itself had secured abundant fertile lands during the 
1920s, but heading into the winter of 1934–5, Anenecuilco entered a bitter dispute 
against several ambitious generals led by Maurelio Mejía, a former zapatista, who would 
despoil the pueblo of its two best fields.526  Franco, charged with protecting 
                                                 
525 Aguilar Domínguez, “Enrique Rodríguez,” 44-56. 
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Anenecuilco’s sacred land titles, was forced into hiding over the winter and authorities 
accused him of spreading “the idea that the current state of things must change.”527 
Also noteworthy, the Plan Revolucionario of 1934 specifically invoked the Plan 
de Ayala of 1911 and adopted the agrarian and democratic principles enshrined in the 
famous document.  The first article of the 1934 Plan named Enrique Rodríguez as chief 
of the liberation movement.  Second, it declared the July presidential elections null and 
named Aurelio Manrique, a prominent opposition leader hostile to official 
anticlericalism, president of a national government with authority to wage war against the 
regime imposed by Plutarco Elías Calles – by then the most powerful and polarizing 
figure in Mexican politics.  Manrique had a long revolutionary background going back to 
the days before 1910 and served as governor of San Luis Potosí in the 1920s, but 
afterwards he became increasingly conservative and was forced into exile from 1929 to 
1933 for publicly denouncing Calles.528  Fourth, the Plan denounced all callistas, who 
had become “owners and lords [of] all public offices and sources of wealth.”529  Most 
importantly, in response to the national debate over the reforming of Article Three of the 
Constitution that would establish socialist education as official policy, the Plan fervently 
rejected the callista doctrine “that without any Authority seeks to educate our daughters 
as they please.”  Children, it asserted, deserved a “Christian education and morally under 
the…exclusive responsibility of their parents.”  The rebels would recognise the ranks of 
all former militants of the zapatista army if they joined the insurrection.  The Plan 
Revolucionario Anenecuilco concluded by denouncing Calles for sending the nation’s 
gold to England, gold which the callistas had appropriated from Mexico’s agricultural 
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and industrial production through corrupt banks.  While less eloquent and shorter than the 
Plan de Ayala, these grievances against the regime were nonetheless frequent among the 
diverse independent political groups in Mexico.  When opposition leader Antonio I. 
Villarreal issued a manifesto to the nation one month after El Tallarín, he echoed the 
sentiments expressed by the Plan Revolucionario Anenecuilco.530   
The uprising in eastern Morelos, coupled with dozens of village petitions for land, 
forced Cárdenas to act.  The president appeared in Anenecuilco in June 1935 to return the 
lands usurped by corrupt generals, although his actions provoked a long conflict with 
neighboring Villa de Ayala over the rich fields.  Villages across Morelos began to receive 
provisional extensions of their ejidos; during the cardenista sexenio, the government 
doled out a further 70,000 hectares of land to rural communities.  The presence of El 
Tallarín in fact pressured the government to carry out a second agrarian reform.  
Following a congress in Jojutla in 1935, an official document circulated stating that 
pending petitions for lands and waters were the most pressing problems among 
campesinos.  The government ordered a brigade of engineers to descend on the districts 
of Jojutla, Cuautla, and Jonacatepec and resolve all outstanding petitions, “as the present 
agitation and the propaganda that the rebel Enrique Rodríguez spreads…merit such a 
response in order to further unite campesinos behind the National Government.”531  The 
promise of lands, water, and forests helped to secure the loyalties of agricultural workers, 
eased tensions in agrarian communities, and to some extent reduced El Tallarín’s pool of 
potential supporters in the pueblos.  Redistributing land, however, was not enough to 
quell the insurgency.   
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The Political Origins of the 1934 Rebellion 
With the backdrop of increasing agrarian unrest, callista conservatism, and political 
corruption, the governor of Morelos played a key role in creating conditions ripe for 
rebellion.  José Refugio Bustamante, victor of the 1934 gubernatorial contest, was typical 
of Morelos’s non-zapatista political class in the post-revolutionary period.  He had not 
fought in the Mexican Revolution, but he became a callista and career politician 
beginning in the 1920s, when he served as municipal president of Cuautla and later as a 
state legislator in the early 1930s.  Although the non-zapatista politicians in Morelos 
never opposed agrarian reform, Bustamante sought to channel all organization, 
mobilization, and demands of the popular classes through the government and official 
party.  Politics under Governor Bustamante was notoriously corrupt.  Politicos in the state 
government walked the Cuernavaca streets armed and frequently caused public disorder.  
The governor even hired gunmen in the district seats and stayed in close contact with 
loyal municipal presidents to control local opposition groups.532     
In this atmosphere, Enrique Rodríguez encountered trouble.  In preparation for the 
1934 gubernatorial election, Rodríguez installed an office in Tepalcingo to support the 
candidacy of Francisco Álvarez (Bustamante’s main rival in the internal PNR elections) 
and began holding public meetings throughout the south-eastern region, where he used 
his personal influence to rally supporters.  The municipal president and cacique of 
Tepalcingo, Luis Mariscal, supported Bustamante, and tensions between he and 
Rodríguez escalated close to violence in 1933.   Mariscal, as cacique of Tepalcingo, often 
employed violence to quell the opposition.533  On 20 February 1934, during the large and 
raucous religious festival of Tepalcingo, when religious sensibilities were highly charged, 
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Rodríguez approached Bustamante in a cantina to greet the official PNR candidate.  
Mariscal intervened and would not allow Rodríguez to speak with Bustamante.  The 
municipal president then departed and moments later shots were fired.  Gunmen pursued 
Rodríguez to the outskirts of the pueblo, but he escaped unscathed.  The chief fled to the 
surrounding ranches and remained underground until September.534   
Rodríguez’s tumultuous experience with members of the PNR delivered him into 
the arms of the national opposition led by Antonio I. Villarreal, who campaigned against 
the official party’s presidential nominee of 1934, Lázaro Cárdenas.  At this juncture, the 
opposition considered Lázaro Cárdenas yet another lackey of Calles, as the latter had 
handpicked a series of presidents since 1928.535  They perceived little difference between 
Calles and Cárdenas.  Although the national opposition to the Cárdenas ticket initially 
lacked cohesion and suffered internal division, prior to the election it coalesced into the 
Confederación Revolucionaria de Partidos Independientes (Revolutionary Confederation 
of Independent Parties).  From Morelos, over half a dozen local political parties and clubs 
joined the Confederation.536  Calles’s radical anticlericalism and the corruption of the 
regime began alienating once loyal supporters in the heartland of zapatismo.  
This was made evident by the government’s own reports.  A Gobernación agent 
sent to Morelos to gather intelligence after the uprising of September 1934 painted 
Enrique Rodríguez as a villarrealista.  According to the agent’s lengthy investigation, the 
rebels maintained contact with Francisco Álvarez, who in January of that year had lost 
the internal PNR elections for governor to Bustamante.  Álvarez, bitter after losing a 
close contest, opposed Calles and remained in contact with Rodríguez and other 
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villarrealistas.  When Antonio Villarreal campaigned in Morelos before the July election, 
El Tallarín and others came out to support him.  The Gobernación agent reported that 
Rodriguez had been in rebellion since 1 July 1934, the day of the presidential election, 
but he made no mention of the violent episode in Tepalcingo in February involving 
Rodríguez, Mariscal, Bustamante, and gunmen.537    
Several months after the uprising began, the government commissioned Julia 
Mora Zapata, niece of the deceased caudillo and a trustworthy figure, to find Rodríguez, 
learn the reasons for his discontent, and convince him to lay down his arms.  Mora went 
south to the small mining community of Huautla.  She did not speak with the rebels 
themselves; however, after talking with locals, Mora concluded that Rodríguez and his 
followers principally took to the hills because “the current local authorities seek to harm 
them for having become disaffected in the latest political contest and have denounced 
them to federal forces.  They have been sought out in their homes, and for fear of no 
protection, they have taken up the position in which they find themselves.”538  The 
investigation fits with Rodríguez’s own reasons for initially revolting.  At his surrender 
four years later in Mexico City, he told a reporter,  
 
It was in ‘34…when I fled to the hills.  I was then in Tepalcingo, working my 
land; but Governor Bustamante did not care for me, because I did not help him in 
his political campaign.  Someone told me: “The forces are a going to come for 
you.”  And I asked him why.  And he answered me: “Because the governor is 
saying that you shouted: ‘Death to the Supreme Government, viva Villarreal.’”  I 
thought, they won’t get a hold of me and I fled to the hills.539 
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Rodríguez’s relationship with an authoritarian governor, in other words, stood as his main 
reason for initially going underground.  He did not deny any of the charges that he had 
rejected the official party.  Nor did he mention the topics of socialist education or 
Cárdenas.  Of course, a philosophical discussion with Mexico’s “famous bandit” did not 
suit the occasion, but Rodríguez clearly argued that mere political self-defence provoked 
his flight to the highlands. 
The insurrection began with a surprise attack.  On 24 September, less than two 
weeks after pronouncing the Plan Revolucionario Anenecuilco, Rodríguez and a band of 
some forty-five individuals entered Tepalcingo at five o’clock in the morning.  Fifteen 
men began to lay siege to the municipal president’s home.  Luis Mariscal, as municipal 
president and loyal supporter of Bustamante, was the governor’s eyes and ears in distant 
Tepalcingo, and his gunmen had nearly taken Rodríguez’s life during the Tepalcingo 
holiday in February.  The assailants surrounded Mariscal’s home and fired shots.  
Surprised, the municipal president fled his house while shooting his pistol at the 
attackers.  He escaped unharmed and would henceforth update the governor and president 
on raids by El Tallarín during his mandate.  The men proceeded to sack Mariscal’s 
house, carrying off leather chaps, a saddle, ropes, spurs, and a horse – equipment for a 
cavalry.  Afterwards, they gathered in the central plaza, read aloud their plan for 
government, shouted their support for Antonio Villarreal, and abandoned the village at 
seven o’clock in the morning, two hours after the siege began.  The raiders levied no 
forced loans, nor did they target any other local residents, but they destroyed the 
telephone line between Tepalcingo and the district seat, Jonacatepec.540 
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Unrest quickly began to unfold.  A day after the attack on Tepalcingo, on 25 
September, federal soldiers charged with carrying out the generals’ land grab appeared in 
Anenecuilco to apprehend the local agrarian leader, Francisco Franco, and despoil the 
pueblo of its best fields.541  To this end, unknown men erected fences on the pueblo’s 
lands and the authorities nabbed Franco, who managed to escape but was forced into 
hiding for several months over the winter.  That such events occurred in the famous 
village was symptomatic of the state of callista politics in Morelos and contributed to 
growing turmoil throughout the region.  The generals accused Franco of colluding with 
El Tallarín and they spread false statements about the elder village leader in the press.542  
It is quite plausible, however, that the events in Tepalcingo the previous day provided the 
pretext for the generals to force the Anenecuilco leaders to hand over the pueblo’s 
cherished land titles and intimidate Franco into signing an agreement.  After the soldiers 
appeared in Anenecuilco, on 26 September 1934, El Tallarín led men on horseback to 
briefly occupy the far south-eastern municipality of Axochiapan.  Locals Jesús García, 
José Solís, and Pedro Pliego joined forces to overwhelm the village.  A fourth 
consecutive day of tumults occurred in Cuautla, when farmers assassinated the local chief 
of police.543  
Was the sudden unrest in Morelos connected to local agrarian and political affairs 
or part of a larger rebellion inspired by Antonio Villarreal from Nuevo León?  The rebels 
in Morelos did not possess direct links to Villarreal, but clearly they sympathized with his 
movement.544  While it is true that in 1934 government supporters labeled most members 
                                                 
541 AGA, Dotación de Tierras, Anenecuilco (Ayala), exp. 23/2961, leg. 1, f. 359, Miguel Franco to 
Cárdenas, 6 January 1935. 
542 AGA, Dotación de Tierras, Anenecuilco (Ayala), exp. 23/2961, leg. 1, f.  421-422, document not 
signed, 25 April 1935. 
543 AGN, Gobernación, IPS, caja 258, exp. 1, Report by José Pérez Tejada G., 9 October 1934. 
544 Sosa Elízaga, Los códigos ocultos, 51. 
 215 
of the political opposition as villarrealistas, and that in October Villarreal announced a 
national rebellion to begin on 20 November, proof of a direct link with El Tallarín is 
based on circumstantial evidence.  Luis Mariscal, the municipal president of Tepalcingo, 
was the only informant to assert a clear connection between Rodríguez and Villarreal, 
and his allegations must be viewed with skepticism.  He claimed that “extraofficial 
reports” given to him revealed that on 17 September, “days before the vandalic 
movement broke out, ex-general Villarreal was at a ranch named ‘Los Metates,’ the site 
where several characters went to sign the said government plan.”545  Los Metates was an 
uninhabited ranch, an hour from the south-eastern train station of Huitchila.  Mariscal 
wrote that Gobernación agents sent to gather intelligence on the uprisings also learned of 
the secret meeting at Los Metates between Villarreal and Rodríguez.  General Miguel 
Henríquez Guzman, the army’s commander sent to crush El Tallarín, additionally 
mentioned that “they constantly receive money and War materials and spread news that 
rebel movements against the Government exists in the entire Republic.”546  Here, caution 
should be exercised with the evidence.  The cacique of Tepalcingo had clear political 
motives for reporting rumors, and he greatly admired General Henríquez, with whom he 
had been in contact with since the uprisings in September.  Finally, Villarreal spent the 
months after the July election in Monterrey and the United States, not in Morelos.547  
Even if the meeting at Los Metates occurred, Villarreal’s revolt from the north fizzled 
during the early months of 1935 and never displayed the capacity to send arms south or 
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support an insurgency in Morelos.548  Logistical obstacles limited an alliance between the 
insurrectionists of Morelos and the north, even though El Tallarín clearly sympathized 
and associated with the villarrealistas.  Most importantly, the flimsiness of the evidence 
linking El Tallarín to political villarealismo reveals that Rodríguez had his own agenda 
in Morelos; he was never beholden to any national politician, and nor was he a proxy 
gunman.    
The spats of violence in Tepalcingo, Axochiapan, and Cuautla shared evidence of 
common political grievances with those of the North, but they had roots in local agrarian 
and political issues particular to Morelos, and many of the persecuted individuals would 
find refuge in the sierra under Rodríguez’s command, swelling insurgent ranks to 
between one and two hundred men.  Many had prior experience with arms, having served 
in the village militias that were still present in Morelos in the 1930s.  El Tallarín, for 
instance, harassed the militia chief of Los Hornos on several occasions for refusing to 
join the insurgency.549  None of the guerrillas appear to have participated in the cristero 
uprising of the late 1920s.  The rebels’ mobility and hit and run tactics allowed them to 
stay one step ahead of annihilation by the federal army.  General Henríquez commanded 
five columns of soldiers and pursued El Tallarín for the remainder of 1934.  In the first 
ninety days of the hunt into the mountains, the army failed to engage the guerrillas even 
once.  From the field, Henríquez noted the obstacles posed by a combination of endless 
hills from which the army columns could be seen from great distances, and deep ravines 
and canyons, in which the rebels could hide and provision themselves at isolated ranches.  
The rebels in hiding, according to Henríquez, survived on small rations of beans and 
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tortillas.  In order to win the support of the local population, the army paid the local 
ranchers in food and forage for their animals, even though General Henríquez remained 
suspicious of their sympathies and considered them ignorant peasants, seeking adventure 
and easily manipulated by demagogues.550   
By the end of 1934, then, a small regional rebellion had broken out in Morelos.  It 
began over politics in the midst of growing agrarian upheaval.  The repression during the 
gubernatorial and presidential campaigns led Enrique Rodríguez and his village followers 
to the hills.  They shared the grievances of other groups in Mexico opposed to the PNR 
regime, and they became a draw for such elements.  Within two years of the initial 
uprisings, the rebellion had spread territorially from the south-eastern corner of the state 
to include the northern highlands of Morelos, especially the borders with Estado de 
México and Puebla and areas surrounding the Popocatépetl Volcano.  Two, or possibly 
even three, guerrilla squads operated in the highlands under the banner of El Tallarín.  
Dividing into smaller bands allowed the insurgents to move swiftly and evade the army.  
For instance, Rodríguez and his men appeared early one morning in Ocuituco, Morelos 
and abducted the village tax collector from his home.  The rebels took him to Hueyapan 
while still dressed only in his underwear and executed him in the central plaza in front of 
a large crowd.551  Rural attacks spilled over into villages in Puebla.552  Despite this 
activity, the army never cornered the guerrillas for a decisive battle and repeatedly failed 
to capture Rodríguez.  Furthermore, no evidence exists to suggest that local agrarista 
militias or paramilitary forces familiar with the local terrain aided the army in its quest to 
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quash El Tallarín.  Armed villagers had backed the federal government in 1920, 1923, 
and 1927, but they would not pursue one of their own in 1934.   
Attacks on Federal Teachers 
El Tallarín countered the education mobilizations of 1934 by attacking rural teachers.  
The rebels viewed SEP employees of the 1930s as agents of an atheist state and as 
outsiders, who were not welcome in the pueblos.  Teachers, tax collectors, PNR 
members, and militiamen were all fair game in their eyes.  “El Tallarín,” recalled one 
woman from Hueyapan, pursued “all those who worked for the government.”553  In 
January 1935, the head of the SEP in Morelos, Leopoldo Carranco Cardoso, provided the 
first reference to the deaths of teachers.  Educators Gilberto Méndez and Silvestre 
González were both killed that winter, although it is not clear if their deaths occurred in 
the same place and at the same time.  Méndez was accidently shot by “federal troops 
during confusion with a militia.”  González, on the other hand, was put to death “by the 
cristero rebels of “El Tallarín,” who, after hanging him, placed a notice on him that said: 
‘dead for imposing socialist teachings.’”554  Unfortunately, the director provided no more 
details of the clash, but fear spread among educators in the countryside and attendance in 
classrooms stood at a new low.  Teachers wanted a transfer away from isolated villages to 
locations closer to the cities.555  These deaths were the first killings of SEP employees 
associated with El Tallarín.   
Similar to the zapatistas of the 1910s, rebel actions quieted during the rainy and 
planting season of the summer, but in September 1935, just before the school year began, 
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attacks on pueblos and teachers resumed.  A few weeks after a brief battle occurred in the 
mining town of Huautla, two normal school students in their mid-20s, Facundo Bonilla 
and Camerino Valle, were put to death near Los Momotles, Tlaquiltenango.  The two 
youths had been traveling on a near-empty bus destined to take them to their posts in 
Colonia Hidalgo and Los Hornos, respectively.  A group of insurgents under the 
command of El Tallarín assaulted the coach and captured the two educators, accusing 
them of believing in socialist education.  The assailants ordered Bonilla and Valle off the 
bus, tied them up, and then beat and shot them, leaving the two bodies by the roadside.  
Both youths died shortly thereafter from their wounds.556  It remains unclear how many 
teachers became victims of El Tallarín.  By the last year of his rebellion in 1938, the 
national daily Excélsior estimated that Rodríguez had been responsible for the deaths of 
seven rural teachers.  The most recent incident had occurred in Cuautometitla, Puebla.  
Assailants killed the local teacher, José Ramírez Martínez, and members of the municipal 
government.  Rebels hung the four bodies from trees in the central plaza and fled the 
village.557  
Other times, insurgents intimidated a teacher and spared his or her life.  On 19 
June 1936 at six o’clock in the afternoon, a group of armed men attacked the school in 
Buena Vista del Monte, a hamlet of 200 inhabitants in the mountains north of 
Cuernavaca.  As the teacher dismissed the students after a full day of classes, a girl 
entered the building alarmed and pleading for help for her family members.  Upon exiting 
the school building, the teacher encountered several armed individuals.  The assailants 
shouted insults at him and poked him with their rifle barrels, preventing him from 
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passing.  Seventy armed men, the teacher later claimed, sacked the village.  The fifteen 
local men who comprised the village militia were absent, and the attackers began to take 
arms from the houses of militiamen.  Villagers fled the pueblo.  Only women, children, 
and the teacher remained in the hamlet.  Surrounded, the teacher could not escape, and 
the attackers shoved and kicked him into the school building.  The rebels demanded all 
documents pertaining to socialist education, arms, clothes, and money.  Several of them 
began to call for the teacher’s death and began to interrogate him.  The unnamed teacher 
recalled, “the women and children present at the time, who were in tears and wailing 
because of the difficult situation I found myself, lent me courageous help.  They made the 
attackers…see that my educational work in the school extended only to practical 
teachings.”558  The educator denied teaching socialist education, but the armed men 
continued their threats until their unidentified chief, most likely El Tallarín, entered the 
school building.  The teacher repeated that the women and children’s pleas were correct 
and that he had abstained from teaching socialism.  These words half-convinced the chief 
to spare the instructor’s life.  He left the educator with a pamphlet and threatened to 
return and kill him.  The rebels retreated after sacking the pueblo, taking with them even 
foodstuffs.  The teacher never provided the name of the chief, but, given that El Tallarín 
based his operations out of the northeastern corner of Morelos around the Popocatépetl 
Volcano in 1936, it is quite likely that Rodríguez or someone closely associated with him 
did interrogate this specific teacher and ultimately freed him.559  In any case, the attack 
shows that the rebels distinguished between the state and its specific policies, between 
                                                 
558 AHSEP, Escuelas Primarias, caja 5811, exp. 7, f. 4, Eliseo Bandala to Director de Educ., 25 June 1936. 
559 After the War Minister transferred General Geneovevo de la O out of Morelos in 1925, the village of 
Santa María no longer dominated the wooded highlands of northwestern Morelos, which would help to 
explain why El Tallarín could operate as far westwards as Buena Vista del Monte.  In late 1935, rebels also 
attacked Tepoztlán, located east of Buena Vista del Monte, although, again, it is not clear if El Tallarín led 
the assault.  AGN, Presidentes, Lázaro Cárdenas, exp. 559.1/4, f. 7, Conde y Rodríguez to Cárdenas, 12 
November 1935. 
 221 
education and anticlericalism.  Teachers could continue to educate village children, but 
only if they respected pueblo traditions and abstained from any discussion of atheism. 
Attacking rural teachers, especially those with an interest in socialism, was one 
expression of the rebellion’s religious component.  Another was Rodríguez’s attempts to 
forge an alliance with the Liga Nacional Defensora de la Libertad – the principal civilian 
institution that backed the cristeros of the late 1920s and 1930s against the federal 
government.  The Liga, an ultra Catholic organization, would appear an unlikely ally of a 
guerrilla from zapatista country given that some wealthy landowners and rich Catholics 
possessed links to the centralized and autocratic lay organization.  And while the Liga 
had endorsed, financed, and armed the cristeros of 1926–9, it had less success doing so in 
the 1930s and was ridden by factionalism.560  But, as with El Tallarín’s strategic 
adherence to villarrealismo, the Liga presented the chief with an ideologically 
sympathetic ally, and possessed a national profile and a history of confronting the state.  
As early as 1934, El Tallarín and his men met a delegation of the Liga from Puebla in the 
small village of Zalostoc, Morelos.  That December Rodríguez recognized the Liga’s 
program as established in the 1934 Plan de Cerro Gordo and agreed to coordinate his 
action with the institution’s directorate.561  While the accord was easily signed, the 
correspondence exchanged between the Liga and the Morelos insurgent demonstrate the 
difficulties of forging such an alliance.  El Tallarín warned the Catholic organization not 
to avoid the agrarian question: “if the league does nothing more than defend Religion, 
                                                 
560 Timothy Clarke Hanley, ‘Civilian Leadership of the Cristero Movement: The Liga Nacional Defensora 
de la Libertad Religiosa and the Church-State Conflict in Mexico, 1925–1938’, PhD diss., Columbia 
University, 1977.   
561 AHUNAM, Aurelio Robles Acevedo, caja 23, exp. 111, f. 118, Agreement by Enrique Rodríguez and 
Narciso Rodríguez, 19 December 1934, The Plan de Cerro Gordo refused to recognize the federal and state 
governments and the 1917 Constitution; however, it did not attempt to roll back the social and agrarian 
legislation of the revolution and recognized women’s right to vote.  
 222 
and worst if it is in line with asendados [sic], be sure that blood will continue to spill.”562  
Rodríguez boasted of his control over the pueblos, urged the Liga to commit to the armed 
movement, and pledged his allegiance to universal Catholic values.  “We are completely 
Religious and deeply respect parish priests (los padrecitos),” another letter asserted.563  
Although convinced of the movement’s genuine religious motive, the Liga failed to 
furnish sufficient war materials for the cristeros of the 1930s, and the correspondence 
reveal an uneasy alliance with El Tallarín.  Again, like the villarrealistas of northern 
Mexico, the Catholic lay organization offered the insurgents of Morelos nominal support 
at best, while failing to devote material resources necessary for war. 
Surrender 
The scenario of a reformist president heeding the cries of the popular classes undermined 
El Tallarín’s rebellion, as Cárdenas had watered-down anticlericalism by 1936, begun his 
agrarian reform in earnest, and exiled Calles from Mexico.  Still, the insurgent displayed 
no signs of surrendering in exchange for amnesty and a good plot of land.  Mistrust of 
politicians stood as a common characteristic of zapatista chiefs in the post-revolutionary 
period.  The revolt’s influence, then, was diffused in the pueblos, effective only in the 
larger scheme of national politics by its longevity, military prowess, and its ability to 
capture the popular imagination in the Mexico City press.  El Tallarín may have 
represented one of the most dangerous and feared guerrilla combatants of the post-
revolutionary period, but, politically, Rodríguez could not, at least in the final years, 
capitalize on the bursts of popular outrage against socialist education or callismo’s 
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agrarian conservatism.  By 1938, El Tallarín was ready to come down from the cold 
mountains. 
Only when Rodríguez’s first cousin, Elpidio Perdomo, assumed the governorship 
of Morelos in 1938 did the guerrilla take advantage of an opportunity to end the rebellion.  
Perdomo, like his cousin, grew up in the southern hotlands and rose to the rank of colonel 
during the revolution.  He remained in the army until the mid-1930s and was stationed in 
the northern city of Monterrey.  Authorities knew Perdomo had a relationship with 
Rodríguez going back to their youth, and shortly after the rebellion broke out in the fall 
of 1934, Perdomo traveled south on behalf of the government in search of his cousin.  
Perdomo arrived in Tepalcingo and failed to convince El Tallarín to surrender his arms, 
although it is not clear if he actually spoke with Rodríguez.564   
Perdomo had campaigned on the promise that he would convince El Tallarín to 
lay down arms, and Cárdenas backed him on this key issue.  Previous attempts by the 
president, Julia Mora Zapata, and Perdomo had failed to persuade the chief to give up the 
struggle.  But the political scenario in the summer of 1938 offered Rodríguez an opening 
with Bustamante now out of power and his first cousin in.  Close friends of Rodríguez 
contacted individuals in the Perdomo administration regarding surrender in exchange for 
guarantees that the rebel would face no criminal charges and could return to a peaceful 
civil life.  Then, relatives of the two cousins became involved.  Genaro Perdomo, aged 
sixty-two and uncle to the governor and rebel, met and spoke with his nephew Enrique 
after eight days of searching for him in the hills.  Genaro convinced his nephew Enrique 
to wait close to their home village of San Pablo Hidalgo at a point named “la Piedra 
Escrita” while he went to Cuernavaca to update the governor.  Genaro and Elpidio 
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together returned to “la piedra escrita.”  After what we can only imagine to be 
affectionate greetings between two cousins who have not seen each other in many years, 
the governor offered Enrique safety and guaranteed protection and the rebel agreed to 
give up the life of a guerrilla.  Perdomo then traveled to Mexico City in order to meet 
with the Ministry of Defence and ensure the amnesty.  The federal government agreed to 
the deal.  Rodríguez wrote and signed a short letter of surrender to Cárdenas.  He assured 
the president that the governor had worked out the conditions of his amnesty and 
requested “guarantees…in order to recognise your good government and dedicate myself 
to a tranquil honorable life.”565  Two weeks later on the 7 September, El Tallarín 
presented himself in the governor’s office, and the following day the two drove with their 
uncle Genaro to Mexico City.  There, at the Ministry of Defence, after four years of 
rebellion, El Tallarín finally surrendered.566  During the surrender negotiations, 
Rodríguez appears to have conceded little more than a promise to lay down arms and 
return to civilian life.  He faced no criminal charges.  Cárdenas, thus, had responded to 
popular pressures form Morelos by redistributing land, watering down socialist 
education, and granting El Tallarín amnesty, thereby recreating the pact between 
zapatismo and the state.567 
Indeed, it was Perdomo’s personal intervention on behalf of the federal 
government that provided Rodríguez with the opportunity to surrender.  The state 
governors of post-revolutionary Mexico often performed such intermediary roles between 
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Mexico City and the general population.568  By 1938, the federal regime had redistributed 
additional lands in Morelos and it no longer sought to implement anticlerical legislation 
at the local level.  Four years of struggle had inched the villages closer to the ideals of 
“tierra, libertad y religion.”  Perdomo offered El Tallarín the confidence to give up life 
on the run.  If Bustamante’s hand-picked successor had won the Morelos gubernatorial 
election, Rodríguez would not have come down from the mountains.  The caudillo’s 
mistrust of government stuck with him until the last days, as a politician’s word was no 
good.  Thus, gubernatorial politics stood at the center of Rodríguez’s reasons for initially 
fleeing to the sierra in 1934 and for ultimately deciding to surrender in 1938, while 
religious discontent fueled widespread indignation in rural Morelos during the rebellion.  
After the election for governor in 1938, Bustamante, who had once attempted to control 
Rodríguez by force, was defeated, out of the political picture, and no longer a threat.  
Both Rodríguez and his cousin Perdomo, in fact, had escaped attempts on their lives by 
Governor Bustamante’s goons, but the former zapatista revolutionaries survived and 
lived to tell the tale.   
A reporter from Excélsior interviewed El Tallarín shortly after his surrender at the 
Ministry of Defence.  The rugged chief shed his riding boots, pistol, and ammunition belt 
and dressed in a new suit and shoes for the occasion.  “He’s a man of the countryside, 
with skin tanned by the sun,” wrote the journalist.  His left cheek was bruised black and 
blue from a blow: “A horse gave it to me,” said Rodríguez.  His right hand was partly 
disabled after taking a bullet several years before.  Excélsior described El Tallarín as a 
victim of circumstance.  Rodríguez denied all the reports in the press of the crimes 
attributed to him over the past four years and stated “that he never assaulted the people; 
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that his famed reputation as a bandit has been formed by his ‘political enemies.’”569  The 
chief departed the Ministry of Defence carrying a letter of amnesty in his pocket 
approved by Cárdenas.  He returned to Morelos and was practically out of public view 
thereafter.  El Tallarín’s life after surrender remains obscure.  He briefly mentioned at his 
surrender that he would not return to farming and would probably lend a hand in the 
Perdomo administration.   An article by El Universal in 1939, when Perdomo was 
entrenched in a battle against the state legislature, mentions accuzations by legislators 
that the governor employed his famous cousin and a group of pistoleros to intimidate the 
legislative body during a political standoff.570  The fog surrounding Rodríguez’s life after 
rebellion only thickens in regards to his death, which apparently occurred within a few 
years after his 1938 surrender.  Some eastern morelenses believed he fell in the violent 
political clashes of Perdomo’s governorship, while one former zapatista recalled that he 
died a drunkard.  In any case, the two causes of death are not mutually exclusive, and 
they suggest that after laying down arms El Tallarín lived in the shadows and struggled 
to settle into civilian life.571 
El Tallarín’s rebellion was the first to erupt in post-revolutionary Morelos and it 
established a pattern among those morelenses who carried the torch of zapatismo into the 
mid-twentieth century.  Rodríguez and his successors were all motivated by the growing 
influence of centralized government in pueblo life.  During the dry season of 1942–3, for 
instance, over one hundred campesinos from eastern Morelos took up arms to evade 
federal authorities and defend agrarian self-sufficiency.  In what became known as the 
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bola chiquita, villagers from Zacualpan, Tlacotepec, and Hueyapan – the same region 
where El Tallarín possessed strong support – resisted a coercive campaign of 
conscription by the federal army to serve in Mexico City during the end of the 1942 
harvest.572  Moreover, as Tanalís Padilla has shown in the case of jaramillistas in the 
1940s and 1950s, farmers increasingly resented politicians’ heavy-handed involvement in 
the local sugar economy and met state repression with mobilization and armed 
struggle.573  Likewise, for both Rodríguez and Jaramillo, repression following the 
gubernatorial contests of Morelos marked key moments on the path to rebellion, further 
emphasizing the key middle roles played by governors during the process of political 
centralization.  After each violent occasion, rural pressures forced the presidents of 
Mexico to intervene, renegotiate the terms of zapatista loyalty, and offer amnesty to the 
movements’ leaders. 
Nonetheless, what separates El Tallarín most from his successors is the degree to 
which the defence of religion formed a central component of his uprising.  Only during 
the first years of the Cárdenas presidency did official anticlericalism provoke a defiant 
response in the Morelos countryside.  It did so in 1934 because, unlike the high-range 
ecclesiastical persecution of the late 1920s, socialist education clashed more with daily 
religious culture.  Before 1934, religion fostered communal solidarity and provided an 
autonomous space for pueblos to operate.  Teachers’ subsequent attempts to undermine 
pious beliefs smacked of central imposition.  Village religious devotions, in this sense, 
formed an integral part of the zapatista concept of local sovereignty, which explains why 
Morelos became an important battleground in the Segunda.  Anticlericalism in the form 
of socialist education threatened village liberty.  And despite the Catholic Church’s weak 
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institutional foundations in states such as Morelos and Campeche (where folk religious 
traditions thrived), official anticlericalism in the 1930s mobilized groups as diverse as 
parents of schoolchildren, former zapatista officers, and middle- and upper class 
laywomen.  The Segunda, then, as Ben Fallaw has showed, tended to unite Catholics 
across Mexico regardless of the Church’s organizational strength.574  The segunderos 
were more geographically and socially diverse than the cristeros of the late 1920s, and 
issues beyond religion could motivate resistance.   
For El Tallarín, religion, while it connected his revolt to ordinary concerns, was 
not even the initial factor that led him to the hills.  Instead, local politics proved decisive 
in his revolt and surrender, which draws attention to the consolidation of the PNR during 
the 1930s.  As we saw, Rodríguez’s struggle had origins in the internal elections of the 
Morelos PNR held in January 1934, lending support to Lorenzo Meyer’s finding that the 
real contest for power during the Maximato already occurred within the PNR rather than 
in constitutional elections between rival parties.575  These internal contests reinforced 
political centralization, but, as the case of Morelos shows, the party hierarchy in Mexico 
City could not control conflicts between its members at the state and municipal levels.  
Rodríguez’s troubles with the PNR also demonstrate that the party was hostile to 
campesino leaders during the Maximato.576  In turn, the experience of Morelos in the 
mid-1930s suggests the callistas did not succumb to popular pressures and negotiate with 
the opposition to the degree that the cardenistas did.  Unlike Saturino Cedillo, whose 
revolt from San Luis Potosí the president crushed in 1938, Rodríguez had the sense and 
the political fortune to quit while he was ahead.  El Tallarín, as he exited the political 
                                                 
574 Fallaw, Religion and State Formation. 
575 Lorenzo Meyer, Historia de la revolución mexicana, 1928-1934, vol. 12: Los inicios de la 
institucionalización (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1978), 273. 
576 Garrido, El partido, 171-173.  
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scene in the 1930s, stood as a defender of agrarian self-reliance, traditional chieftainship, 
and pueblo religious liberty, which was why the pueblos supported him.   
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Conclusion: The Diversity of the Morelos Countryside 
This dissertation has explored different types of rural communities in post-revolutionary 
Morelos that also displayed various kinds of behaviors, but what ultimately united the 
diverse countryside was the shared belief that legitimate political authority in Mexico 
rested upon the sovereignty of the pueblos.  Put simply, the national regime could only 
assert control over rural Morelos once a critical mass of the pueblos consented to rule by 
a new set of elites.  Although the concept of village sovereignty had roots in Mexico’s 
liberal past, the pueblos’ proclivity to engage the federal government over issues of 
politics, land reform, water resource management, and schools reveals that these 
communities did not fight a revolution to return to a utopian bygone era before sugar 
plantations dominated the rural landscape.  Rather, the idea of village sovereignty 
evolved in the 1920s and 1930s to include new political and institutional ties to the 
federal government that were used to enhance local control of village life at the expense 
of the old elites now in remission.  The alliance with the federal government, that is to 
say, made the pueblos more sovereign during this period.  Of course, those new links to 
Mexico City required constant dialogue, countless negotiations, and not infrequent 
conflict before campesinos and national elites reached a settlement.  This study, then, 
contributes to recent cultural histories of the Mexican Revolution that analyze the 
attitudes and strategies of rural folks in order to explain their relationships with the 
national state.  It also shows that moral and economic explanations of village conduct are 
by themselves insufficient to grasp the diversity of the Morelos countryside.  Instead, an 
approach is needed that integrates these cultural, moral, and economic analytical tools 
into a single approach that sheds new light on post-revolutionary villages.      
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Research Findings 
The most important national figure to negotiate Morelos’s reincorporation into the federal 
system was Plutarco Elías Calles, who did so primarily from 1926 to 1934 by backing the 
pueblos in conflicts with Cuernavaca; establishing PNR offices in all the municipalities; 
delivering definitive land resolutions; creating water juntas along the region’s principal 
rivers; and building primary schools in every village.  Calles was in fact significantly 
more committed to bringing the Morelos peasantry into the arms of the state than had 
been his predecessor Álvaro Obregón, who unsuccessfully attempted to resolve local 
political and agrarian conflicts with the authority of his personal charisma.  In contrast, 
Calles used the tools and institutions of the state to forge a closer relationship with 
morelense pueblos.  The peasantry, meanwhile, found a responsive president in Calles, 
who sent personal representatives to oversee local electoral disputes; ousted abusive 
governors at the behest of village petitions; and backed the pueblos in conflicts with local 
elites.  The decline of callismo and the rise of cardenismo in the mid-1930s, however, 
ruptured the alliance between Morelos and Mexico City, forcing President Cárdenas to 
distribute more land in the state, reform the pedagogy taught in federal primary schools, 
and negotiate El Tallarín’s surrender.  Thus, while state formation during the cardenista 
presidency certainly deepened ties between the center and periphery, it was Calles, not 
Cárdenas, who receives credit for being the key architect of the post-revolutionary state 
in Morelos.  If a building metaphor is allowed, Obregón laid the foundation for a 
zapatista home in the national regime; Calles then poured the concrete, laid the bricks, 
and installed the plumbing system; and Cárdenas plugged leaks in the roof and donated a 
garden to finish the job. 
Each president negotiated sovereignty with the pueblos by engaging the 
countryside on matters of politics, agrarian reform, the irrigation system, and village 
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schooling.  Chapter one showed how governance in Morelos was contingent on a critical 
mass of pueblo consent, which explains why political stability did not return to the state 
government until after 1926.  From studying Cuernavaca’s mistakes in the mid-1920s, the 
callistas realized that riding roughshod over local electoral outcomes was 
counterproductive to state formation.  In turn, villagers influenced national elites by 
participating in the internal primary elections of the official PNR.  These finding 
demonstrate that the Sonoran regime did not and could not simply impose itself on the 
rural population.  Rather, the regime encountered a mobilized peasantry that it learned to 
govern in order to win crucial rural support during the national crises of the 1920s and 
1930s.   
One of the most successful ways that Mexico City reincorporated Morelos into 
the national regime was through local participation in the ejidal assemblies.  Land 
committees offered villagers room to maneuver politically by establishing formal 
channels of communication between rural folks and national authorities, giving the 
pueblos more ability to defend their natural resources against abusive state politicians and 
local elites hostile to agrarian reform.  The land petitions of the 1920s, meanwhile, 
revealed that villagers were less concerned about the recognition of old rights (i.e., 
restitution) than they were with gaining immediate and secured control of their ejidos in 
the form of presidential land grants.  Morelos peasants were therefore more politically 
pragmatic than scholars have given them credit for since the village land committees 
offered real benefits to campesinos and were not just vehicles for agrarian 
authoritarianism.  The agrarian reform, in other words, was both a centralizing and 
popular force.   
In contrast to the ejidal assemblies, the federal water juntas were not as successful 
in serving as bridgeheads between Morelos and Mexico City because campesinos 
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considered the National Agrarian Commission to be a more effective channel to redress 
local grievances than the National Irrigation Commission, which Calles did not establish 
until 1926.  The federal councils, moreover, were drawn into inter-pueblo feuds over 
irrigation waters, leaving the locales in de facto control of the region’s rivers still in 1940.  
Only when the juntas negotiated ejidal debts, invested in hydraulic works, and supported 
downstream pueblos lacking sufficient waters did farmers cooperate with the federal 
councils.  Water was crucial to the village economy because it allowed communities to 
grow rice for commercial sale and earn scarce cash in the 1920s; hence, the widespread 
opposition to burdensome usage fees imposed by the juntas.  Furthermore, the rice boom 
in Morelos clearly proves that campesinos were not reluctant participants in commercial 
agriculture.  On the contrary, lowland villages grew as much rice as possible, which 
explains why access to the liquid was the most divisive issue in rural disputes.  The 
pueblo green revolution, in short, pitted neighboring communities against one another 
with federal authorities caught in between them.   
Similar to the ejidal assemblies, federal schools in Morelos were well-received by 
the peasantry because they promoted pueblo reconstruction and gave women a stronger 
voice in the community.  Morelenses found unusually creative ways to incorporate 
federal schooling into village life.  Unique school gardens, for example, grew cash crops 
that funded village daycares and cooperatives that lessened campesinos’ dependency on 
traditional money lenders.  It was not until 1934, when the implementation of socialist 
education in rural classrooms attacked the pueblos’ religious culture, that villagers 
rejected federal schools.  Socialist education’s attempt to eradicate local religion on the 
grounds that priests were now class enemies of the peasantry reveals a new degree of 
radicalism in the federal government’s project.  It also explains why Morelos became a 
central battleground in the Segunda Cristiada of the 1930s.  The Segunda, as the rebellion 
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of El Tallarín shows, involved not just a defense of religion but also political and 
agrarian issues.  Once Cárdenas backed off anticlericalism and negotiated El Tallarín’s 
surrender, the pueblos were reintegrated in the national system.   
It took the federal government two decades to reassert control fully over rural 
Morelos because the diversity of the region’s villages required time for national elites to 
learn the complexities of the countryside.  Different types of communities could be found 
in every region of Morelos.  Take for example Anenecuilco, located in lowland rice 
country, and Santa María Ahuacatitlán, found in the wooded highlands of northwestern 
Morelos.  Anenecuilco and Santa María were the home villages of the region’s two 
greatest generals (Zapata and Genovevo de la O, respectively), and these communities 
displayed clear signs of corporate behavior.  Both were pre-Hispanic villages, in the 
struggle for centuries.  Both aggressively defended their natural resources in the 1920s 
and 1930s.  Neither would accept a simple land grant; each spent years in litigation 
pursuing the symbolically important category of “restitution”—recognition of the 
pueblo’s historic right to the land.  Yet both Anenecuilco and Santa María embraced the 
federal schooling project.  Pueblos such as these could be found in every region of 
Morelos.  In the east, where El Tallarin had strong support, Tlacotepec was another 
powerful pueblo and home to a sizable militia that controlled significant quantities of 
irrigation waters.  Likewise, Tezoyuca, a pueblo located south of Cuernavaca, stationed 
armed guards along the canals that irrigated its rice paddies in order to prevent 
surrounding villages from opening the hydrants and accessing water.  It was these 
vigilantes who in 1926 carried out the massacre of Chiconcuac’s agrarian leaders after 
the latter attempted to open the canal hydrants and free the passage of waters to their 
drying rice paddies.  Tradition, a vivid collective memory, and a history of armed 
struggle bound these strong types of villages together.  Most communities, however, 
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could not marshal the resources to pursue communal interests to the degree Anenecuilco, 
Santa María, Tlacotpec, and Tezoyuca could.   
To be sure, each rural population sought to improve its cultural and material 
situations through engagement with the post-revolutionary state, but how and when they 
did so depended on internal and external pressures and prior armed mobilization.  In the 
western municipal seats of Tetecala, Miacatlán, and Puente de Ixtla, villagers struggled 
against multiple external and internal forces that strained relations in these pueblos during 
the mid-1920s.  The hacendado Emmanuel Amor, for instance, disputed the ownership of 
valuable ejidal plots in both Puente de Ixtla and Tetecala and made backroom deals with 
officials in the agrarian bureaucracy to support his case.  Ejidatarios in both municipal 
seats lobbied Calles to intervene on their behalf and in both cases Calles responded by 
supporting the villagers.  The thirty-two municipal seats, the largest communities in rural 
Morelos of several thousand inhabitants, often displayed characteristics of both cohesive 
and divided communities.  These larger villages possessed more diverse populations, 
especially in terms of social class, as commercial interests and small-property holders 
resided in the municipal seats.  Morelos’s state governors were also more likely to 
commit electoral abuses and intervene in local political affairs in the municipalities than 
in smaller subject pueblos.  In the southeastern municipal seat of Tepalcingo, for 
example, Governor Bustamante had close ties to the village cacique that drove El 
Tallarin to the hills.   In sum, the political stakes were higher in the municipal seats and 
the class divisions deeper between the inhabitants. 
Finally, dozens of other pueblos, some hamlets of not even 250 inhabitants such 
as Chiconcuac, located in western Morelos, and Tenango, found in the southeast, were 
weak, lacked coherency, and could suffer at the hands of hawkish neighbors.  Lacking the 
shared history and solidarity of Anenecuilco and Santa María, many of these 
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communities had formed as settlements for the permanent workforce of a hacienda and 
later struggled to obtain sufficient lands and waters and were vulnerable to larger 
upstream pueblos with ancient water rights.  The lack of resources made these weaker 
villages actively seek the intervention of government authorities as leverage against 
stronger and aggressive neighbors.  Such was the case in Chiconcuac, where villagers 
lobbied the federal water junta to take actions against Tezoyuca’s attempts to control 
access to region’s irrigation waters.  Likewise, hamlets in the highlands of northwestern 
Morelos such as Buena Vista del Monte struggled to access forest resources during the 
early 1920s, when militiamen from Santa Maria patrolled the woodlands and used 
violence to intimidate rival villages.  These weaker communities wanted to become more 
pueblo-like in the sense of exerting greater control over nearby agricultural resources.  
The key, then, to understanding diversity among the pueblos depends on where and when 
the investigator looks.  Village life was not static.  A rural settlement could have varied 
experiences over the course of two decades.   
Avenues for Future Research 
New questions arise from this study’s finding on the pueblos of post-revolutionary 
Morelos.  First, family or genealogical histories of local elites in the region, particularly 
of village smallholders and merchants, would shed light on caciquismo and help to gauge 
the degree of change and continuity from the Porfiriato to 1940.  Exactly which families 
survived the revolution with their small properties intact and how did they adapt to the 
post-revolutionary order?577  Second, more knowledge of Mexico’s rice production 
during the 1920s would allow a comparison of the ejidos in Morelos to private estates of 
                                                 
577 Crespo and Frey, “La diferenciación del campesinado,” 304 hypothesize that these local elites 
benefitted from the agrarian reform of the 1920s, suggesting continuity from the Porfiriato to the post-
revolutionary period.  This dissertation, however, has presented evidence to show that village elites were on 
the defensive in the face of a mobilized peasantry and hostile to the agrarian reform.       
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Sonora and may help to inform our understanding of the national elite’s agricultural 
philosophies.  How many rice mills were in Mexico, when were they built, and who 
exactly controlled them?  Third, additional research into the technical aspects of the 
hydraulic system in Morelos would further explain conflicts over irrigation waters during 
the period.  Moreover, it is still not totally clear why the archives of the federal water 
juntas in Morelos thin out significantly after 1934.  Had the federal government given up 
on its attempts to regulate the historic Cuautla and Yautepec Rivers, or does the missing 
documentation have to do with Cárdenas’s reorganization of the agrarian bureaucracy in 
the mid-1930s?  Fourth, investigation into village women’s participation in the Partido 
Nacional Revolucionario during the 1930s would elucidate their roles in state formation, 
especially since women were allowed to vote in the PNR primaries two decades before 
they won the right to vote in constitutional elections.  Finally, additional research on the 
Catholic Church in Morelos and the characteristics of pueblo religion will illuminate 
regional differences in the state’s religious culture.  Was local religion in the indigenous 
highlands distinct from that of the mestizo communities in the lowland hot country?  
Answers to all of these questions will enhance our understanding of the multiple 
behaviors displayed by morelense villages during the post-revolutionary period.    
 One thing, though, was certain about Morelos’s experience in the aftermath of the 
Mexican Revolution: the federal reforms embraced by the countryside aided the revival 
of the pueblos and made them more sovereign to the detriment of battered Porfirian 
elites.  In return, on numerous occasions villagers came to the defense of a national 
regime that seemed that it had enemies everywhere except in the heartland of zapatismo.  
Of course, the return to peace was accompanied by many trials and tribulations, 
negotiations and renegotiations, and even occasional violence between pueblos and 
rebellion against the state; or, as Gruening put it on a visit to the region in 1925, “the wild 
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life of the guerilla does not conduce to settling down to communal cooperation.”578  Once 
the villages emerged from the political turmoil of the mid-1920s and secured definitive 
titles to their ejidos, however, they in fact did settle down in their reconstructed 
communities, which now teemed with rice paddies, cornfields, orchards, and school 
gardens.  Thus the pueblos were born anew.  
                                                 
578 Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 163. 
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Appendix A: Presidential Land Resolutions in Morelos, 1920-1940 
 
Year 
Number of 
resolutions 
Surface granted in 
hectares 
1920 0 0 
1921 0 0 
1922 12 15,969 
1923 10 8,863 
1924 18 10,078 
1925 11 7,246 
1926 28 23,492 
1927 45 58,789 
1928 18 24,193 
1929 47 59,892 
1930 0 0 
1931 0 0 
1932 0 0 
1933 0 0 
1934 0 0 
1935 3 1,031 
1936 47 29,309 
1937 32 25,507 
1938 17 12,843 
1939 3 612 
1940 1 707 
Total 292 278,531 
 
Source: Elizabeth Holt Büttner, “Evolución de las localidades en el Estado de Morelos según los Censos de 
Población, 1900-1950,” Anuario de Geografía 2 (1962): 35. 
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Appendix B: Rice Price Index in Mexico, 1920-1940 
 
Year Index 
1920 70.2 
1921 80.4 
1922 88.9 
1923 84.4 
1924 91.8 
1925 92.5 
1926 99.5 
1927 92.2 
1928 83.4 
1929 83.2 
1930 65.6 
1931 36.8 
1932 32.3 
1933 27.5 
1934 35.8 
1935 46.7 
1936 45.9 
1937 48.6 
1938 44.6 
1939 43.2 
1940 51.9 
 
Source: Montevideo-Oxford Latin American Economic History Data Base, “Rice Price Index,” 
http://moxlad.fcs.edu.uy/ (accessed 24 October 2014).  
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Appendix C: Population of Morelos 
 
Locality 1921 1930 1940 
AMACUZAC             1,702              2,031              2,504  
Amacuzac  655 V   507 V   897 V  
Cajones  71 CU   165 CU   188 CN  
Casahuatlán  15 CU   110 CU   64 CN  
Cuahuixtla  68 CU   223 CU   105 RA  
Huajintlán  401 P   427 P   671 P  
Miahuatlán  69 CU   104 CU   162 CN  
Playa, La  25 CU   33 CU   -  
San Gabriel las Palmas  398 CN   462 CN   417 CN  
ATLATLAHUCAN  -   -              2,139  
Atlatlahucan  1,366 P   1,565 P   1,749 P  
San Juan Texcalpan  123 P   174 P   215 P  
San Miguel Tlaltetelco   114 P   143 CN   175 CN  
AXOCHIAPAN             2,600              5,212              6,134  
Ahuaxtla  10 R   54 R   45 R  
Atlacahualoya  401 P   446 P   497 P  
Axochiapan  1,337 V   2,590 V   3,198 V  
Axochiapan  -   21 E   33 E  
Cayehuacán  -   18 R   75 R  
García  -   -   13 E  
Quebrantadero  885 P   -   833 P  
San Ignacio (Marcelino Rodríguez)  256 V   324 CN   323 CN  
Santa Cruz Ahuaxtla (Joaquín Camaño)  82 R   123 R   140 R  
Telixtac  540 P   622 P   775 P  
Tlalayo  185 CN   205 CN   202 CN  
AYALA             4,161              5,081              8,531  
Abelardo L. Rodríguez -  -   499 CA  
Anenecuilco  348 P   414 P   894 P  
Anonos, Los  14 R   -   -  
Ayala  742 V   867 V   1,195 V  
Huitzililla  127 P   165 P   580 P  
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Jaloxtoc  383 P   401 P   469 P  
Moyotepec  171 RA   204 RA   339 RA  
Rafael Merino  -   -   109 RA  
Salitre, El  -   -   216 CN  
San Antonio  116 B   145 B   -  
San Juan Ahuehueyo  348 RA   543 R   527 RA  
San Juan Chinameca  285 P   336 P   506 P  
San Pedro Apatlaco  512 P   570 CN   854 CN  
San Vicente de Juárez (Las Piedres)  189 CN   189 CN   318 CN  
Santa Rita (El Vergel)  87 CN   106 CN   175 CN  
Tecomalco  108 RA   87 RA   172 RA  
Tenextepango  539 CN   791 CN   1,418 CN  
Tlayecac  192 P   263 P   260 P  
COATLÁN DEL RÍO             1,696              2,180              3,159  
Apancingo  -   -   137 RA  
Buenavista de Aldama  220 R   320 CN   405 CN  
Chavarría  297 R   272 CN   451 CN  
Coatlán del Río  742 P   732 P   983 P  
Cocoyotla  338 H   423 CN   525 CN  
Colonia Morelos  99 R   156 R   150 R  
Michapa  -   173 R   250 R  
TIlancingo  -   104 R   258 R  
CUAUTLA             6,769            10,468            18,066  
Amilcingo (Otilio Montaño)  68 P   155 P   228 P  
Calderón  49 CN   199 CN   324 CN  
Casasano  308 CN   385 CN   661 CN  
Cuautla Morelos  4,462 CD   6,555 CD   6,431 CD  
Cuautla Morelos  … E   -   -  
Cuautlixco  671 P   986 P   1,322 P  
Emiliano Zapata  -   -   3,228 CA  
Francisco I. Madero  -   -   834 CA  
Hospital, El  142 CN   254 CN   310 CN  
Morelos  -   -   1,220 CA  
Pablo Torres Burgos  -   -   240 CA  
Puxtla  -   91 CN   240 CN  
San José Ixcaptepec  217 RA   748 CN   -  
Santa Inés (Eusebio Jáuregui)  93 CN   125 CN   155 CN  
Tetelcingo  758 P   970 P   1,313 P  
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CUERNAVACA           12,893            15,102            25,666  
Acapantzingo 240 P 387 P  782 P  
Ahuatepec  285 P   371 P   540 P  
Alarcón  13 E   -   52 E  
Amatitlán  192 P   26 E   776 P  
Buenavista del Monte  -  D P  223 P  
Cantarranas  154 B   241 B   450 B  
Carolina  -   -   242 CO  
Centenario  -   -   754 CO  
Chamilpa  314 P   428 P   572 P  
Chapultepec  167 P   234 P   658 P  
Chipitlán  33 B   124 B   306 B  
Cuernavaca  7,117 CD   8,554 CD   14,336 CD  
Francisco Leyva  -   -   353 B  
Gualupita  510 B   692 B   -  
Jiquilpan  -  -  197 CO  
Lomas de la Selva  -   -   579 CO  
Ocotepec  511 P   808 P   1,006 P  
Pueblo Viejo  -   -   153 RA  
San Antón (El Salto)  138 P   211 P   544 P  
San Francisco (La Alameda)  224 B   395 B   753 B  
San Pablo (Las Huertas)  63  B   119 B   198 B  
Santa María Ahuacatitlán  436 P   471 P   856 P  
Santo Cristo  120 B   103 B   -  
Tetela del Monte  96 P   -   359 P  
Tlaltenango  236 P   260 P   818 P  
Vista Hermosa  -   -   9 CO  
EMILIANO ZAPATA  -   -              3,168  
Emiliano Zapata  861 P   1,332 P   1,630 P  
Tepetzingo  126 RA   298 RA   581 RA  
Tetecalita - 209 P  310 P  
Tezoyuca  123 RA   229 P   647 P  
HUITZILAC  -              2,085              2,354  
Coajomulco  207 P   289 P   426 P  
Fierro del Toro  106 E   172 P   79 P  
Huitzilac  479 P   1,007 P   797 P  
Mancillo  -   -   D R  
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Tres Marías (Tres Cumbres)  570 E   617 P   1,052 P  
JANTETELCO             2,672              2,915              3,079  
Amayuca  1,173 P   1,235 P   1,321 P  
Chalcatzingo  251 P   331 P   420 P  
Jantetelco  981 V   1,033 V   1,021 V  
Tenango  267 H   316 H   317 H  
JIUTEPEC             1,961              3,226              2,353  
Atlacomulco  149 P   220 P   370 P  
Calera, La  -   D CU   95 CU  
Cerrado, El  -   D R   -  
José G. Parres  -   -   82 CA  
Jiutepec  407 V   671 V   880 V  
Mango, El  -   17 E   D E  
Progreso, El  -   -   410 CO  
San Gaspar (Cliserio Alanís)  -   185 CN   130 CN  
Soledad, La  -   D H   -  
Soldead, La  -   8 CM   11 CM  
Tejalpa  236 P   227 P   386 P  
JOJUTLA             5,173              6,422              9,200  
Chisco  165 CN   99 CU   235 CU  
Emiliano Zapata  -   -   699 B  
Higuerón, El  532 CN   594 CN   778 CN  
Jicarero, El  25 CU   121 R   212 RA  
Jojutla  2,984 CD   3,348 CD   4,451 CD  
Jojutla  … E   -   -  
Panchimalco  346 P   652 P   818 P  
Río Seco  81 CN   98 CN   141 CN  
San Rafael Chisco (Vicente Aranda)   -   122 CN   146 N  
Tehuixtla  614 P   717 P   670 P  
Tequesquitengo  105 CU   141 P   260 P  
Tlatenchi  321 P   301 P   526 P  
JONACATEPEC             3,725              3,566              3,814  
Amacuitlapilco  353 P   401 P   408 P  
Jonacatepec  2,190 CD   1,963 CD   2,152 CD  
Santa Clara Montefalco  92 H   36 H   13 H  
Tetelilla  744 P   834 P   922 P  
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Tlayca  346 CN   332 CN   319 CN  
MAZATEPEC             1,113              1,213              2,239  
Campo Alegre  -   D R   114 R  
Cañon, El  -   -   64 R  
Joyas, Las  -   -   D R  
Mazatepec  1,113 CD   1,213 CD   1,454 CD  
Pastora, La  -   -   D R  
San Marcos Cuauchichinola  252 P   102 P   450 P  
Santa Ana Cuauchichinola  -   D H   10 H  
Santa Cruz Vista Alegre  51 H   61 H   147 H  
MIACATLÁN             4,388              5,272              6,393  
Coatetelco  1,545 P   2,164 P   2,857 P  
Miacatlán  1,529 V   2,243 V   2,439 V  
Palo Grande  22 VE   39 RA   -  
Palpan  1,253 P   789 P   -  
Rincón, El  -   -   9 R  
Santa Rosa (La Mina)  -   37 M   37 M  
Tlajotla  39 RA   D RA   59 RA  
Vuelta del Monte  -   -   41 RA  
OCUITUCO             7,045              8,225              4,870  
Huecahuasco  276 P   308 P   360 P  
Huejotengo  161 P   168 P   186 P  
Huepalcalco  -   -   275 P  
Jumiltepec  886 P   1,048 P   1,204 P  
Metepec  539 P   563 P   661 P  
Ocoxaltepec  332 P   369 P   198 P  
Ocuituco  1,039 P   1,186 P   -  
San Miguel Huepalcalco  263 P   268 P   -  
PUENTE DE IXTLA             4,703              6,958              8,578  
Ahuehuetzingo  178 P   264 P   345 P  
Algodones, Los  38 CU   23 CU   -  
Coco, El  109 CU   115 CU   65 CU  
Estudiante, El  72 CU   87 CU   117 CU  
Fundición, La  -   4 CU   -  
Plutarco Elías Calles  -   -   814 B  
Puente de Ixtla  1,916 V   2,545 V   2,470 V  
 246 
Puente de Ixtla  … E   -   -  
San José Vista Hermosa  394 CN   390 CN   455 CN  
Tigre, La  -   61 R   247 R  
Tilzapotla  … R   980 P   984 P  
Xoxocotla  1,996  P   2,489 P   3,081 P  
TEMIXCO  -   -              3,420  
Acatlipa  -  98 RA  713 RA  
Cuentepec  639 P   625 P   894 P  
Pueblo Nuevo del Puente  -   -   112 EJ  
Temixco  263 CN   941 CN   1,437 P  
Tetlama  137 P   194 P   264 P  
TEPALCINGO             5,253              5,313              6,287  
Atotonilco  466 P   516 P   616 P  
Huitchila  -   418 R   475 R  
Huitchila  -   25 E   -  
Huitzililla  129 CN   -   -  
Ixtlilco  244 R   304 R   361 R  
Limón, El  36 R   61 R   121 R  
Matarratón  35 R   D R   -  
Pastor  -   D E   29 E  
Pitzotlán  106 R   139 R   153 R  
Pochote de Mayo  77 R   44 R   -  
San Miguel Ixtlilco  665 P   761 P   861 P  
Sauces, Los  81 R   76 R   81 R  
Tepalcingo  3,250 V   2,732 V   3,076 V  
Tepehuaje, El  -   30 R   60 R  
Zacapalco  164 R   232 R   429 R  
TEPOZTLÁN             3,836              4,714              6,034  
Amatlán  100 P   115 P   162 P  
Ixcatepec  66 P   86 P   111 P  
Parque, El  41 E   60 E   64 E  
San Andrés de la Cal (La Calera)  183 P   205 P   317 P  
San Juan Tlacotenco  300 P   402 P   499 P  
Santa Catarina Zacatepec (Gabriel 
Mariaca)  567 P   767 P   991 P  
Santiago Tepetlapa  149 P   153 P   449 P  
Santo Domingo Ocotitlán  274 P   346 P   444 P  
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Tepoztlán  2,156 CD   2,580 V   3,230 V  
TETECALA             2,178              2,579              2,756  
Contlalco  -   R 62   162 R  
Charco, El  -   D H   -  
Francisco Sarabia  -   -   140 RA  
Joyas, Las  -   D R   39 R  
Pastora, La  -   D R   -  
San Ignacio Acotpan  134 H   194 CN   225 CN  
San Miguel Cuautla  135 P   236 P   -  
Tetecala  1,106 CD   1,924 CD   1,892 CD  
TETELA DEL VOLCÁN  -   -              4,784  
Hueyapan  1,855 P   2,193 P   2,408 P  
Tlalmimilulpan  325 P   377 P   432 P  
Tetela del Volcán  1,261 P   1,582 P   1,770 P  
Xochicalco  135 P   163 P   174 P  
TLALNEPANTLA               809                 989              1,418  
Coatepec  12 V   17 V   189 V  
Kilómetro 28  -   D CA   -  
Nepanapa  -   D R   -  
Órganos, Los  -   D R   -  
Tlalnepantla Cuautenco  797 CD   972 CD   1,024 CD  
Veinte de Noviembre  -   -   4 CO  
Vegía, El  -   -   201 P  
TLALTIZAPÁN             3,390              4,404              7,675  
Acamilpa  246 CN   298 CN   502 CN  
Amador Salazar  -   -   313 CN  
Barranca Honda  -   402 P  
Bonifacio García  -   111 P   533 P  
Copales, Los  79 R   67 R   129 R  
Estacas, Las  D R   -  
Huatecalco  271 P   302 P   408 P  
Jilguero  -   35 R   -  
Porfirio Díaz  111 CO   -   -  
Presa, La  -   D R   -  
Pueblo Nuevo  180 P   193 P   322 P  
San Miguel Treinta (Amador Salazar)  102 P   170 CN   779 CN  
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San Pablo Hidalgo  119 CO   209 CN   158 CN  
San Rafael Zaragoza  132 CN   55 CN   165 CN  
Sauces, Los  -   D R   -  
Temilpa  73 CN   83 CN   299 CN  
Temimilcingo  312 P   275 P   506 P  
Ticumán  515 P   574 P   1,193 P  
Tlaltizapán  … E   -   -  
Tlaltizapán  798 V   1,433 V   1,966 V  
Santa Rosa Treinta  452 CN   10 H   -  
Xochimancas  D H   -  
San Rafael Zaragoza  132 CN   -   165 CN  
TLAQUILTENANGO             4,100              7,474              5,685  
Ajuchitlán  86 CU   9 CU   114 CU  
Calabazal  -   92 R   49 R  
Chimalacatlán  35 R   139 R   230 R  
Cuaxintlán  -   392 RA   267 RA  
Elotes, Los  -   34 P   36 R  
Era, La  -   84 R   94 R  
Hornos, Los (Valle de Vázquez)  189 R   339 R   464 CN  
Huautla  302 P   1,156 P   549 P  
Huaxtla  54 R   74 R   24 R  
Huixastla  -   -   52 R  
Lorenzo Vázquez  -     277 RA  
Mezquitera  -   85 R                  47  
Nexpa  178 R   216 R   178 R  
Quilamula  68 R   216 CN   113 CN  
Rancho Viejo  19 R   57 R   65 R  
San José de Pala  -   118 R   138 R  
Santa Cruz  -   203 RA   -  
Santiopa  47 R   29 R   72 R  
Tlaquiltenango  1,731 V   2,219 V   2,518 V  
Tlaquiltenango  … E   -   -  
Xicatlacotla  151 CN   284 CN   335 CN  
Xochipala  107 CU   99 CU   63 CU  
TLAYACAPAN             3,157              4,000              2,421  
San Agustín Amatlipac  81 P   108 P   133 P  
San Andrés Cuauhtempan  165 P   227 P   279 P  
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San José de los Laureles  154 P   216 P   266 P  
Tlayacapan  1,154 V   1,567 V   1,743 V  
TOTOLAPAN             1,362              1,896              1,703  
Ahuatlán Asunción  77 P  78 P  101 P  
Cascada, La  13 E   9 E   5 E  
Nepopualco  238 P   308 P   353 P  
Nicolás Zapata  -   -   23 CO  
Retorta, La  -   D E   -  
San José Buenavista  -   7 H   -  
San Miguel Ahuatlán (El Fuerte)  40 P   53 P   60 P  
San Nicolás del Monte (El Vegia)  110 P   159 P   -  
San Sebastián (La Cañada)  42 P   65 P   58 P  
Tepetlixpita  65 P   66 P   104 P  
Totolapan  777 P   1,151 P   999 P  
XOCHITEPEC             3,693              4,096              4,364  
Alpuyeca  838 P   968 P   1,357 P  
Atlacholoaya  421 P   401 P   619 P  
Chiconcuac  200 CN   330 CN   410 CN  
Jumiltepec   21 CM   -   -  
Puente, El  307 RA   260 R   446 RA  
Santiago Orozco  27 CA   -   -  
Xochitepec  1,103 V   1,291 V   1,532 V  
YAUTEPEC             3,553              6,327              8,887  
Atlihuayan   3 P   -   -  
Caracol  -   -   103 R  
Cocoyoc  382 P   597 P   668 P  
Itzamatitlán  168 P   220 P   221 P  
Napolera, La  -   -   271 P  
Oacalco  193 P   588 P   1,146 P  
Oaxtepec  168 V   250 V   584 V  
Ricardo Flores Magón  -   -   160 CA  
San Carlos (Los Arcos)  34 P   252 P   411 P  
Santa Catarina Tlayca (Ignacio Bastida)  68 P   105 P   128 P  
Vicente Estrada Cajigal  -   -   657 CA  
Yautepec  2,537 CD   4,315 CD   4,358 CD  
Yautepec  … E   -   -  
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YECAPIXTLA             4,293              5,110              5,890  
Achichipico  527 P   713 P   748 P  
Aquiles Serdán  -   -   95 CA  
Huesca, La  99 R   127 P   229 P  
Limones, Los  105 R   76 R   97 R  
Mexquemeca  206 P   243 P   268 P  
Pazulco  26 P   53  P   70 P  
Reyes, Los  198 P   209 P   223 P  
Tecajec  149 P   170 P   207 P  
Texcala  239 P   326 P   391 P  
Tlalmomulco  47 P   59 P   76 P  
Xochitlán  590 P   669 P   808 P  
Yecapixtla  1,779 V   2,113 V   2,205 V  
Yecapixtla  8 E   -   35 E  
Zahuatlán  320 P   352 P   438 P  
ZACATEPEC  -   -              3,254  
Galeana  408 CN   483 CN   628 CN  
Tetelpa  448 P   604 P   709 P  
Zacatepec  277 P   590 P   1,917 P  
ZACUALPAN             4,796              5,237              5,886  
Amilcingo  608 P   641 P   696 P  
Huazulco  608 P   931 P   1,015 P  
Popotlán  284 P   302 P   344 P  
San Martín Temoac  1,178 P   1,360 P   1,563 P  
Tlacotepec  772 P   885 P              1,055  
Zacualpan de Amilpas  999 P   1,118 P   1,213 P  
TOTAL 103,440 132,068 182,711 
- Locality does not appear in the source 
… Locality appears in the source but not population number 
B Barrio 
CD Ciudad 
CO Colonia 
CA Colonia Agrícola 
CM Campamento 
CN Congregación 
D Deshabitado 
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E Estación 
EJ Ejido 
H Hacienda 
M Mina 
P Pueblo 
R Rancho 
RA Ranchería 
V Villa 
VE Venta 
Localities in parenthesis indicate the official secularized name in the 1930s. 
Sources:  Censo general de habitantes, Años 1921, 1930, 1940 (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la 
Nación). 
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